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[In] the study of society exclusive concentration on a speciality has a peculiarly 
baneful effect: it will not merely prevent us from being attractive company or 
good citizens but may impair our competence in our proper field – or at least 
for some of the most important tasks we have to perform. The physicist who is 
only a physicist can still be a first-class physicist and a most valuable member 
of society. But nobody can be a great economist who is only an economist – 
and I am even tempted to add that the economist who is only an economist is 
likely to become a nuisance if not a positive danger.  
 
Hayek, FA 1967, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, p. 123.  
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ABSTRACT 
Innovation is essential to the continual improvement of public sector services. 
Research on public sector innovation is important due to the size, scope, and 
complexity of public sector service delivery. The underlying assumption of the public 
sector innovation literature is that the public sector suffers from a lack of innovation. 
The standard explanation tends to focus on the management and culture that is 
typical of public sector bodies. From that basis, scholars have sought to foster public 
sector innovation by proposing the adoption of practices from the more innovative 
private sector. The impact of regulation on public sector innovation remains unclear 
within the existing theoretical framework, and that relationship has not been 
systematically examined. The lack of attention given to legislative and regulatory 
structures within public sector innovation research is a significant omission because 
any provision of public sector services is a deliberative decision by government 
guided by the political process rather than the market. This thesis makes a significant 
contribution to the economics of public sector innovation, developing a theoretical 
approach based on new comparative economics and evolutionary economics to 
examine regulatory constraints on public sector services, furthered by insight gained 
from case studies and legislative analysis of government schools, independent public 
schools, charter schools, and voucher programs.   
This thesis develops two central claims. First, in any area of public sector service 
provision, a diversity of institutional possibilities for service delivery can be observed. 
This thesis draws on the new comparative economics framework (Djankov et. al 2003; 
Shleifer 2005) and extends its theoretical application to a public sector context. 
Second, each institutional possibility – embedded in its own legislative and regulatory 
frameworks – will have distinct constraints of the dynamism of how public sector 
services are first adopted, transformed, and ultimately come to an end. As this 
suggests, it is possible to identify mechanisms of creation and destruction by 
examining legislative and regulatory provisions. This approach draws on evolutionary 
economics and the Schumpeterian conceptualization of innovation as a dynamic 
process known as “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1942) and uses this insight a 
conceptual lens for legislative and regulatory analysis.  
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Public school education provides an exemplar for examining legislative and regulatory 
frameworks governing public sector service delivery. There is no single method of the 
provision of school education. Instead, as this thesis shows, there is a spectrum of 
institutional forms that have emerged which seek to fulfill the aims of the public 
provision of school education. The institutional theory of regulation, drawn from new 
comparative economics, posits that society faces a trade-off between the perceived 
costs of private disorder and the perceived costs of government dictatorship. 
Institutional possibilities emerge to economize these competing risks. This thesis 
employs the Institutional Possibilities Frontier, associated with new comparative 
economics, as a tool to compare and contrast four examples of institutional 
possibilities – government schools and Independent Public Schools in Australia, and 
the American school choice programs of charter schools and voucher programs.  
The new comparative approach to public sector innovation characterizes regulatory 
constraints as costs of dictatorship. In the school education service delivery context, 
the centralized regulation of public services – expressed in legislation and regulatory 
frameworks – attempts to control various perceived risks of disorder, including 
problems of duplication, positive externalities, information asymmetries, parental 
failure, and societal dysfunction. However, amongst other costs, the consequence of 
centralized control of service delivery is that local autonomy, professional discretion, 
and dynamism, in how schools are established and closed, are necessarily 
constrained. The new comparative approach predicts that decentralized institutional 
arrangements will be more favorable to innovation as compared to centralized 
institutional possibilities, as more dynamic and evolutionary mechanisms of creation 
and destruction will be embedded in the legislative and regulatory framework 
governing service delivery. This thesis provides empirical support for this theoretical 
prediction – demonstrating that there is a correlation between regulatory structures 
and dynamism in a public sector context and affirming the new comparative 
approach’s explanatory power.   
This thesis makes four contributions. First, the new comparative approach to public 
sector innovation that is developed provides a novel theoretical explanation for the 
lack of public sector innovation framed around regulatory constraints. Second, a 
unique method of analyzing regulatory constraints is advanced, which contributes to 
13 
 
the literatures of new comparative economics, evolutionary economics, and public 
sector innovation, in conversation with the literature of school choice and school 
autonomy. Third, several empirical findings are presented through case studies and 
legislative analysis of public school education in the government, independent public 
school, charter school, and voucher program institutional contexts. Fourth, a number 
of insights are offered towards developing evolutionary public policy and greater 
dynamism in public sector service provision. Together, these contributions open up 
new avenues for research and chart a new agenda for public sector innovation based 
on regulatory and comparative institutional analysis.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction    
1.1 Introduction     
There is a long history of research on the economics of innovation, and the 
importance of innovation to economic development (e.g., Schumpeter 1934; 1942; 
Solow 1957; Pavitt 1984; Romer 1990; Porter 1990; Baumol 2002; North 2005; Dopfer 
and Potts 2008). Scholars have long grappled with how innovative practices are 
adopted and diffused to create value in a public sector context (e.g., Walker 1969; 
Rogers 1995) and there has been a renewed focus on public sector innovation in 
recent years (e.g., Potts 2010; Potts and Kastelle 2010; Bloch and Bugge 2013, 2016; 
Mazzucato 2013; Mulgan 2014; De Vries, Tummers and Bekkers 2016, 2018a, 
2018b; Demircioglu 2017; Torfing 2016; 2019; Arundel, Bloch, and Ferguson 2019; 
Cinar, Trott, and Simms 2019). However, the effect of regulation on public sector 
innovation has not been examined systematically – notwithstanding that there is a 
significant amount of regulation inside government (Hood et al. 1998; 1999; Hood, 
James, and Scott 2000).  
The lack of focus on legislative and regulatory structures within public sector 
innovation research is curious because any provision of public sector services is a 
deliberative decision by government guided by the political process rather than the 
market (e.g., Downs 1957; Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Any government 
intervention of this kind necessarily requires a legislative and regulatory framework. 
In this way, regulation facilitates public service delivery at scale. As Joseph 
Schumpeter (1942, p. 184) wrote, ‘… bureaucracy is not an obstacle to democracy 
but an inevitable complement to it.’ However, there is no single way to legislate and 
regulate the provision of public sector services.  
This thesis develops two central claims. First, in any area of public sector service 
provision, a diversity of institutional possibilities for service delivery can be observed. 
This thesis draws on the new comparative economics framework (Djankov et al. 2003; 
Shleifer 2005) and extends its theoretical application to a public sector context. 
Second, each institutional possibility – embedded in legislative and regulatory 
structures – will have distinct constraints of how the dynamism of how public sector 
services are first adopted, transformed, and ultimately come to an end. This approach 
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draws on the Schumpeterian conceptualization of innovation as a dynamic process 
known as “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1942) as a tool for legislative and 
regulatory analysis. Therefore, the overarching contribution of this thesis is to provide 
a detailed examination of the regulatory constraints on the dynamism of public sector 
innovation.  
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the rationale, approach, structure, and 
contributions of the thesis. Accordingly, the remainder of this introductory chapter will 
be presented in the following way. Section two will discuss the importance of public 
sector innovation research and consider the broader policy context for the study. 
Section three explains that this thesis will be confined to one type of public sector 
service (public education) through a series of case studies (government schools, 
independent public schools, and school choice programs) examining regulatory 
constraints and showing the diversity of institutional possibilities. Section four will 
detail the research questions and outline how the thesis will address those questions. 
Section five will summarize the contributions of the thesis. Section six gives a 
disclaimer on the boundaries of the thesis. Section seven will conclude this 
introductory chapter. 
1.2 The importance of public sector innovation research    
Research on public sector innovation is important. One reason for this is that the size 
of the public sector means that there is considerable scope for innovation to drive 
improvements in service delivery (Potts and Kastelle 2010; Arundel and Huber 2013). 
In Australia, a significant amount of taxpayer funding is directed towards delivering 
public sector services. It is significant in terms of the total budget allocated to providing 
these services and as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For instance, 
data from the recent Productivity Commission Report (2019) on Government Services 
outlines the scale of government spending in Australia. For that report, public services 
encompassed childcare, education and training, justice, emergency management, 
health, community services, and housing and homelessness services. The report 
estimated that federal, state and territory governments spend a combined annual total 
of $235 billion on public services (Productivity Commission 2019). This level of 
expenditure each year is equivalent to approximately 14 percent of Australia’s GDP 
(Productivity Commission 2019). Access to these services is relied on by millions of 
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Australians – and improvements in the delivery of these services through innovation 
will improve living standards. Additionally, productivity and efficiency gains through 
innovation mean that improvements in service delivery can be achieved without the 
public sector becoming an increasing drag on economic activity (Moran 2010; 
Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle 2015). This is particularly true in the current Australian 
political context where federal, state and territory governments are under pressure to 
exercise fiscal restraint to return budgets to balance following the Global Financial 
Crisis (Axelson, Netz and Sandstrom 2017; Bloch and Bugge 2016; Torfing 2019).  
The complexity of public sector services creates unique challenges for service 
delivery that demand innovative solutions (Demircioglu 2017; De Vries, Tummers and 
Bekkers 2018a). Accordingly, the study of public sector innovation is essential to 
foster continual improvement in the efficiency and quality of public services (Borins 
2001; Albury 2005; Walker 2007; Osborne and Brown 2013; Torugsa and Arundel 
2016), as well as create flexibility and responsiveness to meet citizens’ high 
expectations of these services (Demircioglu 2017; Gasco-Hernandez, Sandoval-
Almazan, and Gil-Garcia 2017). Further, it is recognized that public services, such as 
educational institutions, make up part of a “National System of Innovation” being ‘the 
network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies’ (Freeman 1987, 
cited in Autio 1998, p. 132). Rigidity in the public sector, therefore, will constrain 
dynamism in the private sector innovation (e.g., Murmann 2003). The complexity of 
public sector innovation is amplified by the fact that “National Systems of Innovation” 
also evolve (Kastelle, Potts, and Dodgson 2014).  
The broader policy context of public sector innovation research is that executive 
governments have been advocating innovation as a solution to improve the quality of 
the public services that they provide (Mergel and Dezousa 2013; Taylor 2016; 
Demircioglu 2017). In the Australian context, Demircioglu (2017, p. 8) observes that 
‘Australian public management reforms and public sector innovation have been 
pursued very seriously in Australia since the 1980s.’ Two recent examples appear to 
continue in this direction. First, in March 2014, the Australian government 
commissioned a ”root and branch” review (known as the “Harper Competition 
Review”) of Australia's competition laws and competition policy (Bilson 2014). The 
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panel’s final report recommended, amongst other matters, that one way of promoting 
innovative service delivery in human services is to promote user choice and 
encourage a diversity of service providers – rather than a single government 
monopoly, a system where the government is the sole funder, provider, and regulator. 
Yet there was little detail about how this is to be achieved, in either in the panel’s final 
report (Harper et al. 2015) or the Commonwealth government’s response adopting 
this proposal (Treasury 2015). Second, in December 2015, the Australian 
Commonwealth government published its National Innovation and Science Agenda 
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2015). The policy document lists one 
of the four pillars as ‘Government as an exemplar’ (Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet 2015). However, there is scant detail in that document how the 
government will provide this example and overcome any current barriers – although 
one government minister subsequently advocated greater use of digital technology 
for the public sector (Taylor 2016). Accordingly, within this policy context, there is a 
significant opportunity for academic research to have an impact in providing 
theoretical and empirical support to efforts that promote innovation in a public sector 
context.   
How has the public sector innovation research literature approached understanding 
how to improve innovation in the public sector context? The extant public sector 
innovation literature is highly fragmented (De Vries, Tummers and Bekkers 2016) and 
comprises of several sub-fields including, but not limited to, e-government, public 
management, and public policy (De Vries, Tummers and Bekkers 2018a). The public 
sector innovation literature does not present a unified theory of why public sector 
innovation occurs. Most of the literature does not empirically test whether there is a 
lack of innovation in the public sector as compared to the private sector (De Vries, 
Tummers and Bekkers 2016). Instead, there is a widely held assumption that there 
is. Indeed, there is a common perception that public sector innovation is an oxymoron 
(Bommert 2010; Torfing 2019; Vigoda-Gadot et al. 2005). However, the predominant 
problem that the conceptual literature seeks to address is “why is there a lack of 
innovation in the public sector?” (Potts and Kastelle 2010). Nevertheless, as Sanford 
Borins (2014, p. 1) observes, ‘innovation in government persists’; and innovators can 
be found in all levels of government. Indeed, Mariana Mazzucato (2013) has ventured 
that the public sector is inherently entrepreneurial in financing high-risk projects (c.f., 
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Potts 2015). As such, recent empirical efforts have sought to counter the general 
negative perception by showing that the public sector does, in fact, innovate (e.g., 
Arundel and Huber 2013; Bloch and Bugge 2013; 2016; Bernier, Hafsi and 
Deschamps 2015, Torugsa and Arundel 2015; Pandey, Pandey and Miller 2017; 
Demircioglu and Audretsch 2017; 2019; Ramli et al. 2017).  
As for the connection between regulation and public sector innovation, “red tape” has 
been noted as a barrier to public sector innovation (e.g., Vigoda-Gadot et al. 2005) 
and surveys have asked about the impact of innovation as part of more extensive 
studies (e.g., Bloch and Bugge 2013; 2016). However, there remains a dearth of 
research on public sector regulation (e.g., Cope and Goodship 1999; Cope, 
Goodship, and Holloway 2003) and specifically on the connection between public 
sector innovation regulation and public sector regulation (e.g., Wagner and Fain 
2018). A novel and systematic approach is needed for gaining new insights that 
address the overarching public sector innovation problem.  
1.3 Approach  
This thesis aims to develop a new comparative approach to the study of public sector 
innovation by examining legislative and regulatory frameworks in a public sector 
context. The novelty of this approach is exemplified in providing a systematic and 
detailed account of regulation in the public sector. However, given the sheer breadth 
of public sector services, a specific area of focus is needed. This thesis will 
concentrate on public school education as an example of a public sector service to 
build a series of case studies.   
School education provides an exemplar as a significant component of the public 
sector, currently accounting for over a quarter of total Australian government 
expenditure on public services. The most recent data shows that recurrent funding 
from federal, state and territory governments combined to $57.8 billion in 2016-2017 
– a real increase of $12.2 billion equating to a 26.75 percent increase from $45.6 
billion spent in 2006-2007 (Productivity Commission 2019). Recent inquiries 
commissioned by the Federal government have focussed on reviewing funding 
models so that expenditure on school education is carried out transparently and 
equitably, and in a way that improves student outcomes (Gonksi et al. 2011; Gonski 
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et al. 2018). Although this might have been a worthy task, at the same time as 
Australian governments have significantly increased school funding, Australian 
students’ performance has fallen compared to other Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations in scientific literacy, mathematical 
literacy, and reading literacy (e.g. Thomson, De Bortoli, and Underwood 2017). This 
suggests that there may be deeper structural issues affecting productivity, efficiency, 
and performance in public school education services – and a focus on innovation is 
an important task.  
There is no single method of the provision of school education. In Australia, the school 
education landscape is typically characterized as simply government schools versus 
the funding of private schools (e.g., Bonnor and Caro 2007). Donnelly (2015) 
proposes that Australia has a tripartite system consisting of government schools, 
independent public schools, and private schools. In this thesis, I will extend this list 
by analyzing two other institutional possibilities from the United States of America 
(charter schools and voucher programs). Separately, these institutional possibilities 
provide individual case studies for gaining insight and building theory for public sector 
innovation more broadly (e.g., Flyvjerg 2006; Yin 2018). Together, these institutional 
possibilities evidence that there is a spectrum of institutional forms that have emerged 
which seek to fulfill the aims of the public provision of education (e.g., Djankov et al. 
2003).  
School education services also provide a useful context for exploring the connection 
between regulation and public sector innovation within Australia because there has 
been a trend towards state governments giving government schools greater 
autonomy (e.g., Victoria in 1993, Western Australia in 2009, Queensland in 2013, 
Northern Territory in 2015). A key claim from proponents of decentralized service 
models is that schools will be incentivized to be more innovative if they are given more 
autonomy (Chubb and Moe 1990; Wohlstetter, Wenning, and Briggs 1995; Lubienski 
2003a; Preston et al. 2012). Therefore, these case studies will draw on the sector-
specific literatures of school autonomy and school choice. For example, the American 
literature on  school choice (e.g., Lubienski 2003a; Bulkley and Fisler 2003; Lake 
2008; Preston et al. 2012) and the more recent Australian Independent Public Schools 
literature (e.g., Gobby, Keddie, and Blackmore 2018; Keddie, Gobby, and Wilkins 
25 
 
2018; Holloway and Keddie 2018) consider innovation and innovative practices within 
these public sector contexts.   
The analysis of legislative and regulatory frameworks governing school education 
requires a theoretical framework. As alluded to, this thesis will approach the public 
sector innovation problem from an institutional perspective. Specifically, I will use the 
Institutional Possibilities Frontier (IPF) developed out of the new comparative 
economics (e.g., Djankov et al. 2003; Shleifer 2005). This framework posits that 
society faces a trade-off between two types of perceived social costs – disorder and 
dictatorship. Institutional responses economize on these costs in different ways. The 
IPF framework facilitates a critical comparative analysis between one institutional 
possibility and another. The IPF, combined with the underlying institutional theory of 
regulation (Shleifer 2005; Davidson 2010; 2013) provides further explanatory power 
by enabling a critical evaluation of the purpose behind regulatory features of an 
institutional possibility. This thesis will present an original application of the IPF 
framework showing that there is an inherent trade-off between centralized 
government control in the delivery of public services and public sector innovation. 
There is no universal definition of innovation within the public sector innovation 
literature (De Vries, Tummers and Bekkers 2016). I will approach this research using 
the Schumpeterian conception of innovation as the dynamic process of “creative 
destruction” (Schumpeter 1942). This Schumpeterian approach has been adopted by 
researchers in the public sector innovation context (Windrum and Garcia-Goni 2008; 
Potts 2009; 2010; Potts and Kastelle 2010; Mazzucato 2013; Stewart-Weeks and 
Kastelle 2015) along with others in a regulatory context (Bauer 1997; Yandle 2002; 
Diamond 2014).  
1.4 Research questions and outline  
The research questions for this thesis are as follows:  
• Question one – what is a new comparative approach to public sector innovation?  
• Question two – how can mechanisms of the creation and destruction phases of 
innovation be observed within public sector services?  
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• Question three – what are some examples of the institutional possibilities that can 
be observed for the provision of public school education services, and what are 
the key legislative or regulatory characteristics of these possibilities? 
• Question four – does the potential for the dynamism of innovation change if 
regulatory constraints change? 
• Question five – given the new comparative approach that has been developed, 
and the research findings, what are the implications for future research exploring 
the relationship between regulation and public sector innovation? 
This thesis will develop answers to these research questions in three parts. In the first 
part of this thesis, I will develop the theoretical and methodological framework by 
providing a critical synthesis and evaluation of the public sector innovation literature 
through the prism of “creation” and “destruction” (Chapter 2) and applying the IPF 
framework and institutional theory of regulation to the public school education context 
(Chapter 3). In the second part of this thesis, I will examine centralized government 
schools (Chapter 4), Independent Public Schools – focusing on Queensland (Chapter 
5), charter schools (Chapter 6), and publicly funded voucher programs (Chapter 6). 
Individually, each chapter in the second part of the thesis presents separate studies 
that make distinct contributions. Together, the individual chapters will provide 
evidence of the diversity of institutional possibilities for service delivery in a public 
sector context from which to draw insights for public sector innovation. In the third and 
final part of the thesis, the implications of the findings will be discussed (Chapter 7).     
1.5 Summary and findings  
 
1.5.1 Chapter two  
The purpose of chapter two is to develop the theoretical approach of the thesis 
through a critical synthesis and evaluation of the public sector innovation literature. I 
will begin this chapter by exploring how the terms “innovation” and “public sector” 
have been defined in the public sector innovation literature, and discuss how these 
definitions inform the scope of my inquiry (Section 2.2). I will then turn to examine the 
difficulties presented in measuring innovation (Section 2.3). Next, I will critically 
assess the public sector innovation literature through the prism of the Schumpeterian 
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concept of innovation, “creative destruction,” critiquing the extant research program 
(Section 2.4). In this exercise, I find that the theoretical understanding of the 
connection between regulation and public sector innovation is not clear and there 
remains a lack of focus on mechanisms of creation and destruction within a public 
sector context. Following this finding, I propose a new research agenda focused on 
institutional and regulatory structures governing public service delivery (Section 2.5). 
Overall, this chapter underscores that my theoretical approach on the constraints on 
public sector conceives innovation as an economic problem rather than as a 
management problem. 
1.5.2 Chapter three  
Chapter three further develops the theoretical and methodological approach of the 
thesis. The chapter begins by providing an overview of the rationale for the public 
provision of education services – using the example of school education (Section 3.2). 
Next, I will argue that public sector services are creatures of regulation (Section 3.3). 
That is, regulation is a way of legally enforcing the government’s spending and policy 
decisions. Following this, a critical synthesis of the economics of regulation will be 
presented (Section 3.4). The institutional theory of regulation (Shleifer 2005; 
Davidson 2010; 2013) posits that society faces a trade-off between the costs of 
private disorder and the costs of government dictatorship. Applying the institutional 
theory, I find that debates over the regulation of public school education services can 
be seen within this context. In this chapter, the IPF is introduced, along with a review 
of the relevant literature (Section 3.5) which will provide an organizing tool for 
comparative institutional analysis in the school education context (Section 3.6). 
Finally, I will apply new evolutionary economics (e.g., Witt 2003; Dopfer, Potts, and 
Foster 2004; Hanusch and Pyka 2007) in developing a Schumpeterian lens for 
legislative and regulatory analysis that will be used in the application chapters to 
follow (Section 3.7).  
1.5.3 Chapter four   
In chapter four, the application section of the thesis commences with a focus on the 
institutional possibility of centralized government schools. This chapter aims to 
discuss the key regulatory characteristics of government schools and to provide a 
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legislative analysis of one mechanism of destruction. In this task, two levels of 
analysis will be presented. 
First, a macro view of legislative frameworks will be presented to show the growth in 
regulatory complexity over time for New South Wales and Victoria. This part will begin 
by offering a historical account of public education in Australia (Section 4.2). I find that 
(i) publicly-funded denominational schools can be seen as an institutional response 
to the perception of high dictatorship costs, specifically in regards to the state 
imposing values on students; and (ii) government schools can be viewed as an 
institutional response to the perception of high disorder costs emanating from 
duplication, unequal access to services, sectarian and social divisiveness. These 
broad institutional structures have not substantially changed over the last century. 
Despite this, however, I will show that there has been a measurable increase in 
regulatory complexity over time. I will do this by analyzing the historical and current 
primary legislative provisions in New South Wales and Victoria (Section 4.3). I find 
that the overall historical trend is the same in both jurisdictions – an increase in 
regulatory complexity over time.  
The second level of analysis in the government school context is an analysis of the 
regulations governing school closure in Australia. In this part of the chapter, I will 
present a comparative analysis of the legislative provisions governing government 
schools in each Australian jurisdiction (Section 4.4). I find that ministerial discretion is 
the sole mechanism for school closure, despite some jurisdictional variations around 
how an education minister will exercise this discretion relating to notice, consultation, 
and reporting. I supplement this finding with a historical case study on Victoria’s 
“Schools of the Future” reform (Section 4.5). This case study highlights the practical 
difficulties of exercising ministerial power. This case study also shows that regulatory 
constraints on the exercise of ministerial power limit the perceived costs of disorder 
but have the effect of constraining the sole mechanism of destruction in the 
government school context.  
Overall, the contribution of chapter four is to provide the first attempt at quantifying 
the regulatory burden in the Australian government schooling sector and show how 
mechanisms for destruction can be identified in the public sector context. 
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1.5.4 Chapter five    
In chapter five the application section of the thesis continues with an analysis of a 
relatively recent institutional development in Australia – Independent Public Schools 
(IPS). Although sharing the same legislative characteristics to centralized 
government schools, I argue that greater school autonomy distinguishes 
independent public schools as a separate institutional possibility. This chapter will 
draw on the school autonomy literature (e.g., Chubb and Moe 1990; Caldwell and 
Hayward 1998) and uses Queensland’s Independent Public Schools program as a 
case study example of regulatory change (Sections 5.2 and 5.3). The Queensland 
IPS program commenced operation in 2013. Schools are accepted into the program 
through an expression of interest application. Application forms require individual 
schools to outline the “innovative educational programs or practices” the school will 
be able to implement if it is accepted as an IPS (“Innovation Question”). In this 
chapter, I will undertake a textual content analysis of the Innovation Question for a 
total of 127 successful applications in the 2013, 2014, and 2015 rounds using coding 
based on the Schumpeterian forms of innovation (new programs, new methods, new 
supply, new markets, and new organization) (Section 5.4). Overall, I find that the 
Queensland IPS initiative will likely foster innovation, according to principal’s 
perceptions about the innovative practices that they will be able to implement 
(Section 5.5). The contribution of this chapter is to show how government school 
principals perceive that the centralized service delivery model of government schools 
is constraining innovation in that setting. Finally, through a critical review and 
synthesis of the recent education research on the Western Australian and 
Queensland IPS programs, I show that my case study findings are consistent with 
the theory of school autonomy and discuss the implications of this for public sector 
innovation (Section 5.6). 
1.5.5 Chapter six     
Chapter six provides the final chapter in the application section of this thesis. In this 
chapter, the focus will turn to decentralized institutional possibilities that exist in the 
United States. Specifically, this chapter will offer a legislative analysis of charter 
schools and publicly-funded voucher programs.  
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Charter schools are publicly-funded schools that, in theory, operate with freedom from 
many of the regulations that apply to government run schools (Allen and Mintrom 
2010; Garda 2012). Voucher programs effectively outsource public education 
services to the private sector. These “school choice” programs co-exist in several 
American states. While structurally different, they have similar aims in that parents 
using the public education system are given a choice about where to educate their 
children – increasing dynamism in the way that services are established, operate, and 
come to an end. I will begin this chapter by drawing on the school choice literature 
(Section 6.2). Next, I will set out the legislative methodology using the example of 
Washington, D.C. to show how these theoretical institutional possibilities of charter 
schools and voucher programs are made concrete in legislation (Section 6.3). I will 
then undertake a Schumpeterian legislative analysis of charter school laws (Section 
6.4) and voucher program laws (Section 6.5), respectively, guided by the institutional 
theory of regulation.  
Through this legislative analysis, I find that charter schools provide for more dynamic 
delivery of public services, as compared to government schools, by facilitating the 
organic establishment of charter schools and the revocation of those charters where 
operators have breached the conditions. This finding gives support to the school 
choice research literature on charter schools and innovation (e.g., Lubienski 2003a; 
Bulkley and Fisler 2003; Lake 2008; c.f., Preston et al. 2012). Despite this, I show that 
charter schools are still subject to extensive regulatory constraints – mitigating the 
perceived costs of dictatorship associated with decentralized institutions. In regards 
to voucher programs, I find that voucher programs offer a more dynamic environment 
for service delivery, with fewer regulatory constraints, as compared with charter 
schools. This finding suggests an increased scope for innovative practices to be 
developed within private schools participating in voucher programs. There is support 
for this proposition regarding the knowledge and learning generated by evolutionary 
processes (Hayek 2002; Witt 2003) in addition to the recent school choice research 
showing that increasing regulatory constraints will limit the participation in voucher 
programs (DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf 2018; 2019). Overall, the contribution of this 
chapter confirms that barriers to creation and destruction in public sector services can 
be found by analysing the legislative structures governing service delivery – and this 
has implications for public sector innovation.  
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1.5.6 Chapter seven     
Chapter seven will provide the final part of the thesis. In this concluding chapter, I will 
draw together the findings and contributions shown throughout this thesis (section 
7.2). The significance and implications of a new comparative approach to public 
sector innovation will then be discussed, along with avenues for future research in the 
areas of regulatory reduction, choice and competition in public services, and the 
consequences of high dictatorship costs in service delivery (Section 7.3). I will then 
move to note the limitations of the research (7.4). Lastly, I will conclude the thesis 
(section 7.5).  
1.6 Boundaries of the thesis 
It is necessary to provide a disclaimer noting the boundaries of this thesis. In this 
thesis, I will use public schooling education services as an example of a public sector 
service. The application part of this thesis (chapters four, five, and six) will draw on 
the education policy literatures of school autonomy, charter schools, and voucher 
programs to inform the case studies in order to build theory and provide insight to 
public sector innovation more broadly. However, this thesis is about the trade-offs that 
are inherent within different legislative and regulatory frameworks – it is not about 
public education as such. Accordingly, this thesis will not provide a comparative 
analysis of academic or other educational outcomes, funding models, pedagogy, 
teaching practice, or other specialist education topics. While these are important 
areas of research, they are not relevant to my research questions. Instead, the thesis 
will provide a legislative analysis to further understand the dynamics of public sector 
innovation and the connection between regulation and innovation within the public 
sector context. 
Additionally, this thesis will examine five institutional possibilities (government 
schools, independent public schools, charter schools, voucher programs, and for-
profit schools). The case studies utilized for analysis are not intended to be exhaustive 
but instead build evidence for the proposition that there is a variety of institutional 
possibilities for the provision of the same public sector service. 
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Further, it is important to note that this thesis is not an exercise in advocacy for one 
form of institutional possibility against another. As will be developed in the first part of 
this thesis (chapters two and three), the desirability of one institutionally possibility 
over another is guided by the perception of comparative social costs – and there are 
trade-offs for policymakers to consider. Whether fostering innovation in this context is 
politically attractive is beyond the scope of this research. Instead, the aim of this thesis 
is to generate new knowledge about the relationship between regulation and public 
sector innovation by developing a theoretical framework and applying that to a 
number of contexts through legislative and regulatory analysis.   
1.7 Conclusion   
Public sector innovation is important for increasing the quality and efficiency of public 
sector services. I will approach public sector innovation as an economic problem 
framed as a function of institutional trade-offs, drawing on new comparative 
economics and a Schumpeterian perspective of innovation. My claim is that the way 
to stimulate public sector innovation is through comparatively better institutional 
frameworks rather than through better management practices or changing 
organizational culture. The background and outline provided in this chapter notes that 
this thesis will focus on one area of public sector services – school education – to 
build a series of case studies. The next chapter begins this exercise by reviewing the 
public sector innovation literature.   
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Chapter 2 – Public Sector Innovation: Towards a 
Regulatory Research Program  
2.1 Introduction 
Public sector innovation is important for a variety of reasons. These include the size 
and scope of the public sector (Potts and Kastelle 2010; Arundel and Huber 2013), 
the complex nature of public services (Demircioglu 2017; De Vries, Tummers and 
Bekkers 2018a), and the high expectations that consumers have about public sector 
service delivery (Demircioglu 2017; Gasco-Hernandez, Sandoval-Almazan and Gil-
Garcia 2017). However, there is a popular perception that a culture of bureaucracy in 
the public sector is pervasive (e.g., Bommert 2010; Torfing 2019; Vigoda-Gadot et al. 
2005). That is, public servants have a reputation for being too preoccupied with 
following a strict interpretation of the rules to worry about satisfying the consumers 
that rely on their services. As Ludwig von Mises (1944, p. 1) observed, ‘nobody calls 
himself a bureaucrat or his own methods of management bureaucratic.’ Rather these 
are pejorative terms, pointing criticism at those tasked with carrying out rigid policies 
and procedures – and at the system itself. Although nobody sets out to be an inflexible 
bureaucrat, there does seem to be a measure of truth in these stereotypes. There 
appears to be inbuilt incentives in the public sector that make service delivery tightly 
regulated and cause these constraints to grow in number and complexity over time. 
However, to date, there has been no systematic examination of the regulatory 
constraints on public sector innovation.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical review and synthesis of the public 
sector innovation literature through the Schumpeterian prism of “creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter 1942). While originally conceptualized to explain the dynamics of private 
sector activity, creative destruction can also be used as a lens to observe non-market 
production. Accordingly, this chapter contributes to a stream of research that seeks 
to apply the Schumpeterian conception of innovation to a public sector context (e.g., 
Windrum and Garcia-Goni 2008; Potts 2009; Potts 2010; Potts and Kastelle 2010; 
Mazzucato 2013; Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle 2015).  
34 
 
The remainder of the chapter will be set out as follows. In section 2, I will explore how 
the terms “innovation” and “public sector” have been defined in the public sector 
innovation literature, and discuss how these definitions have informed the scope of 
my inquiry. In section 3, I will examine the difficulties presented in measuring 
innovation. In section 4, I will critically assess the public sector innovation literature 
through the prism of the Schumpeterian concept of innovation, “creative destruction”, 
critiquing the extant research program. In section 5, I propose a new research agenda 
focused on institutional and regulatory structures governing public service delivery. 
Section 6 concludes the chapter.   
2.2 What is “innovation” in the “public sector”?  
This section of the chapter will consider efforts in the literature to define “innovation” 
and the “public sector”. This task is made difficult by the fact that there are no settled 
or uniform definitions. Many scholars appear to avoid this problem. The aim of this 
section, however, is not to build consensus or propose a new working definition, but 
rather gain insight into the competing perspectives and contributions to public sector 
innovation theory from those researchers that have offered definitions.  
First, let us consider the definition of innovation. As De Vries, Tummers and Bekkers 
(2016) note, the majority of public sector innovation research does not offer a 
definition. As a starting point, Moore, Sparrow and Spelman (1997), in writing about 
innovation in policing, set what the authors themselves describe as a low standard in 
defining innovation as ‘novelty’ combined with a ‘degree of change in relation to the 
organisation’ (cited in Bloch and Bugge 2013, p. 137). This is an inward-looking 
definition as novelty is not meant in comparison to other organizations, but the subject 
organization itself. This allows for incremental changes to be considered innovation. 
Similarly, Andersen and Jakobsen (2018) – borrowing their definition from 
Damanpour (1987) – define innovation as ‘the implementation of an idea— whether 
pertaining to a device, system, process, policy, program, or service—that is new to 
the organization at the time of adoption’ (p. 3).  In contrast, Torfing (2019, p. 1) states 
that ‘innovation is more than just the continuous improvement of existing practices 
and ideational mindsets. It involves a step change that problematizes and transforms 
the way that things are usually imagined and done.’  
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Mulgan (2007) utilizes an outward-facing definition, stating that innovation means 
‘new ideas that work at creating public value’ (Mulgan 2007). Here, innovation has 
three requirements. There must be a new idea, that idea must work and be capable 
of implementation, and the execution of that idea must create value. Variations on this 
three-part definition have been adopted by other scholars (e.g., Kastelle and Steen 
2011; Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle 2015).  
Another approach focusses on the systematic processes of innovation. Schumpeter 
describes innovation as the ‘perennial gale of creative destruction’ – a transformative 
process where economic development results from entrepreneurs employing new 
combinations of resources that blows through and displaces existing ways of doing 
things (1934; 1942, p. 73). Known as the “Schumpeterian definition” of innovation, 
this holds that ‘innovation refers not simply to something new, but rather to a micro 
and macro dynamic process by which agents,organizations, institutions and the 
macro structure of the economy are transformed by the effects of a novel idea, 
however embodied’ (Potts and Kastelle 2010, p. 123). There are various schools of 
thought within the broader innovation field that adopt a Schumpeterian approach 
(Tzeng 2009). On its face, the Schumpeterian definition conceptualizes innovation as 
market competition through consumer substitution – something that is mostly absent 
in public sector service provision (Potts and Kastelle 2010). Indeed, Schumpeter 
himself had a profound cynicism for bureaucratic management, writing that ‘often the 
machine gives little scope for initiative and much scope for vicious attempts at 
smothering it’ (2015 [1942], p. 184). Nevertheless, in more recent years, it has been 
argued that the Schumpeterian definition provides a solid platform for analysis for new 
directions in public sector innovation scholarship, as it focuses attention on the types 
of innovation identified by Schumpeter (Windrum and Garcia-Goni 2008) and the 
dynamic process of innovation (Potts 2009; Potts 2010; Potts and Kastelle 2010) that 
ultimately moves towards a more evolutionary economic policy (Witt 2003). Later in 
this chapter, I adopt a Schumpeterian approach to provide a critical summary and 
analysis of the current literature.  
Shockley et al. (2006) adds to the theory by proposing that ‘public sector 
entrepreneurship occurs whenever a political or governmental actor is alert to, and 
acts on, potential political profit opportunities, thus equilibrating the policy subsystem 
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in which the actor is embedded and moving it towards a new equilibrium’ (p. 218). 
This combines Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” with Kirzner’s “entrepreneurial 
alertness” (Kirzner 1973). The benefit of this definition is that it incorporates both 
micro and macro aspects of the innovation process – and Shockley et al. (2006) cite 
a body of research as authority for the proposition that the Kirznerian concept of 
entrepreneurship perfectly complements the Schumpeterian macro conception of 
innovation. However, it does not appear that this model has been adopted by 
subsequent public sector innovation research. This is perhaps because this definition 
of public sector entrepreneurship is broader in scope than public sector innovation. 
While Mazzucato (2013) also employs the “entrepreneurial” term in her work, The 
Entrepreneurial State, her central thesis does not relate to public sector innovation as 
such, but rather relates to the provision of government funding for innovation. 
Mazzucato (2013) argues that the government’s role extends beyond fixing market 
failures to actively funding high-risk scientific research and development – providing 
several examples including the technologies behind Apple’s iPhone and the “green” 
renewable energy industry. In a critical review, Potts (2015, p. 73) claims that 
Mazzucato ‘misunderstands entrepreneurship, which is not about technological 
boldness or discovery really at all, but about, literally, the market discovery of an 
entrepreneurial opportunity.’ The title of Potts’ (2015, p. 70) review article succinctly 
puts his case: ‘financing risky science does not make the State an entrepreneur.’ The 
caution is that, returning to the contribution of Shockley et al. (2006), the focus for 
public sector innovation is examining the political or governmental actors (i.e. 
individuals) and the mandates placed on them by legislative and regulatory 
frameworks – not on the state as a black box.    
There is an effort in the literature to develop typologies of public sector innovations, 
as both an exercise in taxonomy and as a framework for analysis. For example, 
Windrum (2008) breaks public sector innovation into six types; service innovation, 
service delivery innovation, administrative and organizational innovation, conceptual 
innovation, policy innovation, and systemic innovation. As Torugsa and Arundel 
(2015) observe, this has informed the development of public sector surveys.  
Similarly, in their meta-synthesis on diffusion and adoption, De Vries, Tummers and 
Bekkers (2018a) note four distinct categories in public sector innovation research; 
process innovations (whether administrative or technological), product and service 
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innovations, governance innovations, and conceptual innovations. These efforts are 
useful because some studies examine only one specific type of innovation (as a 
recent example, Andersen and Jakobsen (2018) focus exclusively on organizational 
innovations). By contrast, Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle (2015) construct a framework 
by adopting Schumpeter’s five forms of innovation (i.e. new products, new methods 
of production, new sources of supply, the exploitation of new markets and new ways 
to organise business) and contend that there are many occurrences of public sector 
service innovation in each of those categories. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I will employ 
an adaption of these five forms as a framework for analysing Queensland’s 
Independent Public Schools program.   
Implicit in much of the public sector innovation literature is that innovation is a “good 
thing”. Innovation is a worthwhile process that adds value. Individuals, firms, and 
governments all aspire to be innovative. As I have mentioned, Australia has a national 
innovation agenda which states that ‘Innovation is critical to improving Australia’s 
competitiveness, the standard of living, high wages and generous social welfare’ 
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2015). Historically, however, 
innovation has not always been cast in such positive light. For instance, in the Middle 
Ages, innovation was a pejorative term used by opponents of change – applied to 
heretics or deviants (Godin 2015; see also: Godin and Vinck 2017). Nevertheless, this 
thesis accepts there is a normative need for the process of innovation in the delivery 
of public sector services – with the caveat that it is important to note that not all 
innovative changes will be beneficial or “normative goods” (Osborne and Brown 
2011a). For example, technological advancements may be adopted and diffused in a 
public sector context and bring efficiency or productivity dividends – but those benefits 
may come at the expense of privacy or civil liberties (Osborne and Brown 2011a). 
There is also a possibility of failures, mistakes, or unforeseen circumstances. Torfing 
(2019, p.1) cautions that ‘innovation frequently fails to deliver on its promises and may 
create unforeseen negative externalities.’ A healthy level of cynicism may be required 
to guard against being swept up in pursuing a buzzword-led innovation agenda. Even 
still, it can be said that, overall, the public sector is characterized by too little failure 
and experimentation (Potts 2009).  
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Most of the literature surveyed is also silent on explicitly defining the “public sector”. 
Among the few who do are Potts and Kastelle (2010), who employ a precise definition 
stating that the public sector refers to ‘the coordination, production and delivery of 
goods and services by publicly owned and accountable organisations’ (2010, p. 124). 
Arundel and Huber (2013), adopt the OECD definition of ‘the general government 
sector at the national, regional and local levels plus all public corporations including 
the central bank’ (2013, p. 3). De Vries, Tummers and Bekkers (2018a, p. 5) structure 
their meta-synthesis based on Flynn’s (2007) characterisation of the public sector 
meaning ‘those parts of the economy that are either in state ownership or under 
contract to the state, plus those parts that are regulated and/or subsidized in the public 
interest’. This definition could be criticized as being too broad because there is almost 
no field of private endeavor that is untouched by regulations or subsidies. Below, I 
discuss the problem of incorporating the amorphous “public interest” into ways of 
measuring public sector innovation and this criticism applies here too. However, 
Flynn’s definition does provide a prompt in considering that governments are able to 
fulfill public policy objectives without undertaking the tasks directly. Indeed, this thesis 
argues that public service delivery is not merely a distinction between public and 
private – but that institutional possibilities exist along a spectrum of central 
government control (Djankov et al. 2003). In any case, one can ascertain the breadth 
of the term “public sector” from combining case examples contained within the 
literature. These include many services areas that one would expect as being 
emblematic of the public sector including education (e.g., Haelermans 2010; Pandey, 
Pandey, and Miller 2017; Demircioglu and Audretsch 2019), central government 
administration (e.g., Arundel and Huber 2013; Bloch and Bugge 2013, 2016; Torugsa 
and Arundel 2015; Demircioglu and Audretsch 2017), health (e.g., Windrum and 
Garcia-Goni 2008, Piening 2011), library services (e.g., Scupola and Zanfei 2015), 
local government (e.g., Walker 2007), policing (e.g., Moore et al. 1997, Moranto and 
Wolf 2013), public transportation (e.g., Ongkittikul and Geerlings 2006), public 
housing (e.g., Walker and Jeanes 2001), and state-owned government enterprises 
and utilities (e.g., Luke, et al. 2010, Wagner and Fain 2018).  
The public sector innovation literature has also included abstractions such as the 
development of ‘the welfare state’, the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
countries (Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle 2015, p. 67), through to the use of social 
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media by the President of the United States of America (Borins 2018) as examples of 
public sector innovation. While it could be argued that the actors or decision-makers 
in these examples are public officials or otherwise fulfilling public functions, this thesis 
is concerned with the provision of specific services where public providers, regulators, 
and users are readily identifiable. This is important in considering the incentives, 
costs, and trade-offs that occur within institutional arrangements.  
The maintenance of military forces is a core function of government, pre-dating the 
public provision of human services (see: e.g., Smith 1776).  However, it is an area not 
covered by the public sector innovation literature. One example that explicitly carves 
out the military from public sector innovation is a Nordic pilot study to measure 
innovation, where the authors note that units within defense were typically excluded 
in the framing of the survey (Bloch 2011; Bloch and Bugge 2013). Although the 
authors do not provide reasons for doing so, there would appear to be different 
rationales for the state providing a military force and the provision of human services. 
Similarly, there are different economic incentives for innovation. There is a separate 
literature dealing with innovation in the military and defense industries (see: e.g., 
Grissom 2006). There is also a separate field on the political economy of war (see: 
e.g., Coyne and Mathers 2011). These fields of research are distinct and military and 
defense innovations do not appear to be considered as part of the public sector 
innovation problem. Having now dealt with definitions, I will now turn to consider the 
measurement issues in public sector innovation research.  
2.3 Measuring public sector innovation 
Developing systems of measurement for innovation in the public sector is a crucial 
task for analysis. However, it is a problem that is far from settled. As Demircioglu and 
Audretsch (2017, p. 1681) argue, there is a ‘paucity of measurement’ in this area. A 
major reason for this is because the measurement is dependent on how innovation is 
defined in the first place (Arundel and Huber 2013). Again, I do not intend to solve the 
measurement problem here. Instead, it is my aim to set out the competing theoretical 
perspectives and recent scholarship to provide context for my contribution. This task 
is important because it does assist in framing the methodology of the thesis. As I 
explain in further detail in this chapter, this thesis takes a cost-based approach to 
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analyze institutional and regulatory structures surrounding public service provision – 
adapting a model from new comparative economics – which will yield implications for 
public sector innovation and avoid some of the measurement problems identified in 
this section.  
To answer the question of why there is a lack of public sector innovation the standard 
starting-point in the literature is to compare the public sector to the private sector 
(Potts and Kastelle 2010; Bloch and Bugge 2016). Yet, this approach yields 
measurement problems. In the private sector, the motivation for innovation and 
measures of innovation are closely related. That is, profitability provides both the 
motivational force and the core standard of measurement for innovation (e.g., Mulgan 
and Albury 2003; Potts and Kastelle 2010). This measure does not exist in the public 
sector, principally because public sector services do not operate as profit-making 
enterprises. Indeed, many public services are provided without any direct user costs. 
As Torfing (2019, p. 2) correctly observes, ‘the absence of competition and profit 
motives creates different conditions for innovation in the public sector.’  
Some authors explain away the measurement difficulties in terms of multiple and 
sometimes competing objectives. That is, the provision of public services involves 
both ‘providing services cost-effectively’ and ‘creating societal wellbeing’ (Bloch and 
Bugge 2013, p.4; see also: Mulgan and Albury 2003). This is otherwise referred to as 
“public value” (Hartley 2005; Mulgan 2007; Bommert 2010; see also: O'Flynn 2007). 
Because of this, it is claimed that ‘the public sector is more complex and harder to 
measure’ and ‘any one measure of output may fail to capture the full effects on 
performance’ (Bloch and Bugge, 2013, p.4) – and it is for this reason standard output 
measures do not exist in the public sector (Bloch and Bugge, 2013).  
Further, along this line of “public value,” Klein et al. (2010) contend that one reason 
that public sector innovation or public sector entrepreneurship is so imprecise is that 
public interests are subject to change over time. Incorporating any measure of “public 
value” into the measurement of public sector innovation seems problematic because 
it is completely vague. It is unclear what exactly is meant by that term at any one point 
in time, and it also calls for a socio-political judgment about the perceived value. A 
more theoretical criticism with the “public value” approach to measurement is that it 
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implies that there is a “public interest” that is somehow distinct from the collection of 
disparate subjective private interests (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). 
Arundel and Huber (2013) contend that the reason for the uncertainty surrounding 
measurement of innovation could be, in part, due to the dominant method of research 
in this area being object-based case studies. The argument that these authors outline 
is that while the case study method does provide valuable insights towards 
constructing a theory of public sector innovation, it does not provide any solid 
indicators for benchmark comparisons; nor is it a good tool for tracking innovation 
activity over time (Arundel and Huber 2013). Likewise, Potts and Kastelle (2010) offer 
a criticism of the case study method that the examples of innovation studied may be 
a mixture of ‘lucky accidents’ and ‘selection bias’ – rather than the ‘strategic outcome 
of a deliberate plan’ (Potts and Kastelle 2010, p. 124).  
The insight that the above criticisms provide is that, within the standard public-private 
comparison approach, object-based case studies may be useful in identifying areas 
to improve innovation outcomes, but the approach lacks any real explanatory power. 
That is, object-based case studies are – in themselves – unable to explain why (or 
why not) public sector innovation occurs. A more systematic framework for analysis 
is required.   
Accordingly, there has been a trend towards a more robust phenomenological 
approach using survey data (Arundel and Huber 2013; Demircioglu 2017). Sanford 
Borins pioneered this approach by analyzing the best applications from the Ford 
Foundation – Kennedy School of Government Innovation in American Government 
Award Program (Ford-KSG Awards) (Borins 1998).1 Borins’ initial study analyzed 
coded samples of the semi-finalists’ responses to questionnaires for applications 
between 1990 and 1994 (n = 217). Later studies compared this sample with the later 
1995 to 1998 applications (n = 104) (Borins 2000a) and a more recent study 
compared the 1990 and 1994 sample to those applications received in 2010 (n = 234) 
(Borins 2014). Among other matters, the questionnaires included questions about the 
barriers to the innovative program or policy initiative being implemented, which will be 
                                                          
1 Although Borins (2002) notes that others had previously reported on the Ford Foundation’s 
awards (e.g., Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  
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discussed further in the next section of this chapter. Based on the Ford-KSG Awards 
questionaries, Borins surveyed applicants to similar innovation awards of the Institute 
of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC) (Borins 2000b) and the Commonwealth 
Association for Public Administration and Management (Borins 2000c). Bernier, Hafsi, 
and Deschamps (2015) reviewed 21 years of data from the IPAC Innovation 
Management Awards and included all applications in their analysis rather than just 
the finalists (n = 1,563). As Borins (2008) argues, the value in analyzing innovation 
awards is that the awards function as a good proxy for “best practice” in the public 
sector. For my purposes, public sector innovation awards provide an example of the 
availability of data sources driving research insights. Similarly, my analysis of 
Queensland’s Independent Public Schools program in Chapter 4 of this thesis is 
based on a newly available secondary data source – applications to a new 
government program – and the successful applications function as a proxy for best 
practice in that setting.   
Some scholars have chosen to develop their own surveys to gain insights into public 
sector innovation. For example, Arundel and Huber (2013) utilized a method of 
innovation surveys based on the Oslo manual guidelines for measuring innovation in 
the private sector in a pilot study of Australian Federal Government managers. To 
deal with differences in agency size, the survey respondents were branch-level 
managers (Senior Executive Service Band 1) that had ‘sufficient responsibility to 
develop and implement innovations’ (Arundel and Huber 2013, p. 7). Questionnaires 
asked these managers about a range of innovation activities that occurred over a two-
year period. As part of the questionnaire design, cognitive testing was undertaken to 
determine if ‘potential respondents understood the questions as intended and if they 
were able to answer them’ (Arundel and Huber 2013, p. 8). According to Arundel and 
Huber (2013), the benefit of a survey over a case study is that it collects a wide range 
of data on different types of innovations and helps to avoid the selection bias inherent 
in object-based case studies (see also Potts and Kastelle 2010; for further on the 
importance of the Oslo guidelines, see e.g., Arundel, Bloch and Ferguson 2019).  
Similarly, Bloch and Bugge (2013; 2016) building on Bloch (2011) develop a 
methodology known as “Measuring public sector innovation in the Nordic countries 
(MEPIN)” which also included a large-scale pilot survey across the five Nordic 
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countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). This survey 
encompassed public sector institutions at the central, regional, and local levels. More 
recently, Ramli et al. (2017) distributed survey questionnaires to heads of units and 
divisions across 21 Federal Ministry and Central Agencies in Malaysia, featuring a 
scale of 72 items on innovation capability, innovation activities, innovation 
performance, and wider public sector conditions. Other researchers have sought to 
use existing datasets that have been collected for other purposes – in a comparable 
way to the study of innovation awards. For example, Bysted and Hansen (2015) 
analyze data from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden collected as part of the European 
Employee Index, while Torugsa and Arundel (2017) use data from “Innobarometer 
2010” which the authors describe as a randomized telephone survey of public 
administration agency heads about innovation activities in their agencies (between 
January 2008 and October 2010).   
A limitation of the Arundel and Huber (2013), Bloch and Bugge (2011, 2013, 2016), 
Ramli et al. (2017) and Torugsa and Arundel (2017) studies is that they survey mainly 
top management within each agency. This approach contrasts with several studies 
that use the Australian “State of the Service” (SOS) survey, a large-scale randomized 
survey of public servants conducted annually by the Australian Public Service 
Commission (APSC), where only (approximately) a quarter of respondents were 
classified at executive or senior executive level. This survey series includes a number 
of questions about innovation – and this is measured at the workplace level. For 
instance, Torugsa and Arundel (2015) used a targeted sample of the 2011 SOS 
survey (n = 4,369) to investigate multi-dimensionality of the most significant 
innovation in the respondents’ workgroup. The same authors used the same sample 
from that dataset to examine a separate research question on innovation complexity 
(Torunga and Arundel 2016). Likewise, Demircioglu and Audretsch (2017) use the 
2012 census for their study on conditions for innovation in the public sector. 
Demircioglu (2017) uses a subset of the 2011 survey (n = 3,625) to study the impact 
of sources of innovation on employee job satisfaction in the Australian Public Service, 
a sample of the 2012 census (n = 21,093) to also investigate innovation complexity, 
and a different sample of the 2012 census (n = 74,571) to see whether an “innovation 
climate” can be a solution to reduce employee turnover in the public sector. Finally, 
Acker, Wynen, and Op de Beeck (2018) analyze data from the 2014 census (n = 
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47,305) in their study into the role of gender in the innovation process. In 2012, the 
APSC moved from a sample survey methodology to a census model sent to all current 
APS employees, which removes sampling bias and reduced sampling error (APSC 
2012). Another obvious benefit of this methodology is that a large sample size 
provides more robust results. However, a limitation of the APSC data is that the 
respondents to the SOS surveys are Commonwealth government employees. This 
means that staff involved in front-line public service delivery in major areas such as 
public education will necessarily be excluded because these services are managed 
by state government employees. The equivalent public sector commissions in 
Australian state jurisdictions do not appear to have surveyed employees about 
innovation as part of their mandated annual reporting processes. Until these are 
developed, case studies will still be an appropriate tool for knowledge building in the 
context of public sector services.  
In any case, using surveys as a measurement tool has its limitations. According to 
Pandey, Pandey, and Miller (2017, p. 79), ‘there are issues such as accurate recall of 
past events that may not be salient to the respondent’ and ‘specific data collection 
modality can introduce distortions such as experimenter bias and socially desirable 
responding’ contending that these can be avoided by using administrative reports. On 
this basis, Pandey, Pandey, and Miller (2017) develop a measure of innovativeness 
using an emerging technique of computer-aided textual analysis to analyze letters to 
the board of education from a sample of New Jersey school districts. Although the 
authors encountered challenges in this novel approach, there is the potential for it to 
be applied further in public sector research given the number of reports produced by 
departments and service delivery entities each year. Indeed, computer-aided textual 
analysis is being used as a revolutionary tool in measuring regulation (Al-Ubaydli and 
McLaughlin 2015). Another way of alleviating the problems with survey approaches 
may be to make more use of longitudinal research designs (Andersen and Jakobsen 
2018). 
Potts and Kastelle (2010) and Potts (2010) (building in part on Potts (2009)) advance 
a more radical methodology: a scientific experimental method. Potts and Kastelle 
(2010) posit that the incentive structures in public sector innovation are more 
analogous to those in the science sector. The authors advance three main reasons 
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for this.  First, the reward structure for successful innovation is reputational capital – 
not money. Second, science is generally conservative in its approach – operating 
within existing frameworks, as opposed to the more aggressive strategies found in 
private sector competitive markets. Third, public sector innovation should act on 
tested knowledge, rather than a speculative hypothesis – and so there is a need to 
experiment with new ideas in a controlled environment that minimizes harm (Potts 
and Kastelle 2010). In critiquing other approaches, Potts and Kastelle (2010) offer 
that the core scientific problem of the inductive approach of surveys and case studies 
is that there is no control group. In other words, ‘there is no way of asking whether 
the same effect would have occurred in the absence of the mechanism identified’ 
(Potts and Kastelle 2010, p. 130). Potts (2010) builds on this by proposing an 
experimental elimination. That is, experimental innovation in public sector innovation 
by eliminating programs, rather than adding to the existing stock. The purpose of this 
would be to discover which public sector activities could be eliminated to add overall 
value. On this basis, Potts (2010) proposes a five-step destruction system. In 
summary, every public sector program would be identified and coded, a proportion of 
these would be randomly selected for elimination, the experiment would be 
implemented for a period of time, the results would be analysed, and finally if the 
program was found to have net value it would be reinstated – if not it would be 
permanently eliminated (Potts 2010). In surveying the literature, it does not appear 
that this approach has been taken up by policymakers. Potts and Kastelle (2010) 
recognise some of the practical difficulties with the scientific experimental model of 
analysis. The authors note that the scientific method is relatively new in economics 
and social science, that the approach would not come naturally to most public sector 
employees, and it may be costly and time-consuming (Potts and Kastelle 2010). 
Having canvassed the issues in measuring innovation, the next section of this chapter 
will analyze the causes of the public-sector innovation problem through a 
Schumpeterian lens.  
2.4 Causes of the public sector innovation problem – a Schumpeterian 
reading  
In this section, I return to the Schumpeterian view of innovation and apply it as a way 
of reading the public sector innovation literature. Schumpeter describes innovation as 
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the “perennial gale of creative destruction” – a transformative process where 
economic development results from entrepreneurs discovering new combinations of 
resources that displaces existing practices (1934; 1942). Innovation in this sense is 
the dynamic mechanism of economic development which offers the ‘carrot of 
spectacular reward or the stick of destitution’ (Schumpeter, cited in Dodgson and 
Gann 2010). In this view, innovation consists of two phases – the creation of the new 
and the destruction of the old.  
As I have previously mentioned, the standard approach of the literature is to compare 
the public sector to the private sector – and to adopt private sector practices to 
address the problem of a lack of innovation. Recall also that it is argued that the 
Schumpeterian definition provides a solid platform for analysis and scholarship (Potts 
2009; Potts and Kastelle 2010; Potts 2010). In this section, I will use this lens to 
provide a critical analysis of the extant public sector innovation research. First, I will 
explore factors that inhibit the “creation” phase, and then briefly examine factors that 
prevent the “destruction” phase in a public sector context.      
2.4.1 Barriers to creation 
Of the literature surveyed on the creation side, common themes focused on financial 
incentives and rewards, an overly conservative approach to risk management, the 
innovation cycle, and promoting a culture of innovation. I then consider regulation as 
a barrier to the creation phase of public sector innovation.     
Financial Incentives  
The first theme in the literature that I will explore is the contention that the public sector 
lacks the incentives for innovation otherwise found in the private sector. Typically, the 
public sector offers fewer financial rewards and incentives for employees than the 
private sector (Borins 2001). This is particularly when compared to innovative start-
up companies who may utilize employee share schemes in order to keep initial wage 
costs low, or senior management positions that may come with a combination of share 
options based on performance. This is because inherent in the public sector’s 
performance management system is a focus on efficiency rather than profitability 
(Mises 1944; Potts 2009) – that is, services are run on a cost-minimizing basis rather 
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than profit-maximizing. While poor rewards and incentives are seen as barriers to 
innovation, there is research to suggest that there may be ingrained cultural factors 
which mean that monetary reward is a less powerful motivating force in the public 
sector (Mulgan and Albury 2003; Moran 2010). However, on the contrary, Bloch and 
Bugge (2013) found that a lack of funding and internal incentives were barriers to 
innovation in Nordic public sector organizations. In addition to performance-based 
remuneration, Borins (2001) also noted that a lack of property rights and a lack of 
venture capital were also factors that limited innovation creation. Both factors limit the 
financial rewards available as an incentive to innovate, which include secondary 
actors in the innovation process that financially back innovative ideas. In reviewing 
the previous studies, Borins (2001) found that the leading characteristics of innovation 
in the public sector (i.e., process reengineering, applied information technology, 
developing alternative service delivery mechanisms and staff empowerment) were 
analogous to private sector innovation. Borins (2001) suggests that public sector 
bodies could emulate the private sector’s access to venture capital funding by creating 
innovation support funds, or alternatively public sector organizations could have 
access to a centrally administered fund. This may go some way to mitigating the 
downsides of the experimental approach to public sector innovation suggested by 
Potts (2010) – discussed above – and systematically entrench this experimental 
methodology.   
Risk-Averse Culture  
The second major theme in the literature is the overly conservative approach to risk 
management in the public sector, otherwise referred to as a “risk-averse culture”.  This 
culture is a ‘fundamental obstacle to innovation’ (Bommert 2010, p. 21) (see also: 
Mulgan and Albury 2003; Albury 2005; Koch et al. 2006; Mulgan 2014). Yet, this 
increased scrutiny promotes risk adversity, which may be problematic when it 
prevents or unduly delays efforts to innovate. Paradoxically, when an organization 
suppresses small risks it increases the risk of catastrophic failure (Stewart-Weeks and 
Kastelle, 2015 citing McGrath 2013). There appear to be a number of distinct reasons 
for a risk-averse culture in the public sector.  
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First, as advanced by Potts and Kastelle (2010), is the link between the lack of 
financial incentives, discussed above, and risk-taking. In the private sector, powerful 
profit motives encourage organizations to innovate in order to add value to consumers 
– and there are pay-offs for risks undertaken. In the public sector, however, the main 
incentive is promotion within a hierarchical organization in which there are limited 
benefits from taking on risk (Potts and Kastelle, 2010). Related to the autonomy within 
the public service, Davidson and Potts (2016a; 2016b) present a model of the 
institutions of innovation, which provides insight into the different forms of costs where 
innovation is centralized. Second, the fear of negative media and public blame for 
failure is a significant reason for the culture of risk aversion (Albury 2005; Hartley 
2005; Langergaard and Scheuer 2012; Mulgan 2014; Moran 2010; Bommert 2010; 
Potts and Kastelle, 2010; Koch et al. 2006; Mulgan and Albury 2003). This is of 
growing importance as the media interest in innovation has increased in recent years 
(Borins 2014). As Albury (2005) observes, the public sector is more heavily 
scrutinized than the private sector. In a public policy sense, this is positive due to the 
relative absence of direct accountability measures; public services are financed 
through taxpayer’s funds and yet taxpayers have no meaningful input into the 
management of those services – and public services are rarely subject to market 
discipline. Media scrutiny is an important mechanism to highlight public sector waste 
and mismanagement. High levels of scrutiny are also important because individuals 
and communities rely on vital services provided by the public sector and there is 
always a risk that innovations will fail and have a negative effect on welfare (Albury 
2005; Torugsa and Arundel 2017). Failure in this context means implementing 
innovative projects that do not achieve their expected objectives or fail completely 
(Koch et al. 2006; Borins 2018).  
There is an argument to be made for decentralization of services here in that 
experimentation, and any subsequent failure, will affect fewer people compared to a 
centralized service delivery framework – but the benefits of innovation still have the 
potential to disperse throughout the wider service network. Accordingly, this is not just 
a question of how to manage risks inside a single public sector organization – there 
is a bigger question of how the institutional arrangements governing service delivery 
are designed to limit the costs of failure.  
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Nevertheless, in public sector organizations, there is a disconnected link between 
those taking risks and those that claim the credit for success. That is, it is the public 
servants that will be blamed if innovative ideas fail, but it is the politicians or agency 
heads that will often be credited with the success. Mulgan (2014, p. 17) explains this 
perception, ‘If things go wrong those responsible will be mercilessly blamed: by hostile 
media, opposition politicians. Experiments that don’t work will be denounced as a 
waste of scarce public money. So, it’s natural to default to safe bets.’ Similarly, 
Hambleton et al. (2012) noted a personal experience arising from one of their 
interview-based case studies. One participant shared that ‘“a blame culture” 
presented a major challenge to innovation: ‘if an initiative did not work out, politicians 
would look for someone to blame’ (Hambleton et al. 2012, p. 18). Relatedly, Potts and 
Kastelle (2010, p. 124) implicitly acknowledge this problem when they identify an 
analogy of how innovation works in the public sector in that what financiers do for 
market sector entrepreneurs (i.e. ‘insuring down-side risk for reward of up-side profit’), 
noting that the political class can provide this for public sector entrepreneurs (i.e. 
‘providing cover’). As such, there is a role for politicians and policymakers to explain 
that there are necessary risks involved in the innovation process and that failure is an 
ordinary and proper aspect of innovation (Koch et al. 2006), and also to protect public 
servants that have managed the failed innovations (Borins 2014; 2018). This is 
important because an evolving public sector necessarily involves wastage as a cost 
of experimentation (Potts 2009).   
Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle (2015) propose another reason for a risk-averse culture 
by pointing out that public sector organizations are not set up to change. Rather their 
function is to carry out a longer-term program of expenditure after having first 
identified, or have had imposed upon them, distinct products and services to be 
produced for that foreseeable period. In this way, the delivery of public sector services 
is relatively fixed, rather than being flexible and subject to change. This makes sense 
because public services – and the public sector entities that are charged with 
providing them – are necessarily a creature of regulation. This issue is the key focus 
of Chapter 3 of this thesis. I will review the extant research on the relationship between 
regulation and public sector innovation in more detail below as there is a final 
counterpoint on risk adverseness that is worth noting.     
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There is research that questions the premise that a risk-averse culture acts as a 
barrier to the creation phase of innovation. For instance, Bloch and Bugge (2013) 
found that risk aversion was not a major barrier to public sector innovation. Instead, 
this Nordic study identified a ‘lack of funding,’ ‘inadequate time’ and ‘lack of financial 
incentives’ as the three most important barriers in this setting (Bloch and Bugge 2013, 
p. 10). A later study on Scandinavian respondents found no significant differences in 
the risk culture between the private and public sectors (Bysted and Hansen 2015). 
Osborne and Brown (2011b) argue that the focus should be on risk governance rather 
than risk management. Continuing this theme, Torugsa and Arundel (2017) 
encourage a “rethinking” of the effect of risk aversion on public sector innovation. In 
this study of European public administration agencies, the authors distinguish 
between large and small agencies, and also between high and low risk-averse 
agencies. In this view, managers can yield benefits from their innovation efforts in 
each type of organizations – but ‘the strategic behaviours of managers…differ 
significantly’ in achieving this task (Torugsa and Arundel 2017, p. 909).  
Something that cannot be discounted from these findings is that the surveys were 
generally answered by the top executive level managers and agency heads, rather 
than lower-ranking employees. It may be that these respondents do not perceive 
themselves as risk-averse, whereas operational-level employees within the same 
agency have a different view. As discussed above, executives and agency heads will 
often carry the burden of any risks and, therefore, may have a heightened awareness 
of the risks of innovation. However, what is perceived as sensible risk mitigation by 
one executive-level public servant could be categorized as risk-averse behavior by 
an operational-level employee.  
Nevertheless, there is an obvious truth that underpins the nuanced approach of 
Torugsa and Arundel (2017) – public sector organizations are not all the same. My 
approach adds to this by zeroing in on this fundamental idea. Every public sector 
agency provides distinct services based on its own legislative and regulatory 
mandate. My approach goes further in proposing that each service can be provided 
in a number of different ways. In doing so, the comparative institutional approach that 
I advance can explain the ingrained risk-averse culture that has formed the archetypal 
public servant working within the stereotypical public sector organization and also 
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explain the counterpoint that some agencies are not necessarily burdened by 
excessive risk-averse behavior.   
Innovation Cycle  
The third major theme in the public sector innovation literature is the innovation cycle 
– a question of where innovation occurs in public sector organizations. This theme is 
important in establishing the locus of the creation phase of innovation and then in 
targeting the right parts of the organization to stimulate innovation. But there is 
conflicting literature on this point.  
Bommert (2010) contends that the public service is overly bureaucratic, and that the 
innovation cycle is dominated by senior management of a public sector organization, 
with limited input from junior and mid-level employees. This explains the creation 
phase of public sector innovation as a top-down process. This provides a basis for 
Bommert’s contention for an “open innovation” or “collaborative innovation” approach 
in the public sector – a management theory borrowed from the private sector 
(Bommert 2010; see also Mergel and Desouza 2013). This approach seeks to ‘open 
the innovation process to a large group of actors, to internalize external ideas but also 
to leverage internal knowledge externally’ with the assumption that ‘tapping into the 
vast innovation assets across organizational boundaries will increase the quantity and 
quality of innovations’ (Bommert 2010, p. 19). This seeks to overcome this barrier to 
innovation because the ‘exchange of different experiences, ideas and opinions tends 
to disturb the established practices and their cognitive and normative 
underpinnings…’ (Torfing 2019, p. 4; see also: Sørensen and Torfing 2011; Hartley, 
Sørensen, and Torfing 2013; Torfing 2016). There has been documented success of 
“open innovation” approaches in Australia and elsewhere (e.g., Lee, Hwang, and Choi 
2012). In not seeking to detract from these results, the need to introduce creation 
mechanisms to solve problems with top-down innovation appears to run counter to 
other research.  
Bloch and Bugge (2013), who found that over 60 percent of the Australian public 
sector organization’s representatives surveyed ranked internal actors as highly 
important to driving innovation. Similarly, Borins (1998; 2014), in reviewing the 
Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Innovations in American Government 
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Awards finds that the most frequent initiators of innovations are public servants in 
frontline or middle management positions – although collaborative and interagency 
projects often require initiation by agency heads and elected officials. A reason for 
the inconsistency could be that Bommert’s contention is quite a generalized macro 
view – while Bloch and Bugge surveyed individuals involved in the process and Borins 
analyzed successful projects.  
The answer may indeed be in the middle somewhere, with Bartlett and Dibben (2002) 
finding that there is a need for both political sponsors as well as internal champions 
in the innovation process to drive change (see also Bartlett 2017). It is true, also, that 
different internal stakeholders will have different perceptions and attitudes about the 
innovation process (De Vries, Tummers and Bekkers 2018b). In any case, this aligns 
with a recent trend in public sector “innovation labs” utilising the management theory 
of “design thinking” (McGann et al. 2018). The private sector’s role in public sector 
innovation should not be discounted either as Bloch and Bugge (2013) found that a 
high share of innovative public sector organizations used input from external 
consulting services in developing their innovative activities.  
Public Sector Culture  
The fourth major theme is culture more generally. A typical view is that the public 
sector consists of ‘rule-bound, bureaucratic silos characterized by red tape, inertia, 
and stalemate’ (Sørensen and Torfing 2011, p. 5). The claim here is that this cultural 
environment presents a barrier to innovation. This environment is the product of 
economic incentives. The combination of a lack of financial incentives and the risk-
averse nature of public service delivery, discussed at length above, provide an 
explanation of why this public sector culture exists. Accordingly, there is an effort 
within the literature to address cultural change. For instance, it has been proposed 
that gender balance in the public sector workplace may be a relevant cultural 
consideration as ‘the organizational innovation climate that supports and encourages 
the creation, promotion, and implementation of new ideas may be different for women 
than it is for men’ (Acker, Wynen and Op de Beeck 2018, p. 2). This is unlikely to be 
a major factor in the Australia public sector given that the proportion of female 
Commonwealth public servants now sits at almost 60 percent of total staff – and 
53 
 
approaching 50 percent for executive-level positions (APSC 2017). Although data on 
the broader education and training industry indicates that there is a higher degree of 
gender imbalance in that female staff account for 71.8 percent of the workforce (ABS 
2018). Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle (2015, p. 63) argue that to be effective, 
‘innovation has to engage an almost emotional, visceral level of commitment and 
energy’. Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle (2015) present a model of the innovation 
process through the metaphor of innovation as a virus to be caught. The transmission 
of the virus has three stages: an organization must deliberately expose itself to the 
innovation virus; relatedly, the organization must be willing to mix with other people 
and organizations infected with the innovation virus; and finally, there must be a 
process of lowering the organizations immune system by countering its defenses 
against innovation. After the bug is caught, organizations must then grant permission, 
and provide courage and opportunity in order to lead to ‘deep and influential 
inspiration’ (Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle 2015, p. 65). Similarly, others have 
expressed the barriers to innovation as being ‘in the mindset of public officials as 
policy makers…’ (Vigoda-Gadot et al. 2005, p. 58). This view presents the issue of a 
lack of public sector innovation as a management problem. That is, recruitment 
decisions and leadership activities will be the main drivers of a more innovative public 
sector. This thesis departs from that approach.  
Specifically, the insights of the public choice economics literature (e.g., Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962; Tullock 1965; Niskanen 1971; Stigler 1971) suggest that bureaucratic 
problems limiting innovation will worsen over time because of bureaucratic and 
regulatory capture, for example. Applying the institutional theory of regulation from 
new comparative economics (e.g., Djankov et al. 2003) to the public sector context 
suggests that it is more complex than the public choice school would present – there 
is no single way to regulate public sector services. This means that some institutional 
structures are more open to the dynamism of innovation than others. Applying this 
institutional approach, organizational culture is a symptom of a broader structural 
problem rather than a cause in and of itself. Therefore, it will take more than “catching 
the innovation bug” (c.f., Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle 2015) to change entrenched 
attitudes. It will likewise take more than better management or leadership. This is 
because public sector management decisions are governed on the regulatory 
frameworks that are put in place for service delivery. As a precursor to the next 
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chapter, I will now deal with the extant research on how regulatory structures present 
barriers to the creation phase of public sector innovation.  
Regulation  
The final theme of the literature on barriers to the creation phase of innovation is 
regulation. It is often assumed that issues such as bureaucracy and red tape are 
barriers to public sector innovation (e.g., Torfing 2019). For example, Vigoda-Gadot 
et al. observe, that the ‘concepts of innovation and bureaucracy seem to be mutually 
exclusive’ (2005, p. 27). Given the scale of regulation inside government (e.g. Hood 
et al. 1998; 1999; Hood, James, and Scott 2000), it is curious that the effect of 
regulation on innovation has not been a core focus of public sector innovation 
scholarship. Although there is limited empirical research in this regard, it is possible 
to observe two categories of regulation that may constrain the creation of new 
innovative practices in the public sector context. First, there are those regulations 
which prescribe how the publicly-owned service is to be run, which is necessary 
without a profit motive to guide the allocation of resources (e.g., Mises 1944). This 
includes legislative and regulatory provisions imposed by the parliament to achieve 
policy objectives (Freiberg 2017; Windholz 2018) and also the various bodies, 
policies, and procedures that monitor a public sector agency’s compliance with its 
mandate (Hood et al. 1998; 1999). The second category is “red tape” which consists 
of those ‘rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a 
compliance burden but [do] not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were 
intended to serve’ (Bozeman 2000, p. 12). This category can be further broken down 
into “organizational” – which can have internal and external sources – and 
“stakeholder” red tape (Bozeman 2000; Brewer and Walker 2010). Public choice 
economics can explain how these regulations grow over time through bureaucratic 
capture (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Becker, 1983) and are made more difficult to 
repeal through the manipulation of transaction costs ultimately impacting on the size 
and scope of government (Twight 1988; 1994). Although Pincus (2014) argues that 
the insights of public choice economics has not had a significant influence on 
Australian policy development, and this is one reason for a growth in regulatory 
complexity. While there is a body of literature on the empirical evidence on red tape 
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and performance (see: e.g., Brewer and Walker 2010), innovation is not considered 
specifically.  
There is limited Australian research on the regulation of public sector services. An 
exploratory study by Austen et al. (2012) found that there was a range of governance 
models in Queensland non-state schools. This study was restricted to six non-state 
schools in one Australian state – and did not specifically address innovation. In a 
report that did focus on innovation in the Australian Public Service, Moran (2010) 
provides a limited analysis of regulation focussed specifically on procurement.  
Looking further afield, an exception is the study of Bloch and Bugge (2013) which – 
as part of a broader study – found that between 34 percent and 57 percent of 
respondents to a Nordic survey (depending on jurisdiction and category) stated that 
fulfilling new regulations was a highly important objective for their organization’s 
innovations. Regardless of the specific Nordic jurisdiction, Bloch and Bugge (2013) 
found that fulfilling new regulations is more important for central government 
agencies. The authors argue that this ‘suggests that regulations can have a significant 
impact on stimulating innovation’ (Bloch and Bugge 2013, p. 9). Specific regulations 
were not identified. In commenting on the paper’s broader issue of a high number of 
innovations reported, the authors note that ‘if the public sector as a whole is under 
constant change, then public sector organizations may continuously need to adjust to 
a changing environment or be frequently required to make changes based on new 
regulations or policies’ (Bloch and Bugge 2013, p. 8; see also Bloch and Bugge 2016). 
Conversely, the authors reported that a ‘lack of flexibility in laws’ was a barrier to 
innovation – although there was more variability in this measure across the surveyed 
jurisdictions. For instance, only 7.3 percent of Norway’s central government 
organizations identified this as a barrier to innovation, compared to 52.6 percent of 
central government organizations in Iceland. Again, specific regulations were not 
identified. The relevant survey results are extracted in Table 1.1, below. 
It is not clear whether these results would be replicated in other jurisdictions. For 
example, the Australian Public Sector Commission ‘State of the Service’ does not ask 
respondents about regulation or legal frameworks. However, Borins (2014) made 
similar findings based on a United States data set of innovation awards noting that 
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regulation could be an objective as well as an obstacle. In that study, 26 percent of 
the 2010 cohort of semi-finalists to the Harvard University Kennedy School’s 
Innovations in American Government Awards reported that ‘the innovation itself 
required new legislation or regulations or that it was a response to new legislation’ 
(Borins 2014, p. 20). Meanwhile, 3 percent of semi-finalists in the same cohort 
reported that laws and regulations acted as a barrier to innovation (Borins 2014). It 
was also found that building political support (6 percent) and changing laws (2 
percent) were among the tactics employed by public sector organizations to overcome 
barriers to innovation among the 2010 semi-finalists (Borins 2014).  
Table 2.1 – Extracted results from the MEPIN pilot study, 2008-2009 (in percent) 
 
 
Denmark  Finland  Iceland Norway Sweden 
Drivers  
Central 
govt. 
Other 
Central 
govt. 
Other 
Central 
govt. 
Other 
Central 
govt. 
Other 
Central 
govt. 
Other 
Innovation 
objectives  
Fulfil new 
regulations 48.9 48.2 34.2 24.7 57.1 46.2 54 44.6 42.6 37.3 
Barriers to 
innovation 
Lack of 
flexibility in 
laws 15.9 28.0 23.8 7.8 52.6 51.7 7.3 9.4 31.5 20.9 
Source: Bloch and Bugge 2013, pp. 8 and 10.  
A recent systematic review of the public sector innovation literature found that that 
laws and regulations were ‘dominant contextual barriers’ that public sector innovators 
encountered, providing three examples of procurement regulation, restrictive rules 
around public-private partnership, and the inhibiting effect of high compliance costs 
(Cinar, Trott, and Simms 2019, p. 277). The authors conclude their treatment of 
regulatory barriers with the truism that ‘laws and regulations can affect the innovation 
process in various ways’ (Cinar, Trott, and Simms 2019, p. 277). The paper is correct 
in highlighting that context does matter – but it does not go beyond this fact and 
consider the specific regulatory provisions (and possible alternatives) in those cases.     
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In short, the effect of regulation on public sector innovation is unclear within the 
standard public-private comparison approach. It is a complex problem in that 
regulation appears to act a driver for innovation, tending to a more innovative public 
sector, but it also acts as an impediment to innovation occurring, resulting in a lack of 
public sector innovation. Regulation is inherently restrictive – which would tend to 
constrain innovation (Mises 1944; Ongkittikul and Geerling 2006; cf: Rogers-Dillon 
1999). However, it has been accepted that regulation can enable diffusion where 
innovation has already occurred (Ongkittikul and Geerling 2006; De Vries, Tummers, 
and Bekkers 2018a). Further, regulation can provide a method of standardization for 
e-platforms (Cinar, Trott, and Simms 2019). These ostensibly conflicting positions can 
be reconciled in the following way: regulation can be categorized as a barrier to 
innovation if a specific regulatory action imposes barriers on innovation into the future; 
meanwhile, regulation can be categorized as promoting innovation if a specific 
regulatory action removes past impediments to innovation.  
Ongkittikul and Geerlings (2006) provide a helpful dichotomy to clarify the above 
summary further. In considering the sources of innovation, Ongkittikul and Geerlings 
(2006) observe two patterns. The first pattern is where regulatory change leads to 
innovation. Applied to the public sector context, regulatory change fosters the 
dynamic process of innovation and leads to new methods of service delivery, for 
example, being developed and adopted in the public sector (endogenous innovation). 
Conversely, regulation may constrain innovation by limiting the ability of public sector 
actors to adopt innovative practices. The second pattern is where regulatory tools are 
used to enable diffusion where innovation has already occurred. For example, 
regulatory changes impose new methods of service delivery on the public sector 
(exogenous innovation). From a methodological standpoint, the second pattern is 
problematic. New methods of service delivery, as one example, that are imposed on 
the public sector organization by regulation should not properly be considered public 
sector innovation. Regulation that mandates that public servants conduct a public 
service in a prescribed way is the antithesis of our conceptualization of public sector 
innovation as a dynamic process in the Schumpeterian sense. This second pattern 
presents a practical problem for measurement in that a high number of observed 
innovative practices over time could be the result of a high amount of regulatory or 
policy change – rather than because there is a more innovative public sector. Indeed, 
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this criticism is foreshadowed in Bloch and Bugge’s own discussion of their results 
(Bloch and Bugge 2013; see also Bloch and Bugge 2016).   
Another reason that the effect of regulation on public sector innovation remains 
unclear is that the answer to the question of whether regulation acts as a barrier 
depends on the substance of the specific regulatory framework. As I have 
foreshadowed above, the detail of regulatory provisions is not captured by the studies 
surveying public servants. There is no discussion or analysis of content, quantum, 
quality, or purpose of the regulations that inhibit or encouraged innovative activity. 
Table 2.1 shows variations between jurisdictions. An explanation for this variation is 
that the binding regulatory frameworks are likely to differ considerably between 
countries, within sub-national jurisdictions (i.e., local governments, state or province 
government), and between the various public sector agencies. Capturing this detail 
does not lend itself well to the research design of multi-sector and multi-country 
surveys. Case studies will, therefore, provide a stronger ground to explore the 
relationship between regulation and public sector innovation. This is because public 
sector services by their nature are ‘very specific markets’ (Blind 2012, p. 391; cited in 
Wagner and Fain 2018).  
My review of the public sector innovation literature revealed only one case study that 
purposefully examined the relationship between regulation and innovation. In 
research commissioned by the Water Industry Commission for Scotland, Wagner and 
Fain (2018) present a “scoping study” on the Scottish water sector. Scottish Water is 
a publicly owned commercial corporation established in 2002 to ‘introduce innovation, 
improve customer service, and reduce costs’ (Wagner and Fain 2018, p. 1214). This 
case study involved ‘interviews with senior executives in all stakeholder organizations 
within the Scottish water sector’ (n=12) in addition to reviewing ‘government 
documents, media reports, annual reports, and organizational documentation’ 
(Wagner and Fain 2018, p. 1214). The authors also considered internal and external 
influencing factors on innovation and the role of collaboration in the innovation 
process. That is, regulatory frameworks are presented as one factor among others. 
In summary, the authors presented three findings in addressing the research question 
of ‘to what extent, if any does a regulatory framework inhibit innovation within the 
public-sector environment?’ (Wagner and Fain 2018, p. 1222). First, stakeholder 
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collaboration was found to be important in enabling a ‘clear understanding of roles, 
responsibilities, and resources necessary for promoting an innovative culture across 
the industry’ (Wagner and Fain 2018, pp. 1222-1223). Second, the ‘regulator and 
government must share responsibility for allowing risk and managing uncertainty in 
order to promote experimentation and forwardthinking in the network organizations’ 
(Wagner and Fain 2018, pp. 1223). Third, ‘compliance is tacit and explicit in all 
regulations and the regulator provides the structure to enable innovation beyond 
established protocols’ (Wagner and Fain 2018, pp. 1223). Overall, the authors 
concluded that ‘…the regulation within the Scottish water sector supports innovation 
orientations within the main companies in the network’ (Wagner and Fain 2018, p. 
1223). This case study provides an example of where regulatory structures have 
changed and promoted innovation and provides insight into how innovation occurs 
within a new regulatory context for a heavily regulated public monopoly. However, 
details of the specific regulatory changes are not covered in any detail. The study 
does not provide or examine changes in the regulatory framework. Rather, it analyses 
the experience of senior management after these changes were implemented. The 
conclusions are focussed more on stakeholder management and the relationship 
between the public sector organization and the regulator – rather than providing 
analysis of the regulatory framework. This is curious, given the study’s research 
question, noted above, and in the context of a new regulatory environment.   
There remains a lack of empirical evidence examining the relationship between 
regulation and public sector innovation (Vigoda-Gadot et al. 2005; Wagner and Fain 
2018). This is required in moving past a mere stereotype of the public sector to 
providing concrete examples of how the public sector is regulated and the 
consequence for public sector innovation. The extant literature presents the 
regulatory environment as one factor among many inhibiting the creation phase of 
innovation. The conclusions fit within the predominant theme of public sector 
innovation research – that regulatory barriers are a management problem. While 
survey and interview data provide some insight into the question of how regulation 
affects public sector regulation, no analysis has been undertaken on the detail of 
regulatory frameworks. Accordingly, there is more research that needs to be 
undertaken to understand the relationship between regulation and innovation in the 
provision of public sector services. A systematic framework for this analysis is 
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required, and a method for observing barriers to innovation. Part five of this chapter 
will detail a way forward in this task.  
In briefly summarising this section of the chapter, much of the public sector innovation 
literature is geared towards the creation side of innovation – which has not changed 
in a decade after this was first asserted by Potts (2009). Common themes to explain 
the lack of innovation focused on financial incentives and rewards, an overly 
conservative approach to risk management, the innovation cycle, creating a culture 
of innovation, and regulatory barriers. I will now briefly turn to the destruction side of 
the public sector innovation literature. 
2.4.2 Barriers to destruction  
Joseph Schumpeter famously maintained that ‘the process of Creative Destruction is 
the essential fact about capitalism’ (1942, p. 83). The key insight of this proposition is 
that economic progress and the process of innovation will unfold over time with new 
products and services, new methods of production, new sources of supply and new 
markets, and new organizational forms displacing existing practices. The destruction 
phase of the process is where existing products and services are displaced, old 
methods are made redundant, prevailing sources of supply dry up, and old structures 
buckle. The resources that are freed up in this evolutionary process are then able to 
be redeployed for new productive uses – continuing the cycle. However, studies in 
public sector innovation are almost exclusively focused on the creation phase. As 
Potts (2010, p. 238) notes, ‘the second phase of the innovation process – the 
destruction of the old – is just as important as the first phase – the creation of the new; 
but it typically receives far less attention in innovation theory and practice’.  
In the private sector, the price mechanism and consumer substitution function as the 
key destruction mechanisms that reallocate resources to where they are most valued 
at the product level. Meanwhile, bankruptcy, insolvency and other forms of take-over 
and re-structuring loom as firm-level destruction mechanisms. If a firm does not 
innovate to compete with new market entrants, its revenues, profits, and share price 
will decline to lead to market exit in some form – freeing up land, labor, and capital 
resources to be redeployed by entrepreneurs in the “creation” phase. These 
spontaneous mechanisms are largely absent in the provision of public sector services 
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(Potts 2010). In observing this, Potts (2010) argues that, although creation 
mechanisms are weaker in the public sector, the fundamental difference between 
private sector innovation and public sector innovation is found in the destruction 
phase. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, below.  
Figure 2.1 – Private and Public Sector Innovation Models 
 
Source: Adapted from Potts (2010, p. 241). 
This model explains the consequence of weak or non-existent destruction 
mechanisms is that, in the long run, there is an increase in the size of government as 
new programs and methods of service delivery are added to the existing stock. 
Another consequence of poor destruction mechanisms may be that there is too much 
“bad waste” (i.e., cost of inefficient public services) and not enough “good waste” (i.e. 
costs of failed experimentation) (Potts 2009).  
Potts (2010) proposes an experimental elimination model of randomized trials as a 
solution to the lack of destruction mechanisms. It is based on an evolutionary 
understanding; even where public programs had initially passed a cost-benefit 
analysis when introduced, socio-cultural-political factors or technological changes, for 
example, may change this result and lead to programs being retained when they 
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should otherwise be removed (Potts 2010). The experimental elimination model in 
one sense is a critique of the prevailing public sector innovation paradigm – structural 
changes, not necessarily better management, are required to promote innovation. 
However, in another sense, it is an internal critique as the idea of the experimental 
elimination model fits squarely within the existing framework. That is, the public sector 
has no spontaneous destruction mechanisms which inhibit innovation, and the 
solution is to construct new destruction mechanisms to spur innovation, making the 
public sector function more like the private sector. 
What are the mechanisms of destruction in the public sector? Potts (2010) proposes 
two at different extremes. Destruction could be sharp and shift during major crises 
affecting the public sector’s ability to provide services (actual or political perceived), 
or destruction may be a slow death due to irrelevance or long-term neglect. However, 
while these describe the circumstances leading to destruction – they do not detail the 
specific destruction mechanisms. In a private sector setting, there may be many 
circumstances that lead to consumers substituting one product or service for another, 
including a consumer’s income, tastes and preferences, and the price and availability 
of substitutes and complements. As these demand factors change, the old product is 
discarded for the new product on the market. In this setting, changing tastes and 
preferences – for example – are not the mechanism of destruction. Rather, the 
mechanism of destruction is consumer substitution – that is, the decision by the 
consumer to choose one product or service over another under scarcity. Similarly, in 
a public sector setting, a budgetary crisis or a poor usage of a particular service may 
lead a decision-maker to stop providing a particular service – or provide that service 
in another way – but it is the process that the decision-maker goes about executing 
this decision that is properly the mechanism of destruction. Accordingly, the question 
of “what mechanisms of destruction exist in the public sector” remains open.  
As the only paper in the surveyed literature to touch on the destruction phase, Potts’ 
key contribution – in addition to his experimental elimination model as a solution – is 
in highlighting the deficit of scholarship on this side of the innovation equation. 
Focusing on mechanisms of destruction is then a logical direction for new research to 
take in public sector innovation research. Just as regulation may affect the creation 
phase of public sector innovation – it is conceivable that there may be regulatory 
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constraints on the destruction phase of public sector innovation as well. This is 
especially true in the public sector, as the public sector’s destruction mechanisms will 
be governed by legislative and regulatory frameworks. 
This chapter has noted that the standard approach of the literature is to compare the 
public sector to the private sector. In providing a lens for critical analysis, the 
Schumpeterian conception of innovation as a dynamic and evolutionary process has 
arranged the extant research into identifying barriers to the creation phase of 
innovation and barriers to the destruction phase of innovation. It has been noted that 
the majority of existing research is focussed on the creation phase, and identifying 
mechanisms of destruction remains elusive in the public sector context. It is on this 
basis that I will now outline a new agenda for public sector innovation research.  
2.5 A new agenda for public sector innovation research  
This chapter has set out the preliminary research context for this thesis. There is a 
widely-held assumption in the literature that there is a deficit of public sector 
innovation. The major contribution of this chapter was to provide a critical synthesis 
of this perceived innovation deficit through the prism of the Schumpeterian conception 
of innovation. As a framework for analysis, the discussion in this chapter was 
organized around identifying barriers to the creation phase and the destruction phase 
of public sector innovation. In this task, it was observed that the current explanation 
for the innovation deficit has to do with the structure and culture that is typical of public 
sector bodies: an overly conservative approach to risk management matched with a 
lack of financial incentives and rewards. It was also observed that the current research 
program reduces the public sector innovation problem to one of management. That 
is, public sector organizations can navigate the barriers to the creation and destruction 
phases of innovation through management strategies. In contrast, this thesis 
proposes to take an economic approach.  
A specific area that was identified as requiring further research was the relationship 
between regulation and public sector innovation. The existing research on the effect 
of regulation on public sector innovation is mixed, and this relationship remains 
unclear. However, overall, this chapter has highlighted that legislative and regulatory 
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frameworks are not neutral in considering the creation and destruction phases of 
public sector innovation. 
According to the standard paradigm, the innovativeness of a public sector 
organization is a function of a variety of internal and external factors that drive 
innovation outcomes, mediated by management. For instance, Agolla and Van Lill 
(2013) present a conceptual feedback loop model that is an example of the standard 
paradigm, where “political” and “legal” factors are external drivers of innovation within 
public service organizations – among internal drivers, other external drivers, and 
feedback loops (see also, e.g., Cinar, Trott, and Simms 2019). Nevertheless, in 
explaining this model, Agolla and Van Lill (2013, p. 172) make a significant 
observation.     
[Public sector organisations] are founded through legislation, therefore, their 
operations are prescribed by what is known as a “mandate”; to fulfil their mandate, 
[public sector organisations] are required to operate within given parameters. By its 
very nature, the mandate thus imposes a degree of constraint on innovation. 
This statement is inconsistent with the authors’ presentation of the standard paradigm 
that treats regulation as one factor among many other internal and external drivers 
that feed into a public sector management process. Instead, this observation suggests 
that establishing legislation and regulatory provisions are the starting point in the 
public sector innovation process. Nevertheless, the observation of Agolla and Van Lill 
(2013), above, provides a pathway forward in public sector innovation research by 
focusing on the legislative provisions governing service delivery. Accordingly, there is 
a research agenda here that has not yet been explored in a comprehensive or 
systematic way. 
The research that will be presented in the chapters to follow will move beyond the 
prevailing public sector innovation paradigm by focussing on the economics of 
regulation. To foreshadow the next chapter, new comparative economics and 
evolutionary economics provide the theoretical foundations to analyze legislative and 
regulatory provisions governing service delivery. In this new research agenda 
focussed on regulatory structures, regulation is not one factor among many; the 
regulatory mandate is the starting point in the innovation story.  
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The approach that is being developed in this thesis can be distinguished from an 
approach known as “New Public Management” (NPM). Homburg and Bekkers (2005, 
p. 115) explain that, commonly, NPM ‘focuses on the application of private sector 
management techniques in the public sector’, including accrual accounting, 
performance pay, customer focus, and ‘market-style relations’ between government 
organizations (see also, e.g., Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Gruening 2001; Carroll and 
Steane 2002; O’Flynn 2007; Hall and Holt 2008; Hughes 2018). At first instance, the 
standard approach in the public sector innovation literature may appear to reflect the 
various NPM concepts (De Vries, Bekkers, and Tummers 2016), and researchers 
have pointed to examples of Australian governments taking up NPM propositions – 
including in public school education context (e.g., Armstrong 1998; Carroll and Steane 
2002; Fitzgerald and Rainnie 2012). However, NPM is not a single theoretical 
perspective and “NPM” has been a nebulous term for perhaps as long as the label 
has existed (Hood 1991).2 Instead, NPM is more accurately described as a “shopping 
basket” (Pollitt 1995) or a “buffet” (Borins 2002) of policy proposals from which 
policymakers can select their choices. On this basis, Hughes (2018) considers that 
NPM is too vague to be useful, maintaining that ‘there is an almost total absence of 
identifiable advocates [for NPM, and it] has become a term used almost exclusively 
by critics of public sector reform’ (Hughes 2018, p. 338). While one strand of the NPM 
literature will prove useful in the next chapter for considering “regulation inside 
government” (Hood et al. 1998; 1999; Hood, James, and Scott 2000; James 2000), a 
more useful literature will be found in school autonomy and school choice (e.g., Chubb 
and Moe 1990) because it is framed around various institutional possibilities for public 
school education service delivery. 
This chapter argues that regulation could inhibit both the creation and destruction 
phases of innovation. However, a review of the literature showed that one of the key 
limitations of the extant research is that it does not provide a survey or analysis about 
the detail of regulatory provisions in a public sector context. This was so even in one 
study that specifically sought to explore the relationship between regulation and public 
sector innovation (Wagner and Fain 2018). There is a clear need for more empirical 
                                                          
2 Although it is claimed that the conceptual basis for NPM derives from new institutional 
economics (Hood 1991; Gruening 2001), public choice theory (Gruening 2001; Hall and Holt 
2008; Volacu 2018), and neo-Taylorism (Hall and Holt 2008).  
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research to understand the effect of regulation on public sector innovation. One 
problem that was observed with widescale surveys is that they lack an ability to 
account for the possibility that there are regulatory differences between different 
public sector organizations. This existed even in studies that considered multiple 
jurisdictions (Bloch and Bugge 2013). Those assumptions are erroneous. While every 
public sector organization will have a regulatory structure governing service delivery, 
each agency will have its own distinct mandate. Some regulatory structures may 
tightly prescribe how a particular service is to be provided while other regulatory 
structures may provide a high degree of autonomy. Further, the regulatory structures 
governing service delivery are likely to differ across jurisdictions. These details are of 
fundamental importance to understanding why there is a lack of public sector 
innovation.  
Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to examine the regulatory constraints on 
public sector innovation. This chapter charts a new course for public sector innovation 
research. However, because every public sector service will have its own distinct 
regulatory and institutional frameworks governing service delivery, a specific public 
sector service is required for analysis. In the previous chapter, I noted that this thesis 
will provide a regulatory comparison using several case studies on public school 
education services. School education was chosen for analysis because it is a major 
public sector service accounting for over a quarter of government expenditure on 
public services in Australia (Productivity Commission 2019). In addition, there is an 
ability to leverage from an established literature on school autonomy and school 
choice, as innovation is specifically considered within those contexts (e.g., Lubienski 
2003a; Bulkley and Fisler 2003; Lake 2008; Preston et al. 2012; Wohlstetter, Smith, 
and Farrell 2015).  
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a critical summary and analysis of the academic research 
into public sector innovation using a Schumpeterian lens. This thesis is 
interdisciplinary, necessarily bridging economics, public administration, law, 
regulation, and broader issues of public policy. However, this thesis will approach the 
public sector innovation – and its application within the context of public education – 
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as an economic problem. That is, public sector innovation is framed as a problem of 
competing costs, trade-offs, and institutional choices. As such, the way to stimulate 
the public sector is through comparatively better institutional and regulatory 
frameworks for service delivery rather than through better management practices or 
changing public sector culture. This chapter outlined a new research agenda 
focussing on the regulatory structures for service delivery. The next chapter will detail 
the methodological approach for embarking on such an inquiry.  
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Chapter 3 – Regulation of public education services: a 
new comparative framework   
3.1  Introduction  
Regulation is often perceived as something that is imposed on private businesses in 
the course of providing goods and services to consumers. However, regulation also 
occurs inside government (Hood et al. 1998; 1999; Hood, James, and Scott 2000; 
James 2000; see also: Durant et al. 1986; Cope and Goodship 1999; Cope, 
Goodship, and Holloway 2003). Unlike the private sector, the public sector cannot 
provide services without some level of regulation. When governments decide to 
undertake expenditure decisions, the actions are not carried out by the executive 
themselves (i.e., government ministers) but by government agencies that run 
services. These agencies require direction about how the services will be provided. 
There is an inherent link, therefore, between public sector regulation and the 
justification for government expenditure. Regulation in this sense is a mechanism of 
executive control over the bureaucracy in order to achieve a government’s policy 
objectives (Mises 1944; Freiberg 2017; Windholz 2018).  
There are many reasons that governments undertake public expenditure on services. 
As a specific context for inquiry, as mentioned in the previous chapter, this thesis will 
focus on the regulation of public education services. This chapter will show that the 
regulation of public education services in Australia has occurred since its inception. 
This chapter will begin with a survey of the main reasons that have been advanced 
for the provision of public education services and their application to the Australian 
experience. Although these reasons are not unchallenged, this is a necessary task in 
presenting the argument that the reasons for public sector provision do not appear to 
mandate a single regulatory or institutional structure. Instead, it is argued that a 
variety of institutional arrangements have emerged that are compatible with the 
justifications of public provision.    
How does society make choices about these institutional arrangements? This chapter 
addresses this question by introducing the “New Comparative Economics” framework 
developed by Andrei Shleifer and his colleagues. In brief, this framework posits that 
regulation is one institutional enforcement strategy among many to manage the 
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competing costs of “disorder” and “dictatorship”. Recent developments to this model 
argue that dictatorship and disorder costs are subjective, suggesting that analysis 
should focus on how costs are perceived by relevant actors (Allen and Berg 2017). 
This framework has been applied in many different contexts as a tool for regulatory 
analysis, and its strength lies in focusing ‘our analytical attention, given institutional 
possibilities, on the trade-offs that exist in policing predation at the public and private 
levels’ (Boettke et al. 2005, p. 291). Importantly, the framework assumes that all 
institutions are imperfect – and on this basis, the task is evaluating policy from an 
‘institutional efficiency perspective, rather than from an allocative efficiency 
perspective’ (Davidson and Potts 2016a, p. 202 (original emphasis)). In the new 
comparative framework, “institutional efficiency” can be defined as ‘minimising the 
overall social cost’ (Davidson and Potts 2016a, p. 202). That is, greater institutional 
efficiency will be achieved where a new institutional possibility comparatively lowers 
the cost of disorder without increasing the cost of dictatorship or, alternatively, 
comparatively lowers the cost of dictatorship without increasing the cost of disorder 
(Djankov et al. 2003; Shleifer 2005; Davidson and Potts 2016a; 2016b). The thesis 
adopts this framework to map various institutional possibilities of public education in 
the chapters that follow, conceptualizing a lack of public sector innovation as a cost 
of dictatorship.   
The remainder of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section two considers the role 
of the state in the provision of education. Section three argues that when a service is 
publicly provided there will need to be a regulatory framework in place. Section four 
reviews the economics of regulation literature. Section five introduces the institutional 
possibilities frontier (IPF). Section six maps the institutional possibilities of public 
education and explains how the IPF will be used as a tool of analysis in later chapters. 
Section seven briefly outlines the Schumpeterian lens that will be used to assist the 
regulatory analysis. Section eight concludes the chapter.   
3.2  The role of the State in the provision of education 
In Australia, some form of public education has been provided since the early colonial 
period. Today, state and territory governments are the dominant provider of primary 
and secondary education, with 65.4 percent of all Australian school students attending 
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government schools in 2016 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017). This section of 
the chapter will consider the traditional justifications for the provision of public 
education. As mentioned above, these justifications provide a foundation for a 
government’s institutional responses in establishing and regulating public education 
systems. This survey is not exhaustive, but rather is limited to those that seem to have 
the most relevance to the Australian historical experience; namely, that education is 
necessary for a free and democratic society, that a single provider may be necessary 
to achieve economies of scale, and that education produces positive externalities or 
neighborhood effects. This section will now consider these three justifications 
individually.    
The first contention for the state involvement in education is that education is 
inherently good, and necessary for the working of any free society (e.g., Smith 1776; 
Mill 1859; Hayek 1960). The essence of this moral claim is that citizens need to be 
capable of reading, writing, and comprehending material to make informed choices, 
to be productive, and to be able to govern themselves. Although the primary 
responsibility for children’s education rests with parents, society will bear the burden 
of failure. Accordingly, there will be a legitimate role for the government to provide 
schools for children whose parents cannot provide for them, and where charitable 
efforts are not sufficient. 
Adam Smith (1776 [1904], v.1.177) considered that the public should concern itself 
with the education of the people in situations where the ‘attention of government is 
necessary in order to prevent the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the great 
body of the people.’  Smith notes that ‘the education of the common people requires, 
perhaps, in a civilized and commercial society the attention of the public more than 
that of people of some rank and fortune’ because ‘their parents can scarce afford to 
maintain them even in infancy’ with the consequence that children are put to work as 
soon as they are physically able to (1776 [1904], v.1.180-181). As Quinn’s 
commentary (2013) observes, Smith is not making a market-failure argument here 
but rather a moral one; education is intrinsically good.  
In Smith’s mind, requiring children to be provided with a basic education of reading, 
writing, and accounting will not result in a direct-pay off to government, but it will foster 
a more cohesive society; educated people will be less likely to fall into the ‘delusions 
71 
 
of enthusiasm and superstition’ that threaten to fracture society, be ‘more decent and 
orderly’, show due respect to ‘their lawful superiors’, and more able to judge 
government actions sensibly rather than ‘rashly or capriciously’ (1776 [1904], 
v.1.189). 
In a similar way, John Stuart Mill (1859 [2001], p. 96) asks, rhetorically, ‘is it not almost 
a self-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a 
certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen?’. For Mill, the failure 
of parents to educate their children is a ‘moral crime, both against the unfortunate 
offspring and against society’ (1859 [2001], p. 97). In dealing with a number of 
objections to a state-enforced level of education, Mill contends that such requirements 
are not a question of restricting individual liberty. But a minimum level of education is 
required for the maintenance of the institutions that exist in a free society. One 
example Mill (1859 [2001]) mentions is the institution of trial by jury, which requires 
suitably qualified jurors to comprehend the case before them. Another aspect is more 
general – education takes people ‘out of the narrow circle of personal and family 
selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the 
management of joint concerns’, Mill explains and ‘without these habits and powers a 
free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved’ (1859 [2001], p. 101). 
On these grounds, both Smith and Mill accept state funding for a minimum level of 
education where parents cannot afford these expenses – although they give slightly 
different proposals about how this should be achieved. For instance, Smith (1776 
[1904]) proposed that the state could: (i) establish subsidized schools with fees low 
enough so that poor parents could afford to send their children (although importantly, 
not completely subsidized to ensure teachers still had incentives to perform); and (ii) 
set minimum educational standards through public exams as a precondition for 
working in a corporation or engaging in a trade. By contrast, Mill (1859 [2001]) adopts 
a three-tiered cascading approach depending on how dire the circumstances are. In 
the first instance, Mill argues that if the state required – and enforced – a minimum 
level of education then ‘[the state] might save itself the trouble of providing [an 
education directly]’ (Mill 1859 [2001], p. 97). Second, Mill accepts that a minimum 
level of education might not achieve the outcome and may need to be combined with 
‘State aid to those unable to defray the expense’ (Mill 1859 [2001], p. 98). Third, it 
may be that, facing a choice between direct state provision of education and no 
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education at all, a government could run schools itself on the moral principle of the 
“lesser of two evils” (Mill 1859 [2001], p. 98). In summary, both Smith and Mill see a 
role for the state, on a moral basis, to provide minimum educational standards and 
funding for parents that cannot afford this expense. This general principle would seem 
to be even stronger for children that did not have parents to provide for them 
whatsoever.  
Indeed, in the Australian colonial experience, it was abandoned children that were in 
front of mind. In this historical context, government expenditure for educational 
purposes was based on averting the social and moral problems of a new colony where 
a sizable proportion of the population were convicts. Writing in 1800, New South 
Wales Governor Philip King noted a need to ‘…save the youth of this colony from the 
destructive examples of their abandoned parents, and others who they unavoidably 
associate with’ (cited in Barcan 1980, p. 12). Accordingly, the beginning of state 
involvement in education in Australia appears to be justified on moral grounds.   
The moral view expressed by classical scholars has been carried forward to the 
twentieth century. For example, Hayek (1960, p. 377) states that the justification of a 
government-mandated minimum standard of education rests on two grounds: (i) 
fostering a shared culture; and (ii) providing literacy for democratic representation –    
There is the general argument that all of us will be exposed to less risks and will 
receive more benefits from our fellows if they share with us certain basic knowledge 
and beliefs. And in a country with democratic institutions there is the further important 
consideration that democracy is not likely to work except on the smallest local scale, 
with a partly illiterate people. 
Modern Australian governments rely on a version of this as a justification for 
compulsory schooling regulations, expressing it in terms of the principal-agent 
problem. For example, the Victorian Department of Education and Training (2017, p. 
14) states:   
Parents have strong incentives to ensure their child receives a high quality education. 
However, there may be cases when the best interest of a child (as principal) in 
pursuing education is not fully reflected in decision making by their parent (as agent) 
where the parent is unable or incapable of promoting education for their child. If 
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uncorrected, the principal-agent problem could result in children receiving suboptimal 
levels of education at critical early stages of learning, which can be costly to remedy. 
The child-parent example offered here is not a principal-agent relationship or a 
principal-agent problem in the true sense. This is because (i) the child lacks the 
autonomy to appoint or revoke an agent; and (ii) there is no information asymmetry. 
This problem is better characterized as an example of “disorder costs” discussed later 
in this chapter.  
 Nevertheless, as Hayek (1960, p. 378) observes, ‘it is true that historically, 
compulsory education was usually preceded by the governments’ increasing 
opportunities by providing state schools.’ This claim finds support in the early 
Australian experience where, by the 1830s, the colonial government had begun to 
expand into rural areas where the churches had not yet established schools (Barcan 
1980). This expansion occurred around 40 years before compulsory attendance laws 
were introduced (Barcan 1980). This expansion could be justified on moral grounds, 
‘when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide 
for itself any proper institutions of education unless the government undertook the 
task’ (Mill 1859 [2001], p. 98). One could also characterize the justification for this 
expansion on equity grounds, in that people living in remote areas should not be 
disadvantaged by not receiving a minimum level of education because the 
establishment costs of privately providing education are prohibitive. However, there 
was another argument operating in the minds of New South Wales legislators at the 
time – what modern economists would now refer to as “economies of scale” or the 
existence of a “natural monopoly”. This is the second principal contention for the 
public provision of education that can also be observed within the Australian 
experience.  
Milton Friedman (1955, p. 5) explains the “natural monopoly” argument in the 
following terms.  
In small communities and rural areas, the number of children may be too small to 
justify more than one school of reasonable size, so that competition cannot be relied 
on to protect the interests of parents and children. 
Friedman (1955, p. 5) describes this argument as ‘clearly valid and significant’ but 
correctly notes that ‘its force has been greatly weakened in recent decades by 
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improvements in transportation and increasing concentration of the population in 
urban communities.’ The natural monopoly justification has continued to diminish as 
population growth, urbanization, and the lowering of costs and increased access to 
transportation have all continued well into the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the 
natural monopoly justification certainly had application in the Australian historical 
experience as the colony of New South Wales was growing in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. In that historical context, legislators argued that a single 
government school in each sparsely populated town would be more efficient than the 
various churches establishing several schools to cater for each religious 
denomination – the existing non-government alternative. In 1844, a committee of the 
New South Wales Legislative Council (cited in Barcan 1980, p. 51) described the 
problem with the denominational system in these terms:  
…Wherever one school is founded, two or three others will arise, not because they 
are wanted, but because it is feared that proselytes will be made; and thus a 
superfluous activity is produced in one place, and a total stagnation in another. It is a 
system impossible to be carried out in a thinly populated country.  
Of course, it is difficult to tell any early Australian story without reference to sectarian 
concerns. However, these denominational systems competed with each other, and it 
was a public policy problem because these systems received public assistance from 
the earliest beginnings of education in Australia in the form of land grants and direct 
funding contributions from the government (Barcan 1980). While the natural 
monopoly view might have validity in the rural context, the government’s financial 
support for the denominational system extended beyond these communities. As such, 
there is evidence that the government’s role in education extended beyond acting as 
a provider of last resort, or even the sole provider in the case of a natural monopoly. 
Although it is difficult to distill the stated justification for this expenditure, one 
possibility for this is a response to positive externalities or the “neighborhood effect” 
– the third principal justification that has been advanced for state intervention.  
The externality or neighborhood effect view is that the societal benefits of producing 
or consuming a good or service, sometimes referred to as “merit goods” (e.g., 
Musgrave 1959; Eecke 2003), is greater than the sum of its private benefits (e.g., 
Pigou 1932; Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962). The argument, as applied to 
education, goes as follows. For individuals, the private benefits of education include 
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the accumulation of knowledge and skills that increase productivity and long-run 
earning capacity and welfare. For society, the public benefits of education include 
increased civic engagement and higher economic growth. However, because the 
producers or consumers of education are unable to capture the public or societal 
benefits, this leads to an under-provision of education. Therefore, some form of 
government intervention is required so that the socially-optimal amount of education 
is provided. The strength of this argument depends on the supporting empirical 
evidence. An unavoidable difficulty of the positive externalities justification is an 
underlying assumption that government can pinpoint the socially-optimal amount of 
education.  
Hall (2006, p. 172) explains in his critique of the externalities of education, ‘many 
researchers fail to consider the ability of government to determine and implement a 
solution that maximizes social welfare and thus overestimate the ability of government 
intervention into education markets to improve welfare.’ Indeed, DeAngelis (2018) 
estimates that the United States has a net negative externality (c.f., Santoro 2018). 
Nevertheless, as Hall (2006, p. 165) notes, the externality view is ‘perhaps the most 
commonly cited justification for government involvement in education’. To be sure, in 
Australia, the Productivity Commission recently cited externalities as a ‘sound 
efficiency and equity ground’ that justifies government funding of education and 
regulating compulsory school attendance (Productivity Commission 2017, p. 61).  
Friedman (1955, p.1), for example, puts forward the externalities justification in 
preference to the moral argument for education (he dismisses the latter as being a 
vague paternalistic concern rather than addressing the ‘difficulty of achieving it by 
voluntary exchange’). Friedman (1955, p. 2) states that: 
A stable and democratic society is impossible without widespread acceptance of some 
common set of values and without a minimum degree of literacy and knowledge on 
the part of most citizens. Education contributes to both. In consequence, the gain from 
the education of a child accrues not only to the child or to his parents but to other 
members of the society; the education of my child contributes to other people's welfare 
by promoting a stable and democratic society. Yet it is not feasible to identify the 
particular individuals (or families) benefited or the money value of the benefit and so 
to charge for the services rendered. There is therefore a significant "neighborhood 
effect." 
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Friedman (1955, p. 2) suggests that the ‘most obvious’ way to address the 
neighborhood effect ‘is to require that each child receive a minimum amount of 
education of a specified kind’ and providing a subsidy for this minimum according to 
individual need. This idea continues the policy prescriptions of Smith and Mill, 
discussed above, although for a different reason. The significance of this is that 
acceptance of an externality or neighborhood effect suggests that there is an 
economic case for the role of the state in the provision of all general education – not 
just to avert the risk of parental failure or the limited case of natural monopoly.  
In surveying these principal justifications, I do not seek to claim that these reasons 
are universally accepted – or that they are without blemish. For instance, Andrew 
Young and Walter Block (1999) provide a forceful attempt at refuting each of the 
above grounds as justification for government intervention and present the argument 
for withdrawing government entirely from education (see also Rothbard 2002; Hall 
2006). However, even this account reinforces the point that these are the predominant 
reasons behind government intervention. Additionally, one cannot overlook the 
practicality that the government is involved in financing education – and this inquiry 
proceeds on the basis of that reality.  
Beginning in a world of some government expenditure, the question that then arises 
is how the government should provide education? As will be shown later in this 
chapter, the institutional possibilities for the provision of public education exist along 
a spectrum of government control. The contribution of Friedman (1995) is to openly 
challenge the presumption that nationalizing the education industry is the only way to 
address the private expenditure gap caused by either “neighborhood effect” or 
“natural monopoly”. More recently, Gregório (2018) has applied Hayek and Wilhelm 
von Humboldt's perspectives on liberty as the basis of her argument that respecting 
personal liberty requires the default role of the state in education to be limited to 
supervisory functions rather than one of monopoly provision in a single national 
education system. Yet the presumption of direct provision remains common amongst 
education researchers and other writers (see e.g., Meadmore 2001; Bonnor and Caro 
2007; Smyth 2011; Keddie 2016a; 2016b). This perspective starts from the default 
position of government involvement, contending that only a government-run system 
will maintain integrity in the education system. Similarly, the Australian Education 
Union (2011, p. 9) believes that ‘there is no a priori justification for public funding to 
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private schools,’ with the implication that there is an a priori justification for public 
funding for government-run schools. In section four of this chapter, I will reconcile 
these competing perspectives by applying the institutional theory of regulation.   
In any case, the fundamental point to be made at this stage is that in the early 
Australian experience there was a case made for a level of public expenditure that 
would provide children with a minimum level of education – in the form of government-
run school for the most in need and in rural areas, and public support for the 
denominational or private system. Public involvement in this way has been justified 
by a combination of the moral case for education, natural monopoly or economies of 
scale, and positive externalities or the neighborhood effect. In the next section of this 
chapter, I will put forward the proposition that public services are necessarily a 
creature of regulation.   
3.3 Public services as a creature of regulation  
The people making decisions about public expenditure are usually not the same 
people as those that are tasked with implementing it. Accordingly, any government 
intervention requires a regulatory framework. There is, therefore, an inherent link 
between the rationale establishing a system of public education and the regulatory 
framework that is established. The implication of this is that the more extensive the 
scope of the system, the more complex one can expect the regulatory structure to be 
to cater to a diversity of interests.  
In the Australian system of government, in general, public expenditure will be 
approved by a parliament in the form of an Appropriation Bill.3 Additionally, there will 
be a legislative or regulatory structure put in place to govern the application of those 
funds. Of course, this may be a constitutional requirement.4 However, even in the 
                                                          
3 Note that Australia’s system of government – at both the Commonwealth level and state or 
territory level – is based on the Westminster system, where the executive arm of government 
is drawn from the membership of the legislature or “parliament”. The members of the 
executive (referred to in Australia as “Ministers of the Crown” or simply “Ministers”) are 
responsible to Parliament for overseeing the various government departments. Although 
there is not a strict separation of powers, expenditure by the executive still requires a 
legislative basis.  
4 For recent Australian cases on this issue see, e.g., Pape v Commission of Taxation (2010) 
238 CLR 1; Williams v Commonwealth of Australia (2014) 252 CLR 416. Both cases 
considered, amongst other things, the meaning of section 83 of the Australian Constitution 
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absence of constitutional necessity, there will be a strong incentive for the legislature 
(through legislation) or the executive (through other forms of regulation) to control 
how funds are used to provide accountability, certainty, and enforceability. In any 
case, politicians – whether from the legislative or executive branch – will be practically 
unable to directly supervise the expenditure and day to day management of the 
services, so regulation functions as a mechanism of control ensuring that the 
allocated funds are spent according to the intentions of the legislature or executive.  
Hayek (1973, p. 126) makes a similar point, arguing that ‘the great majority of the 
resolutions passed by representative assemblies do not of course lay down rules of 
just conduct but direct measures of government.’ A consequence of this is that every 
condition or requirement that is put in place limits the discretionary power of the public 
servants charged with implementing the services.  
Mises (1944, p. 41) explains the intention in the relatively straightforward context of a 
king and his governor.  
In order to avoid [arbitrariness] the king tries to limit the governor's powers by issuing 
directives and instructions. Codes, decrees, and statutes tell the governors of the 
provinces and their subordinates what to do if such or such a problem arises. Their 
free discretion is now limited; their first duty is now to comply with the regulations. It is 
true that their arbitrariness is now restricted in so far as the regulations must be 
applied. But at the same time the whole character of their management changes. They 
are no longer eager to deal with each case to the best of their abilities; they are no 
longer anxious to find the most appropriate solution for every problem. Their main 
concern is to comply with the rules and regulations, no matter whether they are 
reasonable or contrary to what was intended. The first virtue of an administrator is to 
abide by the codes and decrees. He becomes a bureaucrat.5 
It is in this way that Mises (1944, p. 45) characterizes bureaucracy as ‘management 
bound to comply with detailed rules and regulations fixed by the authority of a superior 
                                                          
which provides that ‘no money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the Commonwealth except 
under appropriation made by law’. The High Court held that this section does not provide the 
Commonwealth government with a general spending power – funds must be lawfully 
appropriate under statute or other provisions of the constitution.  
5 Mises goes onto state that ‘The same thing is essentially valid for democratic government’ 
(p. 42) – although he adds that ‘The administration, in a democratic community, is not only 
bound by law but by the budget’ (p. 43).   
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body.’ Modern regulatory scholars appear to share a similar view to Mises – executive 
control over the bureaucracy – but perhaps express it in more neutral terminology. 
For instance, Freiberg (2017) describes regulation as a tool for governments to 
achieve public policy objectives that underpin each area of service delivery (see also: 
Cope, Goodship and Holloway 2003; Windholz 2018). A parallel theme is noted by 
public choice and public finance scholars examining federalism and the conditions 
that attach to intergovernmental grants – that is regulation of one government by 
another (e.g., Brennan and Pincus 1990; Garzarelli and Keeton 2018).  
Commonly, regulation is thought of as something governments impose on the private 
sector – but regulation occurs inside government too, where ‘public organizations are 
shaped by rules and standards emanating from arm’s-length authorities’ (Hood et al. 
1999, p. 3-4). As Hood and his colleagues (1999) show, public sector regulation can 
be extensive. Regulation, in the public sector context, is not the actions that public 
servants take in providing the services but rather the frameworks governing this 
service delivery (Freiberg 2017).  
Regulation is difficult to define precisely as lawyers, public sector administrators, 
economists, and other social scientists all have slightly different perspectives. As 
David Levi-Faur (2011, p. 3) has said, regulation ‘means different things to different 
people.’ This thesis will take a broad approach to the examination of regulation to 
encompass both “hard” and “soft” regulation. This distinction is perhaps more 
commonly observed in the jurisprudence of international law (see, e.g., Shaffer and 
Pollack 2010). However, it is also used in the context of domestic public law (see, 
e.g., Weeks 2016). “Hard regulation” refers to formal legislative instruments passed 
by a legislature (e.g., Acts), made pursuant to such legislation (e.g., Regulations), or 
otherwise made under some other form of delegated authority (e.g., Orders). Hard 
regulation has binding legal force. “Soft regulation,” on the other hand, is harder to 
define as its reach ‘occup[ies] a broad section of the spectrum between unstructured 
discretion and legislation’ (Weeks 2016, p. 17). Applying Weeks (2016, p. 18) to the 
public sector context, “soft regulation” will generally include ‘codes of practice, 
guidance, guidance notes, circulars, policy notes, development briefs, practice 
statements…codes of conduct, codes of ethics, and conventions.’ Parliament does 
not specifically authorize these types of regulations, but, as Weeks (2016) shows, this 
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type of regulation can still have real legal consequences enforceable through the 
courts and other administrative review bodies.  
To date, the most comprehensive examination of the regulation of the public sector 
has been conducted by Christopher Hood and his colleagues at the London School 
of Economics (Hood et al. 1998; 1999) who investigated regulation inside the United 
Kingdom government. The study aimed to ‘reveal the overall scope and scale of 
regulation over British government’ and also how this regulation worked in practice 
(Hood et al. 1998, p. 61). The authors summarised their three major findings in the 
following terms:  
• First, regulation inside UK government, when all its forms are taken together, amounts 
to a large enterprise, approaching, if not exceeding, the scale of regulation of private 
business. 
• Second, internal regulation of government seems in many of its domains to have 
increased in formality, complexity, intensity and specialization over the past two 
decades. 
• Third, the behaviour of regulators inside government seems to be related to how close 
they are to those they oversee in professional/social backgrounds. In general, we find 
the more distant regulators are from their clients in backgrounds, the more formally they 
behave. (Hood et al. 1998, p. 62).  
In that study, the authors do not explicitly distinguish between “hard” and “soft” 
regulation. Instead, the authors propose that there are three elements to “regulation” 
in a public sector context: (i) that one public sector organization – i.e., a government 
department or statutory authority – shapes the activities of another; (ii) that the 
overseeing organization is functionally separate from the regulated organization; and 
(iii) the regulatory relationship is based on a legal mandate. This definition is illustrated 
in Figure 3.1, below.  
This definition includes both “hard” and “soft” elements of regulation – but it should be 
highlighted that the regulation still has an official basis. The mandate comes from 
principal legislation and other legislative instruments governing service delivery – in 
addition to departmental policies and procedures.  
Following Hood et al. (1998; 1999), the critical carve-out is that management activities 
within the same organization are not characterized as regulation. In this thesis, I 
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propose that this definition is a good starting point for thinking about public sector 
regulation in many contexts – but that it is too narrow in one respect. That is, the 
definition ought not to be confined to a relationship of mandated control between two 
publicly-owned bodies. Instead, the focus should be on the regulation of public 
services. This is because regulation can also apply to private actors and private 
organizations delivering public sector services (e.g., Windholz 2018). On this basis, 
Cope, Goodship, and Holloway (2003), building on Cope and Goodship (1999), refer 
to this as “regulation inside governance” rather than “regulation inside government” in 
conducting a mixed-methods study on the regulation of vocational education. 
However, I will adopt the term “regulation inside government” in order to be clear that 
this thesis is concerned with public sector regulation. Although, I do proceed with the 
caution that this thesis argues that there are ways of providing public sector services 
that may not involve the direct provision or management by a public sector body. 
Nevertheless, these bodies are regulated to achieve public purposes. This proposition 
will be fleshed out in the chapters to follow.    
Figure 3.1– Definition of Regulation Inside Government 
 
Source: Hood, C, Scott, C, James, O, Jones, G and Travers, T 1999, Regulation inside Government: 
Waste-Watchers, Quality Police and Sleaze-Busters, Oxford University Press: New York, p. 9. 
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In this section of the chapter, it has been argued that regulation is necessary for public 
sector service delivery. Further, it has been argued that public sector regulation not 
only exists, but it is unique and extensive. The question that remains, so far, with this 
argument is that there is no single institutional possibility for the provision or regulation 
of public education. This thesis aims to address the question of what are the different 
regulatory structures and how does society choose among alternatives. An analytical 
framework is needed in order to be able to offer an economic analysis of regulatory 
responses to this problem. The next section of the chapter reviews the relevant 
economic theories of regulation.    
3.4 The economics of regulation and institutional choice   
There are three economic theories of regulation that can be used to inform an 
economic analysis of regulatory structures (Shleifer 2005; Davidson 2013). The focus 
of this section is on economic theories of regulation rather than other ideological, 
historical, sociological, or otherwise political regulatory theories (see, e.g., Drahos 
2017 and Windholz 2018 for recent discussions). Accordingly, this section of the 
chapter will consider the public interest and private interest theories of regulation 
before explaining an institutional theory of regulation that I will adopt in this thesis.  
3.4.1 Public interest theory of regulation  
First, the “public interest” or “helping hand” theory of regulation (Posner 1974; Shleifer 
2005) postulates that governments will intervene in the public interest to correct 
various market failures such as monopolies, externalities, information asymmetries, 
or some other harm that means that the socially optimal level of production is not 
being delivered (Morgan and Yeung 2007; Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2012; Freiberg 
2017; Windholz 2018). Ginosar (2014) argues that the public interest theory has 
undergone a resurgence in recent years. For example, Ginosar and Krispil (2016) 
draw on this theory to explain the development of broadcasting regulation. James 
(2000) highlights that the public interest theory of regulation is used to justify 
“regulation inside government”. 
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On first impressions, this theory may seem to broadly align with the earlier section of 
this chapter, reviewing the principal reasons that have been put forward for the state’s 
involvement in providing and regulating public education. That is, the reason that the 
government intervenes through public education is to correct the under-provision of 
education that would otherwise occur without state provision. However, the public 
interest theory does not provide an account of why specific regulatory responses have 
emerged. To express this idea in another way, the public interest theory provides an 
account of why governments intervene by regulating or providing services – although 
not what form that intervention should take. As this chapter has shown, scholars have 
proposed a range of measures to address insufficient education ranging from 
compulsory schooling regulations, subsidies paid to teachers, subsidies paid to 
parents, and direct provision of government-run schools.  
The public interest theory appears to be blind to the possibility of private governance 
arrangements emerging to correct previous market failures (Shleifer 2005) or that 
courts could promote efficient outcomes by enforcing property rights under the 
common law rules of contract and tort (Coase 1960; Posner 1972). Of course, the 
nature of politics and democratic government is that there are competing visions for 
the public interest (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 2012). Even discounting the difficulties 
in actually computing the public interest (Hayek 1945) and identifying the specific 
government actions that would accurately address the supposed market failure (Hall 
2006), the public interest theory’s most significant shortcoming is the presumption of 
a benevolent government and bureaucracy. This assumption is challenged explicitly 
by a second theory that is typically associated with the Chicago School of Economics.  
3.4.2 Private interest theory of regulation  
The “special interest” or “capture” theory of regulation (e.g., Stigler 1971; Posner, 
1974; Peltzman 1989) argues that rent-seeking firms demand regulation to gain an 
economic advantage over rival firms – regulation which is supplied by self-interested 
politicians seeking political support (see also Downs 1957). Djankov et al. (2002) 
break the private interest theory into two strands, distinguishing between Stigler’s 
“capture” theory that focuses on the benefits flowing to private firms that seek greater 
84 
 
barriers of entry and public choice’s “tollbooth” theory that focuses on the benefits that 
regulators derive from regulation.   
As I have pointed out above, public services will be implemented by the bureaucracy 
rather than politicians themselves. So, in the public sector context, bureaucrats too 
can be treated as self-interested groups that seek to maximize their status, power, 
and budget within an organization (Downs 1964; Tullock 1965; Niskanen 1971). For 
instance, Downs (1964) distinguishes between “purely self-interested officials” and 
“mixed-motive officials.” The former is made up of “climbers” who seek to increase 
their power, income, and prestige within the bureaucracy, and “conservers” who are 
opposed to public sector innovation because it may disrupt the power, income, and 
prestige that they already hold (Downs 1964). The latter consists of “zealots”, seeking 
power to implement the policies they believe in, “advocates” who may be impartial 
inside their own agency but want to increase their agency’s powers at the expense of 
other public sector bodies, and “statesman” that are the archetypal public servants, 
but relish power, prestige, and influence (Downs 1964).  
Of course, these private interests can combine forces by forming “political pressure 
groups” to lobby for regulatory change in their favor (Becker 1983). Although a lot of 
the focus of the private interest theory scholarship has been on the private sector (c.f. 
James 2000), some organized interest groups also have a public sector, including 
public sector trade unions and other non-government organizations (e.g. Principals’ 
associations) that are established to lobby government, among other things. Although 
there are constraints on the ability of self-interested groups to gain an advantage from 
favorable regulation (e.g., Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983), the transaction costs of 
regulatory change can be manipulated in the bureaucracy’s favor (Twight 1988; 
1994). In addition, because bureaucrats become the experts in the government 
programs and regulations that they administer or enforce, there is a bias in keeping 
those programs and regulations in place (Niskanen 1971). Further, voter irrationality 
and bias mean that citizens may not be active or effective monitors of government 
actions even within liberal democratic countries with responsible government (e.g., 
Caplan 2007).  
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Bribery and corruption are also actions that are consistent with the private interest 
theory of regulation. Regulations that provide power to public officials to grant 
licenses, permits, contracts, and the like, create opportunities for officials to seek or 
accept payment in exchange for these approvals (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1993; 
Djankov et al. 2002).  
One consequence of the above combination is that legislators may seek even tighter 
constraints over how the public service is provided, under the guise of accountability 
and quality control. Another consequence is that there will be a status quo bias and 
mission creep, leading to an expanded role for government. These arguments tend 
towards the same direction – predicting that, over time, there will be growth in 
regulatory complexity.  
The private interest theory of regulation, bolstered by the insights of public choice 
economics, provides a powerful critique of the public interest theory in asserting that 
government intervention may not be able to address market failures. Worse, 
government failure may, in fact, result in a less efficient or misallocation of resources 
by distorting markets and sustaining the market failures that the regulation was initially 
intended to address. Despite its clear application in the public sector context, like the 
public interest theory, the private interest theory is limited in its ability to make 
comparisons between different forms of regulatory responses that are intended to 
achieve the same outcomes.  
3.4.3  An institutional theory of regulation  
Andrei Shleifer (2005, p. 441) praises the private interest theory as ‘one of the finest 
moments of twentieth-century economics’ but states that it ‘cannot be the final answer’ 
due to an overconfidence in private orderings, and the paradox that developed 
economies are more prosperous than ever before but more heavily regulated.  
Shleifer and his colleagues advance a third economic theory of regulation (Djankov 
et al. 2003), which Shleifer refers to as the “enforcement theory of regulation” (Shleifer 
2005). This is an institutional theory that considers that all ‘strategies for social control 
of businesses are imperfect and that optimal institutional design involves a choice 
among these imperfect alternatives’ (Schleifer 2005, p. 443).  The theory attempts to 
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bridge the competing public interest and private interest theories by recognizing the 
cost of market failure and government failure. In doing so, there is a move from the 
search for allocative efficiency to the search for institutional efficiency (Davidson and 
Potts 2016). The institutional theory posits that ‘the two central dangers that any 
society faces are disorder and dictatorship’ and ‘institutions function to control these 
twin dangers…’ (Djankov et al. 2003, p. 598).  
“Disorder” is the risk of harm inflicted by other individuals. Some examples of disorder 
include murder, theft, other tortious actions against person or property, breaches of 
agreements, breaches of trust, monopoly price gouging, or individuals subverting 
public institutions to avoid liability for their actions. “Dictatorship”, on the other hand, 
is the risk of harm being inflicted by governments or government officials exercising 
state power; some general examples include taxation, compulsory acquisition of 
property, state controls on exchange, or restrictions on competition. To paraphrase 
Boettke and Candela (2019), the world is in a perpetual state of predation. The 
regulation of public sector services designed to prevent private predation – disorder 
– invites the risk of state predication – dictatorship; and vice versa.   
Of course, some actions will involve risks of both disorder and dictatorship. Take 
corruption, for example. Bribes could be paid by individuals to subvert justice and 
avoid liability for their actions (cost of disorder), or government officials could demand 
bribes in exchange for regulatory approvals (cost of dictatorship) (Djankov et al. 
2003). 
At this point, the concerns around institutions for public education can be recast in 
terms of the risk of disorder and dictatorship. As I have detailed above, classical 
scholars considered that state intervention for public education was justified as a 
society needs a common set of values to avoid society descending into chaos, as well 
as maintaining a productive people that can govern themselves. However, what has 
not been covered so far is the tension that involved in the state’s intervention in 
education. For classical scholars, although state intervention was justified on moral 
grounds, intervention would provide power to the state to impose values through 
government schooling or other forms of regulatory control. This concern can be 
conceived as a cost of dictatorship; that is, government action would potentially 
threaten the liberty of individuals.  
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Mill (1859 [2001], p. 97) writes that:  
A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like 
one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the 
predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an 
aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation; in proportion as it is efficient and 
successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to 
one over the body. 
Hayek (1960, p. 377) elaborates on this tension:  
There is a need for certain common standards of values, and, through too great 
emphasis on this need may lead to very illiberal consequences, peaceful common 
existence would be clearly impossible without any such standards…The fact that all 
education must be and ought to be guided by definite values is, however, also the 
source of real dangers in any system of public education.  
A cost of dictatorship in this context is the risk that the entire system of government 
education could be ‘dominated by the theories of a particular group’ and that ‘the more 
highly one rates the power that education can have over [people’s] minds, the more 
convinced one should be of the danger of placing this power in the hands of any single 
authority’ (Hayek 1960, p. 380). The danger may not be intentional. In a later work, 
Hayek (1973, p. 72) comments that the invention of legislation ‘gave into the hands 
of [lawmakers] an instrument of great power which they needed to achieve some 
good, but which they have not yet learned so to control that it may not produce great 
evil.’  
Settling on a common set of values is a challenging task (Friedman 1955; Hayek 
1960; McLaughlin 1995) and one that is often fraught with political controversy. In 
Australia, modern debates around the merits of a national curriculum, for example, 
are fundamentally a dispute about values (e.g., Berg 2010; Donnelly and Wiltshire 
2014). In the United States, the Cato Institute (2019) has systematically documented 
almost two decades of public schooling clashes over values in America ‘pitting 
educational effectiveness, basic rights, moral values, or individual identities against 
each other’. The Cato Institute’s database plotted on a geographic “battle map,” detail 
hundreds of disputes in public schools over curriculum, freedom of expression, 
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gender equity, human origins (i.e., creationism versus evolutionary theories), moral 
values, race and ethnicity, prescribed reading materials, religion, and sexuality.   
The school choice literature reveals other costs of dictatorship within the public 
education context centered on notions of governance and accountability. A central 
claim of this literature is that government schools will not be responsible to the needs 
of parents and students. For instance, where decision making and service provision 
is centralized, there will be the risk of political influence and bureaucratic capture from 
interest groups. In this case, ‘public officials will come under intense pressure from 
social groups of all political stripes to use it’ and seek to ‘embed their policies in 
protective bureaucratic arrangements’ (Chubb and Moe 1990, pp. 5-6; see also: e.g., 
Gannicott 1997; Donnelly 2015). A related issue is the use of state power to protect 
monopoly control over the public education system by the so-called “education 
establishment” (e.g., Arsen, Plank and Sykes 1999; Vergari 2007) although it has also 
been argued that charter school providers too may use the political process to 
maintain their positions (e.g., Geske, Davis and Hingle 1997).   
Another fundamental premise of the school choice literature is that choice and 
competition will promote innovation in public education because ‘state-administered 
schools are necessarily bound by bureaucratic regulations, inhibiting innovation and 
enforcing uniformity in the way that children are educated’ (Lubienski 2003a, pp. 395-
396; see also e.g. Wohlstetter, Wenning, and Briggs 1995; Arsen, Plank and Sykes 
1999; Lubienski 2001; Lake 2008) – as such lack of innovation in this context can be 
characterized as a cost of dictatorship. Likewise, other regulatory restrictions that limit 
autonomy or restrict competition are costs of dictatorship.  
In terms of the costs of disorder, a starting point is a moral justification for state 
intervention in education espoused by the classical scholars – which I have detailed 
above. In this view, the concern was that children would not be adequately educated 
either because they had been abandoned, or because their parents did not value 
education and so children would be put to manual work too early in life and would not 
acquire basic literacy and numeracy skills. This concern continues in modern times 
with home education, for example, where there is a risk that parents may not be able 
to meet their children’s educational needs (Allen and Jackson 2010; Jackson 2017; 
Victorian Department of Education and Training 2017) – and that educational 
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outcomes are derived from family background (Lubienski 2003b). Accordingly, 
parental failure is a cost of disorder for education. Similarly, one concern about other 
decentralized approaches to delivering public education is that market discipline will 
not ensure that students receive a high-quality education from providers (e.g., Geske, 
Davis and Hingle 1997). Indeed, for-profit involvement in education has been 
dismissed as being ‘antithetical to educative goals’ (Keddie 2015, p. 258) with the 
implication that providers will be more concerned with seeking profit than student 
achievement (cf., e.g., Tooley 2013). 
Another major concern is discrimination in various forms, based on the view that 
‘equity and access’ are ‘core values of public education’ (Keddie 2016a, p. 255; see 
also: Fitzgerald and Rainnie 2012). I have previously identified sectarian concerns in 
the early Australian experience. Along these lines, critics of school choice programs 
assert that there is the potential to ‘further stratify schools along racial, 
socioeconomic, and other class-based lines’ and ‘"skim" predominantly white, 
privileged students from public schools’ (Cobb and Glass 1999, p. 2; c.f. Whitehurst, 
Reeves and Rodrigue 2016). Discrimination against students with a disability is a 
similar concern (Garda 2012). Such forms of discrimination that prevent access to 
public education can be characterized as costs of disorder. Although it should be 
noted that this discrimination could be committed by government officials in the 
exercise of their duties – in which case it can also be characterized as a cost of 
dictatorship.  
As I have mentioned above, corruption and bribery could be classified as either a cost 
of dictatorship or a cost of disorder, depending on the context. This risk is applicable 
in an education context, particularly in developing countries. For example, 
Transparency International (2013) notes examples of corruption in the procurement 
process, the diversion of resources and misappropriation of funds, the payment of 
bribes in exchange for access to education, higher grades, or the granting of awards, 
staff absenteeism, and the practice of nepotism in hiring staff.  
The discussion in this section of the chapter is not intended to be exhaustive. Indeed, 
further examples of dictatorship and disorder will emerge in the chapters that follow. 
Instead, this section aims to show that the major policy concerns in the public 
education context fit well into the institutional theory of regulation paradigm, which 
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states that society faces costs of dictatorship and disorder. I will now move to 
introduce the Institutional Possibilities Frontier, which provides a clear methodology 
for comparing and assessing the trade-offs involved between dictatorship and 
disorder among the various institutions of public education.   
3.5 The Institutional Possibilities Frontier  
There is no single institutional possibility for the provision of public education. 
Because of this, the institutional theory of regulation arising out of the New 
Comparative Economics (Djankov et al. 2003; Shleifer 2005) provides a useful 
framework to analyze and compare these institutional arrangements – the IPF. As I 
have foreshadowed, the key focus of the IPF framework is on the trade-off between 
dictatorship and disorder costs, in that ‘a state that has more powers to control 
disorder also has more for dictatorial abuse’ (Djankov et al. 2003, pp. 598-599). In 
other words, as state power increases to address and mitigate disorder costs, there 
is an associated increase in the costs of dictatorship. In this framework there is always 
some “equilibrium” level of disorder and dictatorship because transaction costs are 
assumed to be non-zero; no institutional arrangement ever completely economizes 
on these costs (Djankov et al. 2003).  
To illustrate the application of the IPF framework, Djankov et al. (2003) use the 
example of social control of business. The authors propose four distinct institutional 
strategies (private orderings through markets; private litigation; public enforcement 
through regulation; and state ownership) that could be employed to reduce disorder 
costs of things such as ‘monopoly pricing, torts, or predatory tactics’ (Djankov et al. 
2003, p. 601). Theoretically, private orderings are the default position. It does not 
mean that activity is unregulated; it means that conduct is regulated by the market 
mechanism (e.g., competitive pressure) and private collective action (e.g., industry 
association codes of conduct or other reputational mechanisms). However, these 
actions may not satisfactorily deal with the disorder problems and ‘societies may 
efficiently accept a higher level of government intervention to limit disorder’ (Djankov 
et al. 2003, p. 602). 
As has been explained, various types of government intervention targeted at 
mitigating disorder costs exist on a spectrum of increasing public control.  
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No public involvement is required with competition and private orderings. Courts 
employ impartial judges enforcing the rules of good behavior. These rules do not even 
need to come from legislation; rather, they may derive from custom or from judge-
made common law. Even in this case, the judge is a public agent with decision-making 
authority. With regulators, the state writes the rules, inspects the product before it is 
sold, and penalizes sellers for delivering a bad product. Both the scope of government 
activity and its centralization are increased relative to independent courts. Finally, with 
state ownership, the government takes complete control over an activity. (Djankov et 
al. 2003, p. 601) 
The trade-off between dictatorship and disorder is shown by plotting these strategies 
on an IPF curve, shown in Figure 3.2. The x-axis shows the costs of dictatorship, 
while the y-axis shows the costs of disorder. The IPF assumes convexity with the 
implication that there is a cost-minimizing point shown at the intersection of the 45-
degree line and the IPF curve (“total loss minimization”) – that is, an efficient point, 
given that there is no such thing as a perfect institutional arrangement as costs are 
present in all possibilities.  
Figure 3.2 - Institutional Possibilities Frontier 
 
Source: Djankov, S, Glaeser, EL, La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F and Shleifer, A 2003, 'The New 
Comparative Economics', Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 31, no. 4, p. 599. 
The distance from the origin represents the level of “civic capital”– a broad concept 
encompassing culture, ethnic homogeneity, natural or physical endowments or 
environments, history, the scale of production, the efficiency of tax extraction, and the 
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level of human capital (Djankov et al. 2003). Higher levels of civic capital will move 
the IPF closer to the origin, illustrating that greater civic capital means a higher 
capacity for society to form institutional possibilities at lower costs – making society 
better off overall. The conception of civic capital has been criticized as being both 
incomplete and as ‘a term so broad as to be essentially empty’ (Rosser and Rosser 
2008, p. 85). Nevertheless, at a basic level, institutions emerge from human 
interaction and that these factors will all impact a society’s ability to form institutional 
possibilities.  
The time frame is also important. While the IPF is fixed in the short run, over time the 
shape, slope, and position of the curve can change (Djankov et al. 2003). Often the 
factors that shift the IPF curve will be beyond our control (Boettke et al. 2005), but 
changes in technology can promote cooperation seemingly in favor of private 
orderings (Djankov et al. 2003; Boettke et al. 2005; Allen et al. 2018; Allen, Lane, and 
Poblet 2019).      
Allen and Berg (2017) modify the IPF framework in two ways. First, the authors treat 
dictatorship costs and disorder costs as subjective. The value of this approach is that 
it recognizes that individuals will be perceptive of costs based on a range of personal 
factors such as political ideology, experience, or knowledge – and these might change 
over time and with new information or persuasion. The insight that applies in the 
context of this thesis is that new regulatory structures and institutional forms for 
alternative methods of delivering public sector services will emerge on the basis of 
perceived institutional efficiency. Secondly, the authors disaggregate institutional 
choices to the individual level where institutional choices are the result of bargaining 
between individuals and groups that have different subjective preferences. An 
example of this disaggregation is illustrated in Figure 3.3, where institutional 
bargaining takes places between two individuals, “Capitalist” and “Socialist.” These 
individuals conceive different ideal institutional arrangements, market ordering, and 
nationalization, respectively – and with equal bargaining power reach a compromised 
institutional possibility of the regulatory state. The authors term their modification of 
the IPF as an “Austrian subjectivist approach” as it draws on a key insight of the 
Austrian School of economic theory that ‘value and costs, including opportunity costs, 
are subjective perceptions’ (Allen and Berg 2017, p. 22; citing Buchanan and Wagner 
1977; Menger 1871; Stringham 2010; Yeager 1987).  
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Figure 3.3 – Subjective Institutional Possibilities Frontier 
 
Source: Allen, D, and Berg, C 2017. ‘Subjective political economy’, New Perspectives on Political 
Economy, vol. 13, no. 12, p. 29. 
The IPF framework and the associated subjective approach has been applied in two 
ways in the extant literature. First, the model can be utilized as an instrument for 
comparative institutional analysis. For instance, Djankov et al. (2003) use their model 
to analyze legal origins, the phenomenon of regulation, institutions in transition, and 
the transplanting of institutions. Whitford and Lee (2012) investigate democracy and 
government effectiveness across countries. Davidson (2013) discusses enhancing 
productivity through greater private enforcement of public rules. Davidson and Potts 
(2016a; 2016b) map the institutions of innovation policy whose efforts are furthered 
by Allen (2017) utilizing the subjective approach in a detailed institutional analysis of 
the private governance of entrepreneurial discovery. Also employing the subjective 
framework, Berg and Davidson (2016) provide an institutional analysis of political 
debates about freedom of speech. In a later work, the same authors consider the high 
disorder costs associated with national public broadcasting (Berg and Davidson 
2018). Other recent efforts in this vein have explored the effect of blockchain 
technology on the institutions of voting and collective decision making (Allen et al. 
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2018; Allen, Berg, and Lane (2019) and methods of legal dispute resolution for smart 
legal contracts (Allen, Lane, and Poblet 2019) (see also: Berg, Davidson and Potts 
2019).  
The second way that the IPF model has been used is as a powerful tool to analyze 
regulation. For example, Shleifer (2005) applies the model to the regulation of 
financial markets; Płóciennik (2013) uses the model to analyze labor market reform 
in Germany; Davidson (2014) explains the costs of disorder in the context of 
environmental protesters; Berg and Davidson (2015) critique proposals for increased 
regulatory controls of the media; Berg (2016) investigates changes in Australia’s 
prudential regulation over time using the subjective framework; Davidson (2016) 
presents the institutional possibilities of tobacco control; and Berg (2018) evaluates 
models of privacy regulation.   
The following chapters of this thesis will employ a combination of these two methods. 
First, the IPF framework will provide an organizing principle to detail the institutional 
possibilities of public education. Second, the IPF framework will provide the basis for 
the analysis of the regulatory framework governing each institutional possibility. The 
next section of the chapter expands on this approach.      
3.6 Institutions of Public Education  
In the same way that the IPF can be used to map institutions of social control over 
business (Djankov et al. 2003), this thesis uses the IPF to map the institutions of 
school education. This chapter has argued that public education is a creature of 
regulation, given that any state intervention to require or provide public services will 
necessarily require a regulatory response. In this way, regulatory structures are 
required in all of the institutional possibilities of public education in order to achieve 
public aims. However, my comparative institutional analysis will show that there is a 
trade-off between regulatory constraints to control costs of dictatorship and disorder, 
and this trade-off has consequences for public sector innovation.  
In the chapters that follow, I propose that each institutional possibility exhibits a unique 
regulatory structure. All these possibilities can achieve public aims but do so through 
different combinations of dictatorship and disorder costs. For example, the state could 
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provide services directly through centrally-managed government schools. In Chapter 
4, I will show that government schools are characterized by high dictatorship costs 
but exhibit low levels of disorder. Another possibility is that the state could provide 
services directly through government-owned schools but provide schools with a high 
degree of local autonomy – Independent Public Schools. In Chapter 5, I will examine 
a recent Australian experience of Independent Public Schools – and how this recent 
institutional possibility provides increased autonomy for relieving public schools of 
high dictatorship costs that restrict innovation. Next, in Chapter 6, I will consider 
separately the decentralized institutional forms of charter schools and voucher 
programs, where providers have a separate legal identity. In these forms, it will be 
argued that increased autonomy implies that costs of dictatorship costs are lower than 
the centralized institutional possibility, but there are higher perceived costs of 
dictatorship – which regulatory requirements attempt to mitigate. In Chapter 7, I will 
briefly discuss for-profit schools in developing countries and home education in 
developed countries. Although these are not public sector institutions for the provision 
of services, they represent options for parents to secede from the public services 
where perceived dictatorships of other possibilities remain too high.  
3.7 A Schumpeterian lens of regulatory analysis  
The Schumpeterian view of innovation is a process of “creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter 1942). This conception of innovation has been used to advance our 
understanding of public sector innovation (e.g., Potts 2009; Potts and Kastelle 2010; 
Potts 2010; Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle 2015). The evolutionary approach of political 
economy recognizes that there is a dynamic process involved in formulating and 
executing public policy (Witt 2003).  The first stage of analysis in this thesis, outlined 
above, applies the new comparative approach (e.g., Djankov 2003) to the regulation 
of public education services. The second stage of analysis involves overlaying a 
Schumpeterian lens for regulatory analysis. Specifically, legislative and regulatory 
measures will be analyzed as a policy instrument with reference to the two distinct 
phases of innovation – “creation” of the new, and “destruction” of the old (Schumpter 
1942; see also, e.g., Potts 2009).This type of evolutionary approach to policy analysis, 
in contrast to neoclassical  static analysis, recognizes that the introduction of a policy 
measure induces learning and behavioral change (Witt 2003). 
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The Schumpeterian approach certainly has relevance for regulatory analysis. For 
instance, Bauer (1997) applies the insights of the Schumpeterian conception of 
innovation to the regulation of the telecommunications industry. Yandle (2002) uses 
creative destruction to examine property rights in the context of environmental 
regulation. Diamond (2014) considers several labor market policies to promote 
creative destruction. Perhaps more commonly, the Schumpeterian approach to 
competition has been referred to in the context of antitrust (otherwise referred to as 
“competition law”) merger analysis (see, e.g., Gilbert and Sunshine 1995). The 
common thread of this research is to show how regulation affects the dynamic forces 
of innovation.  
The research approach that I have outlined in this chapter is a unique approach in the 
economics of public sector innovation. However, the approach does fit within the 
broader tradition at the intersection of institutional law and economics and 
evolutionary economics. Indeed, there is a long history of institutional law and 
economics applied to market and non-market contexts (Posner 2014). ‘Many of the 
founders of and present contributors to institutional economics stress the evolutionary 
facet of institutions’ (Medema, Mercuro and Samuels 2018, p. 423).  
3.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has aimed to outline the methodological approach that will be used 
throughout this thesis. It has been argued that public sector services require a 
regulatory framework in place, but the nature of that framework is a matter of 
institutional choice. While there are various justifications for state intervention for 
public education, public aims can be achieved through various institutional 
possibilities. Against the backdrop of public interest and private interest theories of 
regulation, the institutional theory of regulation – that society forms institutions to 
economize the costs of dictatorship and disorder – emerged as having the most 
relevance to the task of comparing the institutions of public education and examining 
regulatory constraints on public sector innovation within this context. The key 
analytical tool in this institutional approach is the IPF, and various institutions of public 
education can be mapped. In the chapters that follow, the IPF will be used as both a 
method of comparative and regulatory analysis – in addition to using the 
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Schumpeterian conception of innovation as “creative destruction” as a lens for 
analyzing regulatory constraints.  
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Chapter 4 – Regulation of government schools6  
4.1 Introduction  
There is a range of institutional possibilities for the provision of public education. The 
most common arrangement in Australia, however, is via government schools. The 
most recent data shows that, in 2017, there were 9,444 schools operating in Australia 
consisting of 6,228 primary schools, 1,408 secondary schools, and 472 special 
schools catering for children with a disability (Productivity Commission 2019).7 Of 
these schools, state and territory governments own and operated 70.3 percent 
accounting for 65.5 percent of all student enrolments (Productivity Commission 2019). 
Accordingly, the regulatory structures governing this institutional possibility is 
important for considering the impact on public sector innovation in this setting.   
Recent Australian research into innovation in the education field continues to 
concentrate on introducing new technology into the classroom (e.g., O'Rourke, Main, 
and Hill 2017), new pedagogical techniques (e.g., Gouldstone 2018; Halcrow 2018), 
and the changing design of teacher training (e.g., Knipe 2016). Indeed, continuous 
improvement through innovation has been a consistent focus in the education sector 
for decades both in Australia and around the world (Glen, Blackberry, and Kearney 
2017). However, the aim of this thesis is to focus attention on the regulatory and 
structural elements that contribute to public sector innovation, building on the existing 
work that has been done in examining education markets (e.g., Chubb and Moe 1990; 
Arsen, Plank, and Sykes 1999; Lubienski 2003a; Dixon and Tooley 2005; DeAngelis 
                                                          
6 An earlier version of sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, along with parts of Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 7, was published as a chapter in the edited volume: Allen, D, and Berg, C (eds) 2018, 
Australia’s Red Tape Crisis: The causes and costs of over-regulation, Brisbane: Connor 
Court. An earlier version of sections 4 and 5 of this chapter, along with parts of Chapter 2, 
has been accepted for publication with the Journal of Evolutionary Economics (an earlier 
version of which was presented at the 2018 International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society 
Conference in Seoul, Korea). 
7 In the Australian context, as the Productivity Commission (2019) explains, “primary schools” 
provide education from a foundational year (referred to variously as “Kindergarten”, 
“Preparatory”, “Reception”, “Pre-primary”, or “Transition”, depending on the jurisdiction) to 
year 6 or 7 (depending on the jurisdiction); “Secondary schools” provide education from the 
end of primary school to year 12; and “Special Schools” cater for children with a range of 
special needs including disability.  
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and Burke 2017). Specifically, this chapter extends that work by looking at the 
structural elements of the regulation of non-market production.   
This chapter will be set out as follows. Section 2 will provide a historical account of 
public education in Australia that shows that the broad institutional structures have 
not substantially changed over the last century. Section 3 will look at the key 
regulatory features of government schooling and chart the increased regulatory 
burden over time. Section 4 examines the link between regulatory structures and the 
destruction phase of public sector innovation by detailing the mechanisms for school 
closure in Australia. Section 5 supplements the regulatory analysis by presenting a 
historical case study on Victoria’s ‘Schools of the Future’ program (1992-1996). 
Section 5 concludes the chapter.  
4.2 An Historical Account of Public Education in Australia 
This chapter will show that public education in Australia consists of two institutional 
possibilities; centralized public schools owned and operated by state and territory 
governments, and non-government schools (typically referred to as “private schools” 
and characterized as either Catholic or “Independent”) that are assisted by the 
government through the provision of public funding grants. These two institutional 
possibilities have existed for over 150 years. This section does not attempt to provide 
a full history of education in Australia. Australian historian Alan Barcan has provided 
this in his comprehensive A History of Australian Education (1980) (see also, e.g., 
Sherington and Campbell 2007). Instead, the purpose of this section is to provide a 
brief historical account of these institutional structures before providing detail about 
the current regulatory frameworks in place for government schools.  
The beginnings of a formal Australian public education system can be traced back to 
1793. In that year, Lieutenant-Governor of Norfolk Island, Philip King, imposed an 
import duty on liquor to raise funds for education (Barcan 1980). King opened a school 
on the island in 1794, another in 1795, and an orphan facility which included vocation 
training (Barcan 1980). In 1810, having since been appointed Governor of New South 
Wales, King then established an orphan school in Sydney using a similar financing 
method of levying an import duty that was hypothecated into an education fund 
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(Barcan 1980). As explained in the previous chapter, the main purpose – in King’s 
mind – was to provide for abandoned or otherwise poor children.  
In the main, however, it was the various churches that advanced the provision of 
education throughout the colony with the assistance of grants of land from the state. 
By the 1850s, state provision of education had extended to rural areas where the 
churches had not established schools (Barcan 1980) – perhaps supporting a natural 
monopoly view of state provision of education, discussed in the previous chapter. The 
state system was formalized in 1848 when the colony of New South Wales 
established two boards.  
The National Board of Education established government schools (called “National 
Schools”) under the National Education Board Act 1848 (NSW). The Denominational 
School Board was also appointed by the Governor for ‘the temporal regulation and 
inspection of the respective Denominational Schools of the colony [of New South 
Wales], supported in whole, or in part, at the public expense’ (New South Wales 1848, 
p. 23). The two different systems operated separately but had the united purpose of 
creating an educated new colony. The two school systems each have distinctive 
combinations of the subjective costs of dictatorship and disorder. The perceptions of 
these costs differed around cost and tolerance on the one hand, and community and 
parental involvement, as well as values on the other.   
Proponents of the National School System (government owned and managed) 
emphasized the duplication and cost involved in the state supporting multiple 
denominational schools and government schools in the same geographic area 
(Barcan 1980). The problems included poor facilities, untrained teachers, and 
sometimes dangerous working conditions. Another problem was poor enrolments, 
and the high expenses required to provide education in a sparsely populated rural 
colony was keenly felt by policymakers and ‘how to minimize cost became the 
overriding objective in state educational policy’ (Kyle 1990, p. 44). These expenses 
can be seen as a cost of disorder because they emanate from the choices of 
individuals to live in rural instead of the established urban settlements. Another 
highlighted cost of disorder is that uneven distribution of wealth, human and natural 
resources’ (Meadmore 2001, p. 116). A ‘system of central control’ by the state would 
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– Meadmore (2001, p. 116) argues – ensure uniformity in the delivery of public 
services.   
Additionally, sectarianism was a major societal problem during this early colonial 
period in Australia. Meadmore (2001, p. 116) remarked on this period that 
‘Denominational schooling with its associated sectarian and social divisiveness was 
incompatible with the ideal of a unified society’. In 1850, William Duncan (cited in 
Sherington and Campbell 2007, p. 22) made a case for the National School System 
on the basis that it would breed tolerance among the students.  
It will surely be admitted that young men who have been accustomed to read these 
admirable lessons in class together —who, notwithstanding some differences of faith, 
are yet united in youthful friendships — . . . such persons are in a better disposition of 
mind for investigating truth than those who, educated in different schools have been 
accustomed,—as some other children I wot [sic] are accustomed—to argue with a 
heat that may consume rather than enlighten, and whose chief arguments, are the 
abominable nicknames of Papist or heretic, Puseyite or Puritan.  
On the other hand, the supporters of denominational schools were sensitive to the 
high dictatorship costs involved with national schools. Additionally, there were 
concerns that a centralized system would impose particular values on the students. 
As one example, National Schools allowed the reading of the Bible without 
commentary. One Roman Catholic observer contended that this would lead to ‘the 
deadliest of errors, indifferentism — the frightful notion that all religious tenets are 
mere matters of opinion, that men have neither treasure nor responsibility in the one 
revealed Divine Truth’ (cited in Mayrl 2011, p. 50). Sherington and Campbell (2007, 
p. 16) summarise the view of Catholic historians of this period.  
Rather than public education in Australia being seen as an expression of agreement 
among the colonial population, the “secular” acts were seen at best as a form of 
common Protestantism and at worst as a means of proselytizing, to turn Catholic 
children away from their faith. Instead of participating in the centrally administered and 
bureaucratic public education system with a lay teaching force, the adherents of the 
Catholic Church increasingly withdrew to create their own schools based on local 
parishes and staffed by religious orders. 
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Other dictatorship costs increased over time. For instance, Sherington and Campbell 
(2007, p. 17) explained that local community involvement declined in government 
schools after the 1870s and ‘came to be provided and controlled by the central state 
administration, with little regard to the claims of local parent and citizen groups’. 
Meadmore (2001, p. 117) concurred, conceding that   
Although it was recognized that centralized control played an important role in 
ensuring that education services were relatively evenly spread for all children 
irrespective of their geographic location, there was significant criticism of the systems 
for being unresponsive to local needs. 
In any case, by the 1850s, most colonies had a mixture of government-managed 
public schools and provided state aid for denominational schools – dual institutions in 
the provision of public education services. Barcan (1980, p. 74) explains:  
In New South Wales four systems of Church state-aided schools [Anglican, Catholic, 
Presbyterian and Methodist] competed and with each other and the National Schools. 
In Van Diemen’s Land [now Tasmania], Anglican elementary schools dominated and, 
together with a few Catholic Schools, received State aid alongside the declining 
‘Public schools’ based on the British and Foreign System. South Australia was 
distinctive in rejecting State aid for denominational schools except in the period 1847-
51…In Western Australia the state supported a number of ‘Colonial Schools’ 
[Protestant in character, with state aid to Catholic Schools]. 
How can the emergence of two alternative systems be explained? It is here that Allen 
and Berg’s (2017) subjective political economy can be applied. Figure 4.1 shows the 
stylised subjective IPFs for a proponent of the National system who is relatively more 
sensitive to costs of disorder and relatively less sensitive to costs of dictatorship 
(IPFa1), compared with a proponent of the Denominational system that is relatively 
less sensitive to costs of disorder and relatively more sensitive to costs of dictatorship 
(IPFa2). 
Given the subjective IPF curves, the model explains why separate institutional 
possibilities in competition with each other provide an institutionally efficient outcome 
rather than forcing one or the other. Figure 4.1 stylises a snapshot in time. Of course, 
preferences are not given but are discovered (Hayek 1945; Buchanan 1979; Allen 
and Berg 2017). This means that over time, it can be expected that the subjective 
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costs of actors will change as knowledge and information about preferences is 
expanded and adapted for changes in the external environment.  
Figure 4.1 – Institutions of Public Education Circa 1850 
 
The political campaigns for a secular education in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and continuing into the twentieth century tended preferences towards central 
control of public education (Barcan 1980; Maryl 2011). From the 1850s, the number 
of government schools expanded, and colonies progressively withdrew public funding 
to non-government schools: South Australia (1851), Tasmania (1854), Victoria 
(1873), Queensland (1880), New South Wales (1882) and Western Australia (1895) 
(Wilkinson 2013). Nevertheless, in the meantime, the non-government schools led 
the way in secondary education and there is evidence a scholarship (voucher) 
program continued to exist as an institutional choice to delivery public secondary 
education – in addition to centralized public schools. For example, Queensland had 
a scholarship program that provided public funding for students to attend grammar 
(i.e. Church of England) schools; in 1900 regulations were amended to allow 
scholarships to be tenable at Catholic Secondary schools (Barcan 1980). State 
funding was reintroduced in the 1960s, following a long-running campaign 
predominately by Catholics in the wider political context of the Democratic Labor Party 
splitting away from the Australian Labor Party (see, e.g., Santamaria 1981). In 1961, 
Catholic schools represented over 80 percent of all non-government schools (Barcan 
1980). Funding was introduced at a Commonwealth level (1964) and reintroduced at 
state level: New South Wales (1964), Western Australia (1965), South Australia 
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(1965), Victoria (1967), Tasmania (1967); (Queensland’s scholarships had remained 
but became a direct subsidy in 1967) (Barcan 1980).  
The historical outline provided in this section shows that, although the balance has 
waxed and waned, the two institutional possibilities have dominated the provision of 
education services in Australia. This section shows that the two systems that emerged 
are not ‘driven by a laissez-faire agenda of market forces and competition’ as 
Meadmore (2001, p. 116) has suggested – but to cater for different perceptions of 
subjective disorder and dictatorship costs. The next section will outline the current 
regulatory structure governing service delivery and show that there has been an 
increase in regulatory complexity over time.  
4.3 Regulation and Regulatory Complexity    
What are the key characteristics of the regulation of government schools? Chapter 3 
of this thesis advanced the argument that public sector services are creatures of 
regulation. In summary, it was proposed that, generally, there are two separate 
regulatory requirements for Australian governments to provide public services 
lawfully. First, Appropriation Acts by the legislature authorizing the expenditure of 
government funds for specific purposes – in this case school education. Second, a 
regulatory framework for determining how schools are managed. This section will 
provide greater detail about these two regulatory types, as it applies to government 
education. It is proposed that the latter requirement contains the key regulatory 
constraints of most relevance to public sector innovation. 
4.3.1  Funding Arrangements   
The first type of regulation occurs in the context of funding arrangements. 
Appropriation Acts are passed each year, in each jurisdiction, authorizing the relevant 
Treasurer to issue money out of a consolidated revenue fund.8 More general financial 
management legislation also exists to ensure probity over public expenditure.9 A 
complicating factor is how the funding amounts are calculated, and the overlapping 
                                                          
8 See e.g., Appropriation (2018-2019) Act 2018 (Vic); Appropriation Act (No.1) 2018-2019 
(Cth).  
9 See e.g., Financial Management Act 1994 (Vic); Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act 2013 (Cth);  
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responsibilities of the state and territory governments with those of the 
Commonwealth government.  
Historically, the provision of public education was the exclusive domain of the states 
and territories. State involvement in public education predated Australian federation 
in 1901, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Post-federation, the Australian 
Constitution makes no express mention of “education” as one of the Commonwealth’s 
heads of legislative power.10 In modern times, however, both the Commonwealth and 
state and territory governments provide funding to government and non-government 
schools. In 2017, state and territory governments provided 70.2 percent of total 
government funding (Productivity Commission 2019).  
By sector, in 2017, state and territory governments provided 84.9 percent of 
government funding to government schools with the Commonwealth government 
providing the remainder (Productivity Commission 2019). The major funding source 
is the reverse case for the non-government sector, with the Commonwealth 
government providing 75.7 percent of government funding to non-government 
schools and the remainder provided by state and territory governments (Productivity 
Commission 2019).  
When funding to non-government schools recommenced at a Commonwealth level in 
the 1960s, the funding was mainly for capital expenditure. For example, the States 
Grants (Science Laboratories and Technical Training) Act 1964 (Cth) provided grants 
for science laboratories. Funding for recurrent expenditure was introduced in 1970, 
with the States Grants (Independent Schools) Act 1969 (Cth) initially authorizing 
payments to non-government schools at the rate of $35 per primary student, and $50 
per secondary student per annum (Harrington 2013, p. 3). The rate of funding was 
later changed to be a percentage of the government school cost (McIntosh 1994; 
Harrington 2013), and the report of the Interim Committee for the Australian Schools 
Commission (referred to as the “Karmel Report”) then proposed having differential 
per capita rates based on disadvantage (Karmel et al. 1973). Education policy over 
                                                          
10 Australian Constitution, section 51. However, in practice the Commonwealth relies on its 
powers under section 96 which provides that “the [Commonwealth] Parliament may grant 
financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.” 
See, e.g., Australian Education Act 2013 (Cth); section 4.  
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the last few decades has continued to focus on the idea of addressing “inequality” 
(Kenway 2013). Major changes also occurred in 2001 and 2008 (Harrington 2013). 
More recently, funding mechanisms at the Commonwealth level have been the 
subject of two recent reviews (Gonski et al. 2011; Gonski et al. 2018).    
Currently, at a state and territory level, the quantum of funding that government and 
non-government schools receive depends on a formula specific to each jurisdiction. 
The Productivity Commission (2019, p. 4.18) summarises as follows.   
In general, State and Territory government schools systems are funded based on a 
variety of formulas to determine a school’s recurrent or base allocation, with 
weightings and multipliers added for students facing disadvantage. For non-
government schools, State and Territory governments also provide funding for 
recurrent and targeted purposes, usually through per capita allocations.  
The latest data published by the Australian Curriculum Assessment and Report 
Authority (2016-2017), extracted in Table 4.1, compares recurrent expenditure for 
government schools and non-government schools by Commonwealth and state and 
territory governments, as an average of the number of full-time equivalent students. 
The figures show that both levels of government provide taxpayer funding towards 
government and non-government schools.  
Table 4.1 – Government recurrent expenditure on schools by sector 
 Government 
schools  
Non-government 
schools 
Weighted 
Average  
Commonwealth 
government expenditure 
($/FTE student) 
$2,645 $8,053 $4,515 
State and Territory 
governments 
expenditure ($/FTE 
student) 
$14,886 $2,591 $10,634 
Source: ACARA 2019. 
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On a per-student basis, the Commonwealth government provide a higher amount of 
funding to the non-government sector; while the State and Territory governments 
provide a higher amount of funding to government schools. The funding of non-
government schools has been described as a partial or “de facto” voucher program 
(Donnelly 2015). That is, the number of students is one of the key metrics in the 
funding model – although the funding does not truly follow the individual student. 11  
At a Commonwealth level, funding for both government and non-government schools 
passes through state and territory governments. As Beck (2017, p. 831) has first 
observed,  
The Australian Education Act is complex, but its general legislative scheme is 
relatively straightforward. The Act grants funds, calculated in accordance with various 
formulae set out in the Act, to the states and territories on condition that the states 
and territories distribute the funds in accordance with the conditions set out in the Act. 
The conditions attached to Commonwealth grants include ‘requirements to comply 
with intergovernmental agreements on school education, and to implement 
nationally-agreed policy initiatives on school education’ (Australian Education Act 
2013 (Cth), section 4). Regulation exists as a mechanism for the legislature to control 
the expenditure of the funds in accordance with the government’s policy objectives 
(Mises 1944; Cope, Goodship, and Holloway 2003; Freiberg 2017; Windholz 2018). 
This proposition can be extended to controlling the expenditure of funds within the 
bureaucracy of another jurisdiction. In this case, the Australian Education Act 
functions as a way to ensure that the Commonwealth has a legal mechanism to 
control the funds acquitted to an “Authorising Body” (in the language of the Act). 
Accordingly, this fits clearly fits within the definition of “regulation inside government” 
established by Hood et al. (1999) as (i) one public sector organization (the 
Commonwealth government) shapes the activities of another public sector 
organization (the state or territory government); (ii) the organizations are not in a direct 
chain of command (both governments are sovereign entities); and (iii) the regulatory 
relationship is based on a legal mandate (made under Commonwealth legislation 
making the funding contingent). In addition, intergovernmental grants may also be 
                                                          
11 The regulation of voucher programs in the United States will be considered in Chapter 6.   
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subject to “implicit” terms where states and territories are incentivized to act in line 
with the Commonwealth government’s preferences (Brennan and Pincus 1990). More 
expensive intergovernmental regulatory constraints is predicted to provide state and 
territory jurisdictions with less scope for local experimentation (Garzarelli and Keeton 
2018).  
The latest figures from the Australian Public Service Commission show that, as of 30 
June 2018, there were 1,776 employees working for the Department of Education and 
Training (APSC 2018). None of these departmental employees are involved in 
delivering front-line services. This indicates the extent of work that is required in 
administrating the regulatory requirements linked to the Commonwealth funding 
arrangements.   
4.3.2  Regulatory Measures   
Colonial Australia’s early system of public education became formalized in legislation 
in the lead up in the 1850s. For example, as has been discussed above, in New South 
Wales in 1848, a combination of legislation and executive orders established two 
boards – The National Board of Education, to provide funds for government schools 
and the Denominational School Board, to allocate state aid to denominational 
schools. Similar institutional frameworks were put in place in the other Australian 
colonies (Barcan 1980). ‘For over a century’, the regulatory structures ‘characterized 
by high levels of rigid, centralized control by the Directors General and their senior 
officers, remained relatively undisturbed’ (Meadmore 2001, p. 117). Today, the 
centralized delivery of government schooling continues.  
State and territory jurisdictions have legislation regulating (or establish mechanisms 
such as statutory authorities to regulate) many facets of the government schooling 
system. In summary, this legislation covers the following areas:  
• The establishment and closure of government schools;  
• Control of land and buildings;  
• Enrolments of students in government schools; 
• School curriculum;  
• The formation and powers of school councils;  
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• Registration and employment of teachers and principals; and 
• Reporting and accountability requirements to education departments. 
In applying the institutional theory of regulation (Djankov et al. 2003; Shleifer 2005; 
Davidson 2013), the explanation for these regulatory provisions is to achieve 
uniformity in service delivery to guard against potential costs of disorder. The above 
list shows that the key decisions about establishing (or closing) schools, hiring (or 
firing) staff, managing enrolments, and choosing the content that is taught, are 
centrally prescribed. Individual parents, principals, teachers, and schools are not 
given direct choice autonomy over these matters. Three examples, below, illustrate 
that controlling for risks of disorder comes with heightened dictatorship costs.   
The first example is that many matters relating to staffing are prescribed. Mandated 
registration procedures mitigate against the risk of disorder that unqualified teachers 
are hired (out of negligence, necessity, mistake, or otherwise) to teach in government 
schools. However, the trade-off with dictatorship costs comes in providing state 
control over deciding who can teach in government schools – meaning that pre-
screening decisions are made by bureaucrats rather than school principals. Another 
cost of dictatorship of having a single employer of teachers for government schools 
(i.e., a government department rather than individual schools or individual school 
districts) is that inflexible work practices are a defining feature of employment 
agreements for teachers (Stanley, Allen, and Lane 2014). 
The second example is that Australia has a national curriculum enforceable through 
a mixture of federal and state regulatory measures. There are several risks of disorder 
if individual government schools choose between, or developed their own, competing 
curriculums and left curriculum matters up to the professional autonomy of teachers 
using their training and judgement. For instance, according to the Australian 
Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) (2019), ‘The (Australian) 
national curriculum was introduced to improve the quality, equity and transparency of 
Australia’s education system’. In the years leading up to its introduction in 2008, 
typical arguments in support of a national curriculum were that there needed ‘to be 
greater consistency across education systems to benefit students required to transfer 
across State/Territory boundaries’, that overcoming duplication would promote 
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‘efficiencies through the sharing of scarce resources’ and that a ‘national approach 
will help produce a sense of national cohesion’ (Harris‐Hart, 2010 p. 297, citing Reid 
2005). In discussing Australia’s road to a national curriculum, Harris‐Hart (2010, p. 
313) concluded that 
…rhetoric has systematically been utilised by successive Federal governments (of 
varying political complexion) to generate a perception of mistrust and crisis. This has 
also generated the false perception that a national curriculum will provide a panacea 
to a wide range of educational problems; that is the perception that a standardised 
national curriculum will result in greater access, equity and educational outcomes for 
all students. 
In other words, to justify further centralization of public education, Federal actors 
sought to increase the perceived costs of disorder. However, setting a curriculum is 
a function of values and priorities (Friedman 1955; Hayek 1960; McLaughlin 1995; 
Tooley 1995; Berg 2010) and the trade-off with any centrally mandated curriculum is 
that there is a high risk of dictatorship. For Hayek (1960, p. 380), the task of setting a 
centralized curriculum is tantamount to central planning of any economy, arguing that 
‘the more highly one rates the power that education can have over [people’s] minds, 
the more convinced one should be of the danger of placing this power in the hands of 
any single authority.’ To borrow from Hayek’s earlier work (1945, pp. 520-521), the 
dispute is not about whether a curriculum is needed or not; it is a dispute about 
whether the curriculum should be mandated centrally by one authority for the whole 
education system or divided among many individuals. Aside from this, there are 
higher dictatorship costs associated with the lack of dynamism involved in such a 
centralized system. The nature of regulation between different government entities is 
that any changes require agreement between the various state, territory, and 
Commonwealth governments in addition to any usual consultation conducted with 
other stakeholders.12  
                                                          
12 For example, ACARA is governed by the Ministerial Education Council constituted by the 
relevant State, Territory, Commonwealth government ministers responsible for school 
education (see, Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority Act 2008 (Cth)). 
See also, the ‘National School Reform Agreement’ (COAG 2018).  
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Take enrolments as a final example. If enrolments were open and subject to the 
payment of fees, the main risks of disorder in this situation are that parents (with 
rationally limited information) might make poor choices in deciding on a school or that 
the individuals that manage school intake discriminate in some way (whether on 
academic ability, capacity to pay, or some other personal attribute). Regulation 
requiring schools to provide education and no-direct cost to parents combined with 
allocating schools to geographic zones – and requiring schools to admit students that 
reside within those zones – guards against both risks. Some jurisdictions do provide 
a limited choice in government schooling by permitting schools to admit a student 
from outside the geographic zone if there is enough capacity.13 When this is not 
possible, a base level of “Tiebout choice” remains. Tiebout (1956) proposed the idea 
that optimal solutions for public goods can occur by citizens voting with their feet and 
moving to jurisdictions that supply more or less public goods depending on their tastes 
and preferences. Applied to school education, parents can relocate to the school of 
their choice and take advantage of the geographic enrolment guarantee.  Of course, 
there are higher transaction costs associated with exercising this choice in either 
renting or purchasing a property near a school. Additionally, school distance will be 
only one factor among many in choosing where to live (Chubb and Moe 1990).  
Enrollment regulation also causes spillover effects into other markets. For instance, 
there is an extensive economic literature testing the connection between higher 
residential property prices and desirable school zones (Davidoff and Leigh 2008 
present findings on the ACT but this trend has also observed in other countries using 
various methodologies, see e.g., Oates 1969; Black 1999; Rosenthal 2003; Kane, 
Reigg, and Staiger 2006; Rehm and Filippova 2008; Ries and Somerville 2010; Dhara 
and Ross 2012). The more schools that exist within a particular geographic area – 
the more Tiebout choice that exists. Accordingly, there will generally be a relatively 
higher degree of Tiebout choice in metropolitan areas with more schools per square 
kilometre compared to country areas. The provision of schooling at no direct cost to 
parents causes information and other problems in the allocation of resources, as 
                                                          
13 For example, in Victoria, section 2.2.14 of the Education Training and Reform Act 2006 
(Vic) provides that “a child of compulsory school age may be enrolled at a Government 
school that is not the child's designated neighbourhood Government school if there is 
sufficient accommodation for the child at that school.”  
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prices are fundamentally a mechanism for coordinating dispersed information about 
preferences (Hayek 1945). Mandated school zoning regulation magnifies the 
information problem by significantly increasing switching costs, thereby removing 
other non-price demand signals. Commenting on the New Zealand experience of 
school choice, Fiske and Ladd (2000, p. 282) reason that ‘when space is available in 
existing schools, building new schools is not a cost-effective way to meet student 
demand. Moreover, the managers of popular schools…have little incentive to 
expand.’ Zoning regulation requires government departments to manage the capacity 
issues and centrally plan the establishment and closure of schools. The implication of 
this for public sector innovation will be discussed in further detail with the regulatory 
analysis and case study presented in sections 4.4 and 4.5, below.     
In summary, the reason it can be said that the institutional possibility of government 
schooling is characterized by high costs of dictatorship is that government schools 
are ultimately managed and operated by a central bureaucracy – and in some cases 
an overlapping hierarchy of bureaucracies. Although there has been a trend in some 
Australian jurisdictions towards “self-managing schools” (e.g., Caldwell and Spinks 
1988; 1998; Caldwell and Hayward 1998) public sector innovation in the government 
school context must occur in lower-level activities operating within the centralized 
regulatory constraints.14 The next sub-section of the chapter will show that 
government schooling in Australia has been subject to increasing regulatory 
complexity. 
4.3.3  Increasing Regulatory Complexity    
The extent of regulation has built up over time. In New South Wales, the first 
legislation for government schooling came in the form of the National Education Board 
Act 1848 (Barcan 1980). Since this time, the major reforms came in the form of the 
following principal pieces of legislation: Public Schools Act 1866; Public Instruction 
Act 1880; Education Act 1961; Education Reform Act 1990 (today known as the 
Education Act 1990).15 In Victoria, the first principal legislation for government 
education was the Common Schools Act 1862 (Barcan 1980). Since then, the early 
                                                          
14 School autonomy and choice programs are the focus of Chapters 4 and 5.  
15 Incorporating amendments as at 8 January 2019.    
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reforms and consolidations came with the passage of the Education Act 1872, 
Education Act 1890, Education Act 1915, Education Act 1928, and the Education Act 
1958 (Barcan 1980). The 1958 Act was regularly amended in the years that 
followed.16 The 1958 Act was replaced by the current regime – the Education Training 
and Reform Act 2006.17 
An analysis of the growth in the word counts of this legislation will provide a useful 
indication of the growth in regulatory complexity. Researchers have attempted to 
quantify regulatory burdens. Traditionally, this has been done by using page counts 
as a proxy measure to observe the growth in regulatory complexity. For instance, 
Lilley and Miller (1977) show the growth in the number of pages of the United States 
Code of Federal Regulations between 1970 and 1975 (see also, e.g., Coglianese 
2002; Dawson and Seater 2013; Crews 2017). Another approach is to compare the 
file size of the digitized version of regulations which helps control for differences file 
type and formatting between jurisdictions (Mulligan and Shleifer 2005). The most 
robust and sophisticated approach, to date, called “RegData”, developed by 
researchers at the Mercatus Centre at George Mason University, counts the number 
of restrictive clauses within legislation (Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2017). However, 
the RegData methodology for Australia is only in its early stages of development 
(McLaughlin, Potts, and Sherouse 2019) and not yet available.18 Page counts are a 
blunt measure and do not account for changes in the formatting of legislation over 
time. Therefore, where possible, word counts may provide a better proxy for 
regulatory complexity compared to page counts.  
The changes in regulatory complexity will be presented in terms of word counts and 
page counts. The legislation for analysis was first obtained from the official sources. 
In New South Wales, the official versions of the Act are published on the government’s 
“NSW Legislation” website.19 Similarly, in Victoria, the legislation is published on the 
                                                          
16 However, the earliest historical consolidation of the 1958 Act that is currently available is 
from 1997, which is used below as a point-in-time data point. Historical consolidations of the 
Education Act 1958 (Vic) were obtained from the Victorian Legislation and Parliamentary 
Documents online database: <http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au> last accessed 1 March 
2019.   
17 Incorporating amendments as at 1 November 2018.  
18 For disclosure, I note that I was a research assistant on this working paper in a joint 
project between the Mercatus Centre at George Mason University and RMIT University.   
19  <https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au> (last accessed 1 March 2019).  
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government’s “Legislation and Parliamentary Documents” (1996-present) and 
Australasian Legal Information Institute’s “Victorian Historical Acts” database (1851-
1995).20 Page counts were obtained simply by recording the number of pages of the 
document, regardless of document format.  
To obtain word counts a three-step process was undertaken. First, legislation was 
obtained in its original file type and converted into a text file in Microsoft Word (if 
required).21 Second, editing was undertaken as required. Manual editing took two 
forms. Random numbers and symbols and spacing between letters of the same word 
from the conversion process were removed. These are errors in the file conversion 
process and have the effect of increasing the number of words. Next, tables of 
contents, schedules detailing historical amendments, and various headers and 
footers were also removed, where applicable, because these features have changed 
over time and the inclusions would lead to: (i) inconsistency, particularly with the 
nineteenth-century legislation; and (ii) have the effect of amplifying the regulatory 
complexity through double counting. The third and final step was to perform a word 
count using Microsoft Word’s word count function.  
The conversion process was more difficult (and therefore less accurate) for the 
legislation prior to 1990s. In particular, the conversion of the 1915 Act in Victoria could 
not be carried out accurately and was excluded from the word count analysis. Note 
that the reported figures provide an analysis of the principal legislation establishing 
the regulatory framework and do not include regulations made under the Act. 
Nevertheless, it provides a more fine-grained view of regulatory complexity than 
reporting page counts alone.  
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 report the New South Wales legislative data by word count and 
page count, respectively. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 report the Victorian legislative data by 
word count and page count, respectively. Overall both methods show growth in 
regulatory complexity in both jurisdictions. Note that the data does not include sub-
legislative instruments such as Regulations or Ministerial Orders made under the Act.  
 
                                                          
20  <http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/>; (last accessed 1 March 2019).  
21 Legislation was in .html, .pdf, or .doc file depending on year and jurisdiction.  
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Figure 4.2 – NSW Principal Education Act, by word count 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – NSW Principal Education Act, by page count 
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Figure 4.4 – Victorian Principal Education Act, by word count 
 
 
Figure 4.5 – Victorian Principal Education Act, by page count 
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The overall historical trend is the same in both jurisdictions – an increase in regulatory 
complexity over time. The initial education Acts in both jurisdictions provided for the 
establishment of boards to oversee the government schooling system – leaving most 
regulatory matters to discretion – in just two pages. The current education Acts (97 
pages in New South Wales and 714 pages in Victoria) provides extensive detail about 
the complex structural arrangements. The bulk of the increase in complexity appears 
to come in the last 30 years. To be sure, the government’s role in education has 
expanded since government schooling first began in the 1850s. Once a provider of 
last resort, today around two thirds of Australian primary and secondary school 
students are enrolled in government schools – providing both primary and secondary 
education (ABS 2017). But, as has been previously mentioned, the broad institutional 
structures are not radically different from a century ago.  
However, it is a reasonable argument to make that the government schools of the 
1850s cannot be compared with modern government schools. The rejoinder comes 
in just isolating the current legislative regimes. In New South Wales, the current Act 
as passed in 1990 was 79 pages or 21,231 words in length; the most recent 
consolidation in 2018 now spans 97 pages or 37,998 words.  In Victoria, the current 
Act as passed in 2006 was 428 pages or 89,632 words; the most recent version in 
2018 recorded 714 pages or 156,228 words. Measured by word count, the changes 
equate to an 80 percent increase in New South Wales over approximately 28 years 
and a 74.3 percent increase in Victoria over approximately 12 years.  
The increasing regulatory complexity in the current legislation alone provides 
preliminary evidence of a “red tape” in the regulation of government schooling. That 
is, there is a difference between the extent of legislation required to establish the 
institutional frameworks to govern a baseline level of service delivery and those ‘rules, 
regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden but 
[do] not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve’ (Bozeman 
2000, p. 12). This finding provides a new possible explanation for why Australian 
teachers have longer working hours compared to other countries in the OECD 
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(Freeman, O’Malley, and Eveleigh 2014).22 Recent evidence from New South Wales 
reported increased workloads for teaching staff because of non-teaching related tasks 
(Fitzgerald et al. 2018). Indeed, one respondent from that New South Wales study 
branded the compliance burden as a ‘a tsunami of paperwork’ (Fitzgerald et al. 2018, 
p. 10). This suggests a school-level compliance burden that is affecting service 
delivery. The typical explanation has been to associate increasing school-level 
administrative workloads with school autonomy reforms (e.g. Gobby 2013a; 2013b). 
This argument carries some weight and will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
However, this explanation overlooks the fact that there has also been an increased 
regulatory burden over time. The finding presented in this chapter is significant 
because it suggests that the public sector policy focus should not be to wind back 
school autonomy reforms that promote public sector innovation but instead to engage 
in a program of removing regulatory burden inside government. Measuring the burden 
is the first step in such a program.  
There is a sizable difference in the length of the Principal Acts of New South Wales 
and Victoria. The most recent version of the New South Wales Act measures 37,998 
words across 97 pages compared to 156,228 words across 714 pages of the most 
recent version of the Victorian Act. An explanation for this difference is that the data 
analyzed is the Principal Acts not all the Acts regulating government education. For 
example, prior to the repeal of Victoria’s 1958 Act in 2006, Victoria had several pieces 
of legislation governing school education including the Community Services 
(Attendance at School) Act 1970, Educational Grants Act 1973, Education (Special 
Developmental Schools) Act 1976, Teaching Service Act 1981, Victorian Curriculum 
and Assessment Authority Act 2000, Victorian Institute of Teaching Act 2001, and the 
Victorian Qualifications Authority Act 2000. Much of this is now incorporated into 
Victoria’s 2006 Act. Compare this to the current situation in New South Wales, where 
several Acts regulating government schooling are not consolidated into the Principal 
Act including the Teacher Housing Authority Act 1975, Teaching Service Act 1980, 
Education (School Administrative and Support Staff) Act 1987, Teacher Accreditation 
Act 2004, and the Education Standards Authority Act 2013.  
                                                          
22 Note that this report was based on the 2013 OECD Teaching and Learning International 
Survey. The survey is conducted every 5 years and the next edition is expected to be 
released in 2019.  
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Additionally, there will be other general legislation (i.e., not just applying to the 
provision of education) that will impact on the operation and management of 
government schools. These include compliance and reporting requirements imposed 
on all public sector bodies such as the Public Sector Management and Financial 
Management Acts.23 Another example is the general “Equal Opportunity” legislation, 
which will be considered further in the case study presented in section 5 this chapter.    
4.4 Mechanisms for School Closure in Australia   
Innovation has a destructive side. In the Schumpeterian tradition, innovation is 
understood as ‘Creative Destruction’ – a dynamic force driving economic 
development. In this conception, innovation is more than just new ideas but rather the 
process of how novel ways of doing things are adopted and which transform the 
existing landscape. In Chapter 1, I noted that existing research noted that the majority 
of the extant research focusses on the creation phase of public sector innovation 
(Potts 2010). To date, mechanisms of destruction have not been specifically 
identified. This section of the chapter proposes a new way forward in identifying 
destruction mechanisms of public sector services. In doing so, it builds on a stream 
of research that seeks to apply the Schumpeterian conception of innovation to a public 
sector context (e.g., Windrum and Garcia-Goni 2008; Potts 2009; Potts 2010; Potts 
and Kastelle 2010; Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle 2015).  
Public sector services are a creature of regulation. On this basis, it is proposed that 
identifying the mechanisms for destruction in public sector services can be found by 
systematically reviewing the relevant legislation. Murmann (2003), in a wider 
comparison, has shown that the national university systems in America, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom coevolved alongside technological advances and industry 
changes – partially through the mechanisms of the opening and closing of individual 
universities. In a similar way, in the context of government schooling, one way that 
destruction manifests itself at a “firm” level is through closing schools. This may be 
necessary for a number of reasons, including budget consolidation, poor 
                                                          
23 In New South Wales, see e.g., Government Sector Employment Act 2013 (NSW) and the 
Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (NSW). In Victoria, see e.g., Financial Management 
Act 1994 (Vic) and the Public Sector Management and Employment Act 1998 (Vic). Each of 
the other states, territories, and the Commonwealth will have its own equivalent legislation 
covering these matters.   
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performance, or population changes – but the mechanisms for closing schools will be 
detailed within the relevant legislative framework. Previous sections of this chapter 
have focused on New South Wales and Victoria, this section of the chapter will 
consider all states and territories.   
The legislation was obtained from the official state and territory government online 
databases, in force as of 30 June 2018. Each jurisdiction’s legislation was reviewed 
to identify the decision-maker or another administrative body that has the legal power 
to close a school and any conditions or restrictions on the exercise of that power. The 
legislative frameworks for each Australian state and territory jurisdiction are 
summarized in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 – Legislative Frameworks Governing School Closure in Australia 
Jurisdiction  Relevant Legislation  
Destruction 
Mechanism 
Australian Capital Territory 
Education Act 2004 (ACT); 
Section 20. 
Ministerial 
Discretion 
New South Wales 
Education Act 1990 (NSW); 
Section 28.  
Ministerial 
Discretion 
Northern Territory 
Education Act 2015 (NT); 
Division 9. 
Ministerial 
Discretion 
Queensland 
Education (General Provisions) 
Act 2006 (QLD); Chapter 2 
Part 3. 
Ministerial 
Discretion 
South Australia 
Education Act 1972 (SA); 
Section 9, and Part 2A.  
Ministerial 
Discretion 
Tasmania 
Education Act 2016 (Tas); 
Section 97. 
Ministerial 
Discretion 
Victoria 
Education and Training Reform 
Act 2006 (Vic); Sections 2.2.1 
and 2.2.2.  
Ministerial 
Discretion 
Western Australia 
School Education Act 1999 
(WA); Part 3 Division 1.  
Ministerial 
Discretion 
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An examination of the legislative provisions reveals that ministerial discretion is the 
sole mechanism for school closure. That is, in every Australian jurisdiction it is for the 
relevant Education Minister (however named) to decide whether a school should be 
closed or amalgamated. There are, however, some differences in the restrictions on 
the exercise of this discretion between jurisdictions relating to notice, consultation, 
and reporting.  
Most jurisdictions require notice periods before a school can be legally closed. In 
South Australia, the process takes a minimum period of three months. In Queensland, 
a six month notice period applies. 12 months’ notice is required in the Northern 
Territory and Western Australia. In the Australian Capital Territory, a 12 month notice 
period also applies before a decision can be made – for closure in a further six months 
or at the end of the school year, whichever is later. In New South Wales, the process 
will take approximately 18 months as the Minister must announce by June 15 for the 
closure of a school at the end of the following year. Ministers in some jurisdictions are 
required to publish the notice in the Government Gazette (or another form of public 
notice) or are required to provide notice in writing to the school Principal and School 
Council and Parents and Community Association. No specific notice requirements are 
provided for under Tasmanian or Victorian legislation. There are exceptions to notice 
requirements where special, exceptional, or emergency circumstances exist to justify 
the closure. Some jurisdictions provide a waiver where a majority of parents of the 
students at the school agree with the proposed closure.        
All jurisdictions, except for Victoria, also set out a consultation procedure to be 
followed and specify particular interest groups that must be consulted before a final 
decision is made about the closure or amalgamation. Generally, this requires that the 
Minister consult with the school community (i.e., parents of students, and teachers), 
the school council, and the school association (where applicable). The legislative 
requirements in some jurisdictions are straightforward. For instance, legislation in the 
Northern Territory, Queensland, and Western Australia contains broad requirements 
to consult with groups including parents, staff, School Councils and Parents and 
Community Associations. The Tasmanian requirement is even simpler – requiring the 
Minister to consult with the School Association. By contrast, the legislation in the 
Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, and South Australia all contain more 
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extensive consultation provisions requiring independent committees to be formed (the 
membership of which is prescribed) that will conduct a review and report back to the 
Minister. Ultimately, the Minister is not bound by any recommendations arising out of 
these consultation processes – in all jurisdictions the legal decision making power to 
close or amalgamate a school rests with the respective Minister. However, in New 
South Wales and South Australia, the Minister is required to publish reasons for their 
decision where it is contrary to the recommendations of the review committee.  
The legislation in some jurisdictions specifies the factors that the minister is bound to 
consider in making a decision. These are expressed mainly in general terms –
Ministers must have regard to the education, economic, and social impacts of the 
school. In the Australian Capital Territory the decision factors include environmental 
concerns. In Tasmania, there is a broad discretion for the Minister to make a decision 
based on any circumstances they consider appropriate.  
Interestingly, the review of these legislative provisions discovered that Western 
Australia has a limited rule-based mechanism in addition to the general Ministerial 
power. Section 56(3) of the School Education Act 1999 (WA) provides that ‘if the 
Minister is satisfied that a government school is regularly attended by less than the 
prescribed number of students the Minister is to either: change the classification of 
the school…; or take action to amalgamate or close a school’. This requirement does 
not apply where the Minister determines that there are significant educational, 
economic or social reasons for not complying. However, it does not appear to be 
prescribed by the current regulations (see: School Education Regulations 2000 
(WA)), and so this trigger is not currently in operation. However, it is a significant 
prompt in showing that the legislation in all other jurisdictions provides that the 
exercise of discretion is entirely based on Ministerial initiative. How then do Ministers 
go about the task of closing schools? The next section of this chapter will consider a 
historical case study.  
4.5 Case Study: School Closures in Victoria’s Schools of the Future 
The historical case study presented in this chapter is on the “Schools of the Future” 
(SOTF) reforms which took place in Victoria during the Kennett government’s first 
term (1992-1996). A key part of the SOTF reforms included the systematic closure 
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and merger of hundreds of Victorian public schools. A significant source for this case 
study is the published accounts of the then Victorian Education Minister Don Hayward 
(Caldwell and Hayward 1998; Hayward 2016). In order to limit the distortion of 
hindsight or personal bias, this auto-biographical material is supplemented with 
government reports, parliamentary debates, and published decisions from courts and 
tribunals. The SOTF reforms have been previously examined in the context of 
educational leadership and management (e.g., Caldwell 1994; Townsend 1996), 
professional development programs (Chadbourne and Ingvarson 1998) and 
federalism and school funding (Hinz 2016). In contrast, this study will be confined to 
one aspect of SOTF, and focus on the implications for public sector innovation. In this 
section of the chapter, I will consider the role that school closures played in the SOTF 
reforms, the mechanisms that allowed the closures to take place, and an example of 
regulatory restrictions on closure.  
4.5.1 Schools of the Future  
The “Schools of the Future” reforms in Victoria were a multifaceted suite of reforms 
instituted in the first term of the Victorian Kennett government designed to 
decentralize public education, provide greater autonomy and management 
responsibility to individual schools, and significantly reducing the size of the 
bureaucracy. SOTF comprised four key elements: a new budget framework, an 
accountability framework, a curriculum framework, and a “Quality Provision 
framework” (QPF) (Caldwell and Hayward 1998; Hinz 2016). The QPF led to the 
systematic closure or merger of hundreds of Victorian public schools.  
There were three key economic reasons for QPF forming part of the SOTF package. 
First, the State’s fiscal position. In 1992, the incoming Victorian government inherited 
a fiscal position where government expenditure exceeded revenue by $3 billion in the 
financial year 1991-1992 – of which education accounted for the highest category of 
expenditure. In particular, the Department of Education had a $40 million operating 
deficit, a maintenance backlog of over $600 million, and the ‘time bomb’ of 8,000 
teachers that were on unpaid leave (predominately maternity leave or extended family 
leave) with guaranteed jobs on their return (Caldwell and Hayward 1998; Hayward 
2016). Second, public education was not being delivered efficiently. The report of the 
Victorian Commission of Audit (1993) showed that Victorian spent 15 percent more 
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than required to provide school education services. On a per-student basis, Victoria’s 
expenditure was 13 percent higher than New South Wales and 9 percent higher than 
Queensland (Victorian Commission of Audit 1993).  Hayward states that senior 
education bureaucrats had advised that this inefficiency could be attributed to ‘cozy 
deals between the previous Labor government and the teacher unions’ (Hayward 
2016).  Third, resources needed to be consolidated to offer students a comprehensive 
curriculum – supporting the curriculum framework element of the SOTF reforms 
(Directorate of School Education 1993a). For these reasons, QPF was an essential 
element of the SOTF reforms. 
Earlier in this chapter, I noted the two distinct phases of innovation in the 
Schumpeterian conception – creation, and destruction. This was undoubtedly true in 
Victoria’s case, with the benefits of QPF unlocking resources for use in other areas.  
For example, Hayward explains that:  
…the question had to be asked as to whether the existing configuration of some of 
our schools was such as to best do that. In particular, we had the responsibility to 
consider whether the merger of schools would result in students being offered access 
to a curriculum of greater breadth and depth. Also, with a larger cohort of students, a 
merged school had the opportunity to build a team of teachers with a range of different 
skills and backgrounds. This would broaden the educational experience for students 
and help the school to meet the different and individual needs of each student. It would 
also enable a synergy to develop and grow between a group of teachers with different 
talents, which together could make the school a much more vibrant, creative and 
exciting place. (Caldwell and Hayward 1998, p. 44)  
The closure of schools under the QPF meant that the resources freed up on the 
destruction side could now be re-employed on the creation side. This consisted of 
expanding curriculum and other educational programs and improving or making better 
use of school facilities (Directorate of School Education 1993a).  For example, in 
September 1993 Education News reported that six new primary schools were being 
built, along with one replacement primary school, one new secondary college 
campus, and two new stages at two different secondary colleges – all funded through 
the QPF (Directorate of School Education 1993b). From a public sector innovation 
perspective, there is no reason that those resources could not have been reallocated 
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to innovative projects in other areas of public services. Nevertheless, Hayward 
explained the arrangement:   
I was able to gain the agreement of the Cabinet to reinvest every dollar from the 
proceeds of the sale of the surplus real estate back into school improvement. This 
was to be in addition to our regular capital works and maintenance budget. Over a 
three year period we raised nearly $200 million from asset sales. With this, and money 
from our regular budget, we were able to reduce the … $670 million maintenance 
backlog by about half. (Caldwell and Hayward 1998, p. 45)  
As the above passages foreshadow, there was no automatic mechanism for releasing 
inefficient or unproductive resources in the Victorian public education system. Neither 
was there an automatic mechanism for the redeployment of those resources. In the 
public sector, an information and coordination problem is a barrier to a dynamic 
Creative Destruction process. The centralized system relies on the bureaucracy to 
monitor school performance, and also predict and be responsive to population and 
demographic changes. Even if this information is capable of being transmitted to the 
bureaucracy, it requires a decision-maker to act, because there is no localized 
mechanism for closure reflected in the governing legislation. Indeed, Hayward 
provides an example of the consequences of executive inaction:  
Over its ten-year reign, the Labor Government failed to address the issue of 
demographic shifts in population, and the effect of these on school enrolments. As a 
consequence, in some of the older established areas there was an excessive number 
of unused places in schools. For example, in one inner city area alone there were 
more than 2000 unused secondary school places. At the same time, the Labor 
Government had failed to keep up with the demand in the rapidly growing outer 
suburbs for new schools, and for increased capacity in existing schools. (Caldwell and 
Hayward 1998, p. 40) 
Of course, Hayward is making something of a political point. However, his observation 
is precisely what Potts (2010) referred to as “ossification by accumulation”. In other 
words, the public sector has an ‘accumulation bias’ where ‘extant programs have to 
be actively eliminated’ (Potts 2010, p. 240).  
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This information and coordination problem is compounded by the fact that in the 
Australian public education system, consumer substitution is slight. As previously 
noted, Potts observed that in the private sector ‘the destruction phase of the 
innovation process happens automatically by the market mechanism of consumer 
substitution’ (2010, p. 239). In the public sector this mechanism is weak because even 
in a situation where enrolments fell dramatically due to parents exercising choice to 
enroll their children in another public school or a private system, school-level 
destruction (i.e., closure) will not automatically follow. To borrow from Hess (2010, p. 
45), what exists is “choice without consequence.”  
As such, in the centralized institutional form of public education, the public must rely 
on the Minister for Education, on behalf of the government, to exercise his or her 
discretion to close a school. The ministerial action is the exclusive form of destruction 
in this institutional arrangement – as highlighted in the previous section of this charter. 
It is for these reasons that the SOTF reforms – including QPF – were able to take 
place almost exclusively by executive action rather than legislative change (Hinz 
2016).         
Ministerial action as the exclusive mechanism for destruction is made explicit in the 
Education Act 1958 (Vic)24 which governed public education at the time of the SOTF 
reforms. In 1992, the legislative provisions were mainly the same as are in force today 
– with one key development which is discussed further below.   
Relevantly, section 21 of the Act provided that, subject to the Act, the Minister may 
from time to time:  
(a) establish in such places as are desirable and extend and maintain State schools, 
including primary schools, special schools, higher elementary schools, high schools, 
central schools, central classes, girls' secondary schools, continuation classes, 
technical schools, and teachers' training colleges (including colleges for training 
kindergarten teachers for kindergarten schools receiving financial assistance from 
the State);  
(b)  declare or alter the classification of any such school; 
                                                          
24 As amended. Note that this Act was repealed effective 1 July 2007 and replaced with the 
Education Training and Reform Act 2006 (Vic).  
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(c) discontinue any such school. 
Section 17 of the 1958 Act also provided that ‘the property connected with any State 
school which is discontinued may be sold or leased.’ Sections 18, 18A, 19A, 20A of 
the 1958 Act contained powers dealing with the ability to enter into leases, acquire 
property, and enter into contracts for capital works, among other things. Combined, 
these incidental powers facilitated the redeployment of land and capital resources.  
However, ministerial action does not mean that there was no process. After all, 
Ministers are accountable to the parliament – and in turn the electorate (although 
these incentives are hardly as strong as immediate feedback provided by market-
based incentives given elections only take place every three or four years, and even 
then voters select a candidate – not vote on individual issues). 55 schools were closed 
by incoming Minister Hayward on 20 November 1992 (Victoria 1993b, pp. 819-821).   
Hayward explained the criteria for these initial school closures: 
1. Was there a long-term declining trend in the school’s enrolment?  
2. Was there an excess of student places in that area?  
3. Was there convenient access to an alternative school?  
4. Would students have access to a broader curriculum choice if a merger took place? 
(Caldwell and Hayward 1998, p. 41) 
Hayward then established “Quality Provision Task Forces” across the state, 
‘consisting mainly of representatives of school communities’ (Caldwell and Hayward 
1998, p. 44). Their task was to recommend to the Minister which schools could be 
closed or merged. The Minister would consider the task force reports, and if he 
proposed to make a decision contrary to the recommendations, further consultation 
with the task forces would occur (Hayward 1993). The effect of this appears to be 
twofold: granting greater ownership of the process to local communities and providing 
the Minister with a measure of localized information and preferences unable to be 
captured just through demographics and statistics. The Minister also received 
additional information from the bureaucracy, such as the practical implications of 
implementing task force recommendations (Hayward 1993). Although, as the 1958 
Act made clear, the decision is one for the Minister to make. What this process shows 
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is that the destruction mechanism of school closure induced learning and creative 
responses on the part of the decision maker (Witt 2003). 
For these later decisions, Hayward said that any decision to merge or close a school 
was made for the same three reasons:   
1. Improving educational opportunities of students access to broader curriculum;  
2. Redirecting resources to where they were most needed; and  
3. Not investing scarce capital to upgrade schools which did not have a long term future 
(Caldwell and Hayward 1998, pp. 41-42). 
The outcome of the QPF was ‘a large number of mergers of two or more previous 
schools on the site of one of the previous schools. As a consequence, [the 
government] were able to close more than 250 previous school sites’ (Caldwell and 
Hayward 1998, pp. 44-45). Early evidence at the time showed that closure, a merger 
of two schools, or the establishment of a multi-campus secondary college through a 
merger of four schools, meant increased enrolments for remaining schools allowing 
an expanded curriculum offering for both new and existing students (Directorate of 
School Education 1993a).   
The wide-ranging Ministerial powers set out in the 1958 Act, outlined above, meant 
that the destructive mechanism was mostly unencumbered. Indeed, it is hard to 
conceive a more centralized process. However, the cases of Richmond and Northland 
Secondary Colleges show that even the most centralized destruction mechanism is 
not entirely free from regulatory constraint.      
4.5.2  Richmond and Northland Secondary Colleges  
In the case of Victoria’s QPF, the Minister’s decision to close two particular schools – 
Richmond and Northland Secondary Colleges – was challenged in the Equal 
Opportunity Board (EOB) under section 44 of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic)25. 
Legal action of this type is not unprecedented.26 In Australia, as in other common law 
                                                          
25 This Act was subsequently repealed by the Equal Opportunity Act 1995. The current Act is 
the Equal Opportunity Act 2010.   
26 See, e.g., Durant v Greiner (1990) 21 NSWLR 119. In that case, the plaintiff 
unsucessfully brought an application for review in the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
129 
 
jurisdictions, executive action can be subject to a merits review of the decision in 
administrative tribunals or judicial review through the courts. The EOB is an 
administrative appeals body that was a precursor to the current Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal.   
Richmond Secondary College 
The first case involved a review of the Minister’s decision to close Richmond 
Secondary College (Richmond). The Age newspaper reported that ‘Male students at 
Richmond Secondary College had alleged they had been sexually discriminated 
against because the only department school to remain open in the suburb was a girls' 
school’ (Pegler and Easterbrook 1992, p. 2). At the first hearing27, the EOB 
determined that there was ‘an arguable case’ and granted interim orders requiring the 
school to remain open (Pegler and Easterbrook 1992, p. 2). However, ultimately the 
application was not successful with the EOB finding that the closure affected both 
male and female students (Painter 1993).  
In the meantime, protestors – with the support of the teaching unions – had occupied 
the school. Eventually, the protestors were forcibly evicted from Richmond by police 
officers in December 1993– one year after the Ministerial decision to close the school 
(Tobin 1993; see also: Jolly 1996; Caldwell and Hayward 1998). The saga was widely 
reported in the local media, and it was later alleged that the police officers involved 
used excessive force against the protestors (see, e.g.: McCulloch and Clayton 1996). 
The closure of Richmond has also been used as an example in the context of research 
on young people and violence (Bessant and Watts 1994).  
The Richmond case provides an example of the increased transaction costs imposed 
by regulation even where the application for review of the Minister’s decision was 
unsuccessful. This is one way that regulation can constrain the destruction phase of 
public sector innovation. The operation of the Equal Opportunity Act meant that higher 
transaction costs were involved in the exercise of the destruction mechanism. These 
include legal costs, costs to maintain and secure buildings to comply with the interim 
                                                          
challenging the exercise of discretionary power of the minister to close a school under the 
Education and Public Instuction Act 1987 (NSW).  
27 Sievers v State of Victoria (1993) EOC 92-482. 
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orders of the EOB and the opportunity cost of having the site not in productive use for 
that period. According to Hayward, the action delayed, but did not prevent, innovative 
use of the resources to create Melbourne Girls College – an amalgamation of three 
schools to create an autonomous government school providing a ‘high quality girls’ 
education’ to compete with non-government schools (Caldwell and Hayward 1998, p. 
42).  
Northland Secondary College 
The second challenge to the Equal Opportunity Board involved the Minister’s decision 
to close Northland Secondary College (Northland). The Department of Education had 
recommended to the Minister that the school should be closed ‘because of the 
oversupply of places in the area, the declining enrolments at the school, the poor 
quality of education being provided and the physical condition of the school’ (Caldwell 
and Hayward 1998, p. 43). The Minister acted on this recommendation, deciding that 
Northland should be closed at the end of the 1992 school year.   
Two students of Northland during 1992 lodged a complaint with the Equal Opportunity 
Board. The complaint was that the proposed closure of Northland amounted to 
discrimination on the ground of race, against the complainants and other Aboriginal 
students at Northland, in breach of section 28 (relating to discrimination by an 
educational authority) or section 29 (relating to discrimination in the provision of goods 
and services) of the Act. The EOB agreed – and ordered the school to be re-opened.  
The evidence before the EOB included the following.28   
• In November 1992, the Minister announced his intention to close Northland. At the time, 
about 400 students were attending the college and, of them, between 49 and 55 were 
Aboriginal. 
• Northland was closed in December 1992. Throughout 1993, many of the students who 
would have attended Northland in 1993 enrolled and attended other secondary schools 
in the area. However, some 15 Aboriginal students and an unknown number of other 
students continued to attend at the college where they were taught by a handful of 
                                                          
28 This follow is an extract of the Board’s reasons for its decision in Sinnapan v State of 
Victoria (No 2) 1994 EOC 92-658 reported at [77,461] - [77,462]. It has been edited for brevity.   
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teachers who were formerly engaged at the college and now provided their services on a 
voluntary basis (see further: Knight 1998).  
• Northland was a school which was unique within the Victorian education system, adopting 
the so-called "whole school approach" to the provision and delivery of the education 
services it offered. The "whole school approach" was a method of teaching which involved 
parents, students and teachers in the whole of the school's activities and processes and 
was one which lent itself to the Aboriginal culture and way of life.                                     
• After the closure of Northland, the Department of School Education had directed the 
establishment of a similar program at another college. However, the evidence suggested 
that the “whole school approach” at Northland could not easily be transferred to another 
school.  
• Aboriginal students had an added cultural disadvantage in relation to their ability to access 
the public education service in Victoria which is over and above cultural disadvantage 
which may be suffered by other groups within the community and that, on that account, 
the closure of the college was of disadvantage to them.  
The litigation was protracted. The case involved two interim decisions by the Equal 
Opportunity Board (‘EOB’)29 and an appeal in the Supreme Court30. The substantive 
matter was heard by the EOB, which ordered on 7 December 1993 for the school to 
be re-opened.31 The State appealed the EOB’s decision to the Supreme Court32, 
initially succeeding with Justice Beech setting aside the EOB’s orders and dismissed 
the complaint.  
The complainants then appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court33 (as it was 
then known) where Justices Brooking, Phillips and Hansen determined that the orders 
should be set aside and remitted back to the EOB. The EOB conducted a further 
hearing during September and October 1994. On 2 December 199434, the EOB again 
decided that the school should be re-opened, with a final order made on 14 December 
                                                          
29 Sinnappan v State of Victoria (1993) EOC 92-498. 
30 Sinnappan v State of Victoria [1993] 1 VR 547; (1993) EOC 92-499.  
31 Sinnappan v State of Victoria (1994) EOC 92-567. 
32 State of Victoria v Sinnappan (1994) EOC 92-568. 
33 Sinnappan v State of Victoria [1995] 1 VR 421.  
34 Sinnappan v State of Victoria (1994) EOC 92-658. 
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199435. The State again appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court36 but was 
not successful on the primary issue of keeping the school closed.  
As Hunyor (1996, p. 102) explains, the legal implication of this case appeared to be 
that ‘any reduction in the provision of a [public] service will constitute a term on which 
that service is provided, and most likely a "requirement or condition" for the purposes 
of showing indirect discrimination…’ even if other public services were available. This 
finding severely restrained the Victorian governments ability to close public services. 
Indeed, the court expressly noted that its interpretation of the Act ‘must necessarily 
make it difficult for any service provider to reduce the benefits of the service being 
provided’ (cited in Hunyor 1996, p. 102). This meant that legislative action was 
needed to remove the constraints of anti-discrimination laws. This case study 
highlights the role of destruction mechanisms in generating knowledge in the public 
sector context (Witt 2003) and shows that legislative provisions are not static.   
4.5.3  Subsequent Legislative Action 
Following the Richmond and Northland Secondary Colleges litigation, the Education 
(Amendment) Bill 1993 was introduced into the Victorian Parliament.37 Amongst other 
things, the Bill inserted a new section 21A to prevent the Minister for Education’s 
decision to close a school being challenged in any court, tribunal, or before the 
Ombudsman. Similarly, the Bill inserted a new section 14B to prevent councils of 
government schools from issuing legal proceedings against government bodies 
without the consent of the minister. 
In the second reading speech to Parliament, Hayward (Victoria 1993a, p. 1204) made 
an explicit link between the Bill and the QPF.  
In limiting the right to review a decision of the Minister to discontinue a State school, 
the power of litigants to seek interim relief and to undertake costly litigation against 
matters of government policy is unacceptable due to the adverse effect on the quality 
                                                          
35 Sinnappan v State of Victoria (1994) EOC 92-659. 
36 Sinnappan v State of Victoria [1995] 2 VR 242. 
37 The Bill was introduced before the Northland litigation had concluded. The Bill was not 
retrospective.  
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provision program and on the uncertainties created in the educational situations 
affected by the litigation.  
The “privative clause” survives in the current form of the Victorian Act.38 This means 
that, in Victoria, there is no ability for a tribunal or court to review a minister’s decision 
to close a school. A similar provision operates under Western Australian legislation. 
The Schools of the Future case study has shown that the ability to bring an 
administrative or judicial review of ministerial decisions provides an ex post check on 
executive power. Legal review of decisions might be important to guard against 
arbitrary decision making where there are no enforceable preconditions to the 
exercise of the ministerial discretion to close a school under the legislation. This may 
explain the court’s reasoning. However, this restricts the ability to close schools – 
constraining the sole mechanism of destruction in the government school context. In 
the Richmond case, closing the school allowed new services to be provided to new 
markets. In the Northland case, an underperforming school remained open – 
preventing resources from being redeployed elsewhere.  
4.5.4  Discussion  
Previous research on public sector innovation has observed that the public sector has 
weak or non-existent destruction mechanisms (Potts 2010). The conclusion that can 
be drawn from the case study presented in this chapter is that the generalization is 
more nuanced – within centralized institutional possibilities for service delivery, the 
public sector lacks spontaneous destruction mechanisms.  
The systematic review of the broad legislative frameworks in every Australian state 
and territory regarding government schooling found that ministerial discretion is the 
sole mechanism for school closure in every Australian jurisdiction. There are, 
however, some differences in the restrictions on the exercise of this discretion 
between Australian state and territory jurisdictions.  For example, most jurisdictions 
require notice periods. Most jurisdictions also set out a consultation procedure to be 
followed – and some jurisdictions require the Minister to appoint a committee to 
conduct a review and provide recommendations. Only one jurisdiction – Western 
Australia – has a limited rule-based mechanism in addition to the general Ministerial 
                                                          
38 See: Education and Training Reform Act 2006; sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.31.  
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power but it does not appear that this has been used. Although destruction 
mechanisms are necessary for non-market production, ministerial discretion as the 
sole destruction mechanism appears to be problematic for three reasons.  
The first problem with Ministerial discretion is that there is an inherent information 
problem with such a centralized mechanism. Knowledge about the merits of a 
decision to close schools will be distributed among many stakeholders and the 
Minister will never have perfect knowledge of a school’s circumstances. Of course, 
this is one of the key dictatorship costs inherent with any system of central planning 
(e.g., Hayek 1945). Although consultation provisions that exist in some jurisdictions 
provide some local information into the decision of whether or not to close a school, 
any formal consultation and review process will only begin on the Minister’s initiative 
(often in practice relying on departmental advice). Further, the legislative analysis in 
section 4 of this chapter shows that any recommended course of action from the 
consultation and review procedures will not be binding on the Minister. However, the 
SOFT QFP case study shows that even where consultation provisions are not formally 
prescribed, the Minister may nevertheless undertake local consultation despite the 
fact that it will be non-binding. In these cases, stakeholder consultation is a way that 
Ministers can lower the perceived dictatorship costs of closing schools (cf. Twight 
1988; 1994).  
The second problem with Ministerial discretion is that the decision to close schools 
will often be unpopular. For instance, the Minister may lack the political support 
needed within the government (i.e., the Minister’s colleagues) or the wider community 
to exercise this power. In a democracy, ministers will attempt to make decisions that 
tend towards the preferences of the median voter (Downs 1957). The problem is that 
these preferences will be influenced. In this regard, public sector teachers’ unions will 
often use their influence to maintain the operation of government schools (as the 
protests at Richmond show). In this environment, the sole mechanism of destruction 
relies on the political will of the Minister. The SOFT QFP case study shows that the 
mechanism of destruction will be reserved for a fiscal crisis rather than exercised as 
necessary. This finding is consistent with the generally observed risk-adverse culture 
and the increasing concern of media scrutiny feeding a lack of public sector innovation 
more broadly (Albury 2005; Borins 2014; Hartley 2005; Langergaard and Scheuer 
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2012; Mulgan 2014; Moran 2010; Bommert 2010; Potts and Kastelle, 2010; Koch et 
al. 2006; Mulgan and Albury 2003).  
The third problem with Ministerial discretion is that there may be additional regulatory 
constraints on the exercise of Ministerial power in some jurisdictions. This will be the 
case where a Minister wants to exercise power to close a school but is overruled by 
an administrative appeals body or court (as the Northland case shows). The above 
discussion evidences that Ministerial power is a weak destruction mechanism – but 
there is the possibility that there is no destruction mechanism legally available.  
The question that follows is how public sector regulation might further evolve in a way 
that would improve the dynamism of destruction mechanisms in public sector service 
delivery. In this regard, macroeconomists will be familiar with the rules versus 
discretion debate within monetary policy (see, e.g. Crockett 1994). It may be that a 
rules-based system would strengthen this destruction mechanism by alleviating 
these problems. The legislation could set criteria for when schools should be 
closed – relying on data – triggering an automatic review by the public sector if 
performance or enrolments, for example, fell below a specified threshold. The 
legislative provisions could also provide the Minister with a residual discretion, but 
a rules-based system would inject a level of spontaneity into the process. This is 
important because more dynamic selection mechanisms could avoid the need for 
wide-scale public service closures. Of course, such a rules-based system would 
not be static; instead, a rules-based continue to evolve over time responding to 
changing policy objectives.      
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter provides the first attempt to detail, quantify, and analyze the regulation 
of government schooling in Australia. Through a historical account of public education 
in Australia it has been shown that the broad institutional structures for service 
delivery have not substantially changed over the last century. However, an analysis 
of the principal legislation in New South Wales and Victoria over time shows a 
measurable increase in regulatory complexity. Although the key regulatory 
characteristics of government schooling attempt to minimize costs of disorder, the 
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findings of this chapter suggest that the costs of dictatorship from increased regulatory 
complexity have been overlooked as a priority for public sector reform. 
It is understood that industry and product life cycles are evolutionary processes (e.g., 
Klepper and Graddy 1990; Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos 1990; Malerba and 
Orsenigo 1996; Klepper 1996). That is, ‘product markets typically undergo a life cycle 
of introduction, growth, maturity, and eventual decline’ (Stadler 1991, p. 293). Much 
is known about the industrial dynamics of the private sector, guided by market 
feedback selection mechanisms. Much less is known about the evolutionary 
processes that exist in public sector services. While previous research on public 
sector innovation has observed that the public sector has weak or non-existent 
destruction mechanisms, the specific mechanisms have not been identified (Potts 
2010). Rather than proposing new artificial mechanisms (c.f. Potts 2010; Potts and 
Kastelle 2010), this chapter has advanced a new methodological approach for 
observing destruction mechanisms in public sector services. Specifically, destruction 
mechanisms will be built into the regulatory framework governing public sector service 
delivery. This is built on the previous chapter which noted the requirements for a legal 
framework to be established for government service delivery.  
One of the defining features of the centralized nature of service delivery is the 
regulation of the establishment and closure of government schools. As such, a key 
structural way that the destruction phase of public sector manifests in public education 
services is the closure of schools. A review of the principal legislation of each 
Australian state and territory detailed the procedure to close a school lawfully. This 
showed that ministerial discretion was the sole mechanism of destruction in this 
setting. This regulatory analysis was supplemented with a case study on Victoria’s 
SOTF reforms – the systematic closure and merger of hundreds of Victorian public 
schools in the first term of the Kennett Victorian government – as an example of how 
ministerial discretion has been exercised in practice. Overall, this chapter has 
highlighted that the legislative and regulatory frameworks governing service delivery 
are not neutral in considering the destruction phase of public sector innovation – 
furthering a Schumpeterian understanding of public sector innovation. The conclusion 
that can be drawn from this is that that centralized service delivery lacks spontaneous 
destruction mechanisms. The next chapter will consider moves to improve the 
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creation side of innovation within a centralized institutional possibility of service 
delivery.  
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Chapter 5 – Regulation of Independent Public Schools39   
5.1 Introduction  
There has been an increasing trend towards school autonomy or school-based 
management within the Australian government schooling sector over the last 40 years 
(e.g., Caldwell and Spinks 1988; 1998; 2013; Caldwell and Hayward 1998; Gammage 
2008; Keddie 2016b). This trend has continued over the last decade. In particular, a 
new institutional form of government school that has emerged in recent years in 
Australia is the “Independent Public School” (IPS) launched in Western Australia 
(2009), Queensland (2012), and the Northern Territory (2015). In 2014, the Australian 
government announced a $70 million funding package to assist state and territory 
governments to introduce or support greater flexibility and school autonomy programs 
(Pyne 2014).     
Schools operating as part of an IPS program are publicly accountable and taxpayer-
funded schools that are owned and managed by state governments but are given 
‘greater freedom and resourcing from centralized governance to manage their own 
affairs’ (Keddie, Gobby, and Wilkins 2018, p. 378). In this chapter, it will be argued 
that the reason that it represents a distinct type of institutional possibility for public 
education service delivery on an educational IPF spectrum is that an IPS is 
characterized as delivering a different combination of dictatorship and disorder costs 
as compared to a centralized government school.  
Australian IPS programs have received recent attention from education policy 
researchers; on the Western Australian IPS program (Fitzgerald and Rainnie 2012; 
                                                          
39 An earlier version of this chapter was submitted on 21 July 2017 and accepted for 
publication on 15 December 2017 in the Australian Journal of Public Administration (an 
earlier version of which was presented at the 2017 Australian Centre for Entrepreneurship 
Research Exchange Conference). The case study and results presented in this chapter 
remain as originally published. The introduction, literature review, and discussion have been 
updated to incorporate, amongst other things, the findings of the most recent education 
policy research on Independent Public Schools in Australia (e.g., Keddie 2017; Holloway 
and Keddie 2018; Gobby, Keddie, and Blackmore 2018; Keddie, Gobby, and Wilkins 2018; 
Gobby and Niesche 2019). It is also noted that a review commissioned by the Queensland 
government (Potential Solutions 2018) has also been released subsequent to the initial 
publication. At the time of submission, this chapter remains the only published study 
considering IPS programs to gain insight from a public sector innovation and economics of 
regulation perspective.    
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Gobby 2013a; 2013b; 2016; Gobby and Niesche 2019) and the more recent 
Queensland IPS program (Gobby, Keddie, and Blackmore 2018; Gobby, and Wilkins 
2018; Holloway and Keddie 2018; Keddie 2016b). The first part of thesis argued that 
the impact of regulation on public sector innovation remains unclear within the current 
theoretical framework. This chapter proposes to advance this understanding by 
bringing the public sector innovation literature into conversation with the economic 
theory behind school autonomy. Specifically, this chapter aims to investigate the 
effect on planned innovation in schools where some of the centralized regulatory 
constraints are relaxed. 
This chapter explores regulatory constraints on innovation in service delivery by 
examining Queensland’s IPS program, which was announced in 2012 and 
commenced operation in 2013. This program was explicitly instituted to provide 
schools with additional ‘autonomies focused on cutting red tape and opening up new 
opportunities for innovation’ (Queensland Department of Education and Training 
2012a). Recall that one of the challenges in the public sector innovation field is that 
there is a ‘paucity of measurement’ of innovation (Demircioglu and Audretsch 2017, 
p. 1681; see also Arundel and Huber 2013; Potts and Kastelle 2010). Chapter 1 of 
this thesis argued that a specific example of regulatory change is needed because 
each public sector service has its own distinct regulatory and institutional frameworks 
and, because of this, the effect of regulation on public sector innovation will vary 
between services. So within the education context, how can regulatory change be 
measured? Two recent studies in the United States attempt to measure the effects of 
regulation on participation in school choice programs by randomly assigning different 
hypothetical (but commonly proposed) regulations and surveying private school 
leaders in Florida (DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf 2018) and California and New York 
(DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf 2019). In this chapter, I will advance a unique method of 
documentary analysis measuring the actual proposed innovative practices in 
Queensland government schools.  
Admission to the Queensland IPS program is through an expression of interest that 
requires schools to specify what innovative programs or practices they would 
implement as an IPS (“Innovation Question”). This chapter systematically examines 
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responses to the Innovation Question from successful applicant school principals, 
showing the perceived effect on innovation as regulatory constraints are relaxed.  
The remainder of this chapter is arranged in the following way. Section 2 considers 
the relevance of the school autonomy literature and the implications for public sector 
innovation. Section 3 introduces Queensland’s IPS program. Section 4 outlines the 
method used for the Queensland case study. Sections 5 reports the findings of the 
case study. Section 6 analyses the results through the prism of Schumpeter’s five 
forms of innovation. Section 7 reflects on the broader question of school autonomy 
and regulation, looking for commonalities with other recent research on the Western 
Australian and Queensland IPS programs. Section 8 concludes the chapter by 
considering the Queensland study’s implications for the broader themes of the thesis.   
5.2 Theory of School Autonomy   
However, there is no single model of school autonomy. There are institutional 
arrangements that can free up constraints on the demand or the supply side of public 
education services (Witte and Rigdon 1993; Mintrom and Vergari 1997). However, 
“Charter Schools” are the most pervasive in the United States and are considered 
extensively in the literature. This institutional form of service delivery – and its 
theoretical underpinnings – will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 6. For now, it 
suffices to state that charter schools are ‘non-sectarian, publicly funded schools of 
choice’ that ‘operate in parallel with—and often in competition with— traditional public 
schools’ (Allen and Mintrom, 2010, p. 457). In theory, charter schools should be free 
from many of the regulations that apply to other public schools in order to foster 
innovation (Chubb and Moe 1990; Wohlstetter, Wenning, and Briggs 1995; Lubienski 
2003a; Preston et al. 2012). Indeed, stimulating innovation is an explicit intent of some 
charter school legislation (Steedman, Cummins, and Ricciardelli, 2014). The 
empirical evidence of the link between charter schools and innovation is mixed (e.g., 
Lubienski 2003a; Bulkley and Fisler 2003; Lake 2008; Preston et al. 2012).40 
Nevertheless, Preston et al. (2012) argues that two key theoretical perspectives 
                                                          
40 Charter school regulation and the implications for innovation are the focus of Chapter 6.  
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underpinning the charter school literature are helpful to explain innovation in that 
setting.  
First, “market theory” argues that competition between schools will create the 
incentives needed for a diverse range of offerings and motivate schools to be more 
responsive and innovative to cater for students’ needs (Preston et al. 2012). This 
perspective is analogous to the existing public-private model comparison approach of 
public sector innovation.41 Perhaps one way of achieving this is by having local 
governments compete for the provision of public goods (Tiebout 1956). Although 
some have argued that Australian IPS programs lead schools to rely on “market 
solutions” to be successful (Holloway and Keddie 2018) it is essential to note that no 
Australian jurisdiction provides schools with complete autonomy (Gobby 2016). As 
such, the market theory perspective is of limited value in the present context because 
government schools – with school-based management autonomy or not – remain 
owned and operated by state and territory governments with enrolment restrictions. 
However, the market theory does have significance for voucher programs and for-
profit schools which will be addressed in the next chapter.  
Second, “autonomy theory” holds that, if charter schools are free from centralized 
bureaucracy, schools will enjoy greater autonomy to ‘experiment with new 
organizational and instructional strategies’ (Preston et al. 2012, p. 319). Although the 
characteristics of charter schools can differ depending on state laws as some 
jurisdictions are more permissive than others (Mintrom and Vergari 1997; Finnigan 
2007).  
The two perspectives first developed in the school choice literature can be extended 
to other school autonomy programs such as IPS, to gain insight into public sector 
innovation. For instance, Keddie, Gobby, and Wilkins (2018, p. 380) note that there 
is 
…an expectation that school autonomy will remove the supposed inefficiencies and 
constraints on personal freedom associated with bureaucratic governance in ways 
                                                          
41 This perspective holds that the way to incentivize innovation in the public sector is by 
making the public sector function more like private markets and private enterprises. See 
Chapter 1 for further discussion.   
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that will improve the innovation and economic efficiency of the public education 
system more broadly. 
The autonomy perspective provides a path beyond the current public-private model 
by reframing the question; instead of making a comparison between the public sector 
and the private sector, this perspective calls for an examination of the regulatory 
frameworks that impact public sector service delivery – and their effect on innovation. 
For instance, Caldwell and Spinks (2013) identify that command-and-control 
approaches are one reason that there is a lack of disruptive innovation in schools. 
This is an important finding because it means that decentralized service delivery may 
be being implemented without full regard to regulatory constraints, which may be 
undermining innovation – one of the key justifications for undertaking decentralization.  
In Australia, the most recent wave of school autonomy reforms has come in the form 
of IPS programs. The first example of this is Western Australia’s IPS program that 
was introduced in 2009. This was a program specifically designed to reduce 
bureaucracy by devolving decision making power to the local level while cutting 
‘unnecessary red tape that currently inhibits principals from being innovative’ (Liberal 
Party Western Australia Division 2008, p. 3). By 2016, 445 schools had commenced 
as independent public schools, covering 70 percent of students and teaching staff 
(Education and Health Standing Committee 2016). According to the WA Department 
of Education (n.d.), ‘Principals of Independent Public Schools have more freedom to 
make decisions about important matters that impact students’ education such as 
student support, staff recruitment, financial management, governance and 
accountability.’ The University of Melbourne’s Centre for Program Evaluation was 
commissioned by the WA Department of Education to a review of the IPS program in 
2013 and found that while the overall results have been positive, ‘some schools have 
traveled further along the path to autonomy than others’ (2013, p. 74).  
The previous chapter provided evidence of this by examining Victoria’s Schools of the 
Future reforms, showing that entrenched regulatory barriers mean that the public 
sector lacks spontaneous destruction mechanisms. This chapter turns to the effect of 
school autonomy reforms on innovation. The remaining sections of this chapter will 
examine the effect on innovation of Queensland’s attempt to move to a more 
decentralized model of service delivery in public education.  
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5.3 Queensland’s Independent Public Schools Program  
In Queensland, public education is managed through a centralized government 
agency – the Department of Education and Training.  The organizational structure 
provides that operations, governance, schooling policy, and teacher employment are 
managed centrally, with individual school principals reporting to this bureaucracy 
through seven regional directors (Queensland Department of Education and Training 
2012b).  
In the lead-up to the 2012 state election, the Liberal National Party (‘LNP’) announced 
its Preparing Our Children for Future Success policy (Liberal National Party 2012). 
This policy document outlined a proposal to introduce an Independent Public Schools 
program that would allow school principals and school councils to have greater control 
and ownership over the operation of their school. That is, local schools would be given 
greater autonomy to make local decisions. The policy was opposed by the incumbent 
Labor government and the Queensland Teachers’ Union (Hurst 2011).   
After the LNP’s successful election, the newly appointed Education Minister set about 
implementing the IPS initiative. The prospectus (Queensland Department of 
Education and Training 2012a) explained that schools had a range of “autonomies” 
already available, which included the ability to:  
• drive the implementation of the Australian and Queensland Curriculum;  
• adopt a range of curricula;  
• plan the school’s learning program including setting flexible school hours;  
• offer differentiated learning programs;  
• determine the timing of their student free days;  
• determine their staffing with the endorsement from local workplace committees;  
• recruit non-teaching staff;  
• select their own deputy principals and heads of department when vacancies occur;  
• select casual and temporary teachers through departmental processes;  
• manage minor maintenance, and minor capital works projects up to $100,000;  
• manage school utilities and retain savings;  
• expend the school bank account to a maximum of $250,000; and   
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• sign or vary contracts with procurement approval and dispose of plant and 
equipment up to the expenditure delegation. 
However, an IPS would have additional autonomies to ‘embrace enhanced 
innovation’ in order to ‘better respond to the unique potential of their students and 
communities’ (Queensland Department of Education and Training 2012a, p. 6). 
Queensland Premier Campbell Newman claimed the initiative would ‘cut red tape’ 
and ‘remove layers of management’ (Queensland Department of Education and 
Training 2012a, p. 2). The IPS program was a regulatory change. The prospectus 
(Queensland Department of Education and Training 2012a) specified that additional 
autonomies would include:  
• the freedom to directly recruit staff and to build a team that is fit-for-purpose to 
drive innovation;  
• more autonomy to manage and utilize infrastructure, financial resources, and 
human resources;  
• more autonomy to work in new ways with local businesses, industry and other 
community organizations;  
• an option to pursue creative models of sponsorship, industry partnerships, and 
infrastructure partnerships;  
• increased flexibility to shape curriculum offerings; and  
• the freedom to shape and deliver innovative educational practices.  
In addition to increased autonomy, schools accepted into the IPS program each 
received a $50,000 establishment grant, and $50,000 per annum designed to 
compensate the school for administrative functions previously undertaken by the 
Department (Queensland Department of Education and Training 2012a). It has been 
previously documented that increased school autonomy comes with a higher 
administrative burden for individual schools to manage (e.g., Whitty, Power and 
Halpin 1998; Gobby 2013a; Gobby, Keddie, and Blackmore 2018). Funding to offset 
this burden is also a feature of the Western Australian IPS program, where schools 
received between $20,000 and $40,000 in transition funding depending on their size 
(Centre for Program Evaluation 2013). Case study evidence from the WA program 
suggests that the one-off grants left schools without the necessary financial resources 
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in future years and this limited the school principal’s ability to innovate (Gobby 2013a). 
Accordingly, the intention of the permanent level of funding in the Queensland 
program appears to be aimed at enabling schools to take full advantage of their 
increased autonomy.  
In 2012, expressions of interest (‘EOI’) were sought from schools wanting to become 
an IPS for the following year. Of the applicants, 26 schools were accepted for 2013. 
A further 54 schools were added in 2014, along with a further 47 commencing in 2015 
– a combined total of 127.42   
5.4 Method  
This chapter presents a qualitative analysis of publicly available secondary data 
originally collected by the Queensland government as part of its EOI process. The 
analysis involves a content analysis to identify proposed innovative practices and 
coding based on an adaption of Schumpeter’s five forms of innovation.  
The EOI process required a written application. Amongst other things, the application 
required individual schools to outline the ‘innovative educational programs or 
practices that the school will implement’ if it is accepted as an IPS (“Innovation 
Question”) (Queensland Department of Education and Training 2012a, p. 10). The 
EOI process in 2014 and 2015 also required a response to the same question. The 
author obtained access to the Innovation Question responses for the applications 
rounds in 2013, 2014, and 2015 from the Queensland Department of Education and 
Training under the Right to Information Act 2009 (QLD).43 In total, the responses to 
this question for EOI applications were examined for 127 schools.  
The data identifies individual schools. This enabled categorizing the school as a 
primary school (“State School”), a secondary school (“State High School”), a P-12 
college (“State College”), or a special school (“Special School/Other”) – which then 
allows a comparison between those categories. The school principal was the 
                                                          
42 At the time of submission, 250 schools have now commenced as Independent Public 
Schools.  
43 Disclosure number 340/5/3744. This legislation provides a right to apply for access to 
documents held by government agencies and Ministers. In other jurisdictions this is known 
as “Freedom of Information”.  
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signatory on each EOI. Drawing on the discussion of school autonomy in section 2 of 
this chapter, the school principal is best placed to provide details about perceived 
innovations because they have decision-making autonomy under the IPS policy, and 
the school principal will be leading the implementation of innovative practices at the 
school level. In reporting the data, the names of the principals and the names of the 
individual schools have been omitted. It is expected that principals’ responses to the 
Innovation Question to provide detail about the innovative practices that schools plan 
to implement as an IPS and provide insight into the constraints of the current 
centralized service delivery framework. Academic research and policy evaluations of 
the Western Australian IPS program used surveys or interviews on a small number of 
respondents after the program had been implemented (Centre for Program 
Evaluation 2013; Gobby 2013a; 2013b; 2016; Gobby and Niesche 2019). The same 
can be said of the scholarly research into the Queensland IPS program (Gobby, 
Keddie, and Blackmore 2018; Keddie, Gobby and Wilkins 2018; Holloway and Keddie 
2018; Keddie 2016b). The policy review commissioned by the Queensland 
Department of Education used a combination of interviews and focus groups 
(Potential Solutions 2018). Surveys of school principals have also been used to gain 
insights in comparing innovativeness between charter schools and traditional public 
schools (e.g., Mintrom 2001). By contrast, the data used in this study is unique in two 
respects. First, the data captures the entire cohort of accepted applications. Second, 
the data provides insight into the perceptions of school principals about the 
contemporary constraints on innovation operating within a centralized government 
school, prior to the IPS system being implemented in that school.  
The data calls for a textual analysis to be conducted. Based on the conceptualization 
of innovation in the public sector context, the documents were examined asking: 
whether the applicant school identified any innovative programs or practices that it 
would implement that it is not currently implementing; if so, what are these programs 
or practices; and how does the IPS program remove barriers to innovation 
experienced in the current centralized system.44 An innovative practice was observed 
if the principal identified something that was not currently being undertaken – or was 
being expanded to offer to a different category of students. An innovative practice was 
                                                          
44 See Chapter 1, Section 2, for the discussion of the conception of innovation in the public 
sector.  
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not observed if the principal identified something that would simply be continued 
under the IPS initiative.  
Following Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle (2015), a manual content analysis of the data 
was conducted using a system of coding based on an adaption of Schumpeter’s five 
forms of innovation (Schumpeter 1934). Innovation practices identified were 
organized into the following broad categories: (1) new programs; (2) new methods 
(practices) of delivering programs; (3) new sources of supply; (4) new markets; and 
(5) new ways to organize service delivery. Subcategories were developed based on 
a preliminary examination of the data. This is a distinct attempt – noting our 
conception of innovation, and our ultimate interest in public sector innovation – on 
similar processes taken by Mintrom (2001) who arranged the data into five broad 
categories (school administration and management, curriculum, instructional 
techniques, use of technology, and the promotion of parental involvement), Preston 
et al. (2012) who categorise their data into four categories (staffing policies, academic 
support services, school organisational structures, and governance) and Lubienski 
(2003a, p. 404-718) who distinguishes between “educational” changes (‘practices 
regarding curricular content and instructional strategies with immediate impact at the 
classroom-level’), and “administrative” changes (‘organisation-level practices and 
structural designs that do not directly affect classroom techniques or content’).  
New programs encompass both professional development programs for staff, 
academic programs for students – including literacy and numeracy, recovery and 
extension, extra-curricular activities such as sport and music, languages other than 
English, or vocational or employment pathways. A new method refers to new 
curriculum developments or using ICT. New sources of supply include partnerships 
with business, industry, research institutes or universities, or other schools. New 
markets are, for example, programs for parents or other community groups – rather 
than existing students, using marketing programs to target new enrolments, and 
leasing or licensing out the school’s facilities to other community groups. Finally, new 
ways to organize service delivery include measures around staffing flexibility such as 
restructuring, reallocating or recruiting staff, the employment of support staff, school 
timetabling, instituting a multi-campus, and actions around the school’s buildings, 
maintenance or infrastructure.  
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5.5 Results 
Overall the results show that Queensland’s IPS initiative will foster innovation, 
according to principal’s perceptions about the innovative practices they will be able to 
implement as an IPS. The textual analysis conducted, based on Schumpeter’s five 
forms of innovative practices, is presented here in two ways and supplemented by 
drawing directly from the text of the EOI applications.  
First, Table 5.1 reports the average number of innovative practices observed. The 
results are broken down into the form of innovative practice, commencement year, 
and school type.  
Table 5.1 – Average number of proposed innovative practices, by category, school 
type and year 
School Type 
(Number) 
New 
programs 
New 
methods  
New 
supply 
New 
markets 
New 
organization  Total 
2013       
State School (9) 2.00 1.11 1.22 0.33 1.55 6.22 
State High School (13) 2.23 1.00 2.54 0.54 1.77 8.08 
State College (2) 1.50 0.50 1.50 1.00 2.00 6.50 
Special/Other (2) 1.50 1.00 2.50 0.00 1.50 6.50 
All types 2.04 1.00 2.00 0.46 1.69 7.19 
2014       
State School (31) 2.29 0.68 1.68 0.55 1.35 6.55 
State High School (17) 2.88 0.35 2.24 0.29 1.53 7.29 
State College (5) 2.80 0.80 1.60 0.00 1.20 6.4 
Special/Other (1) 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 
All types 2.50 0.57 1.81 0.43 1.37 6.69 
2015       
State School (37) 2.84 0.92 2.3 0.51 1.62 8.19 
State High School (7) 2.86 0.29 2.14 0.29 1.14 6.71 
State College (1) 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 
Special/Other (2) 0.50 0.50 2.00 0.00 1.00 4.00 
All types 2.74 0.85 2.21 0.45 1.49 7.74 
 
Table 5.1 shows that proposed innovative practices were mostly observed in the 
new programs and new sources of supply categories, although there are slight 
variations in the observations over the three years – and this was true of all school 
types except for Special/Other. However, the number of proposed innovation 
practices does vary with school type over three years. For instance, there is a 
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reduction over time in the average number of proposed innovative practices in State 
High Schools from 8.08 in 2013, to 7.29 in 2014, and 6.71 in 2013. Meanwhile, 
State Schools increased from an average of 6.22 in 2013, to 6.55 in 2014, and 8.19 
in 2015. 
Table 5.1 also shows that for State Schools and State High Schools more innovative 
practices were proposed for the new programs category, followed by new methods of 
supply, new organization, and new methods of delivering services, with new markets 
being the least common.  
The second way that the textual analysis is presented is by providing further detail on 
the type of the proposed innovative practices. The breadth of these practices falling 
within each category was summarised in the previous section. Table 5.2 shows the 
frequency of schools proposing a particular type of practice in its written application 
(expressed as a percentage of the count). As an example of how to interpret this data, 
innovative practices relating to extra-curricular activities were proposed in 19 percent 
of all successful 2013 applications.        
Table 5.2 – Distribution of proposed innovative practices, by year 
Proposed Innovative Practice 2013 2014 2015 
New Programs    
Academic Support Services - Disadvantaged/Underachieving  12% 19% 15% 
Academic Support Services - High Achieving/Extension 19% 26% 26% 
Academic Support Services - Literacy and numeracy 15% 9% 28% 
Academic Support Services - Others  15% 20% 23% 
Extra-Curricular  (incl. sport, music, others) 19% 19% 26% 
Language Immersion  8% 6% 0% 
LOTE program 8% 7% 11% 
Professional Development - ICT 4% 0% 0% 
Professional Development - Mentoring/coaching 12% 22% 36% 
Professional Development - Other 23% 44% 55% 
Professional Development - Subject specific 12% 4% 4% 
Vocational Education/Employment Pathways 27% 19% 4% 
New Methods    
Curriculum  62% 20% 34% 
ICT 27% 35% 40% 
New Supply    
Business/Industry Partnership 38% 28% 26% 
Community Partnership 54% 44% 45% 
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Research/University Partnership 38% 43% 36% 
School Partnership (incl. international) 38% 46% 60% 
New Markets    
External Accreditation 0% 2% 4% 
Lease/License of School's Facilities 15% 17% 4% 
Marketing/Parent Engagement 23% 24% 26% 
Outside Hours School Care 4% 0% 0% 
New Organisation     
Buildings/Maintenance/Infrastructure 35% 19% 11% 
Employment of Support Staff 35% 24% 45% 
Hours of school 8% 7% 13% 
Multi-campus 12% 2% 2% 
Teaching staffing flexibility (incl. restructure, reallocation, 
recruitment)  46% 67% 60% 
Timetabling  8% 7% 2% 
    
5.5.1  New programs 
The data shows that the IPS program encourages schools to propose new programs 
that are responsive to the needs of their students. Table 5.1 indicates that schools 
propose to adopt an average of between 2.04 and 2.74 new programs over the three 
years where data was examined. The data revealed eight distinct categories of 
proposed programs for students, and four distinct categories of professional 
development programs – detailed in Table 5.2.   
The applications reveal a strong link between staffing flexibility and the ability to create 
new academic programs. For instance, a State High School in Brisbane stated that it 
was currently exploring becoming a pilot school for a new history program, and noted 
that ‘due to the specialist nature of the course content, staffing flexibility would greatly 
benefit and support this innovative program’ (2013 application). Similarly, a State High 
School in Brisbane’s outer suburbs indicated that full-time-equivalent flexibilities 
would enable it to ‘initiate a tutorial model for students in identified areas of need’ 
(2014 application). A strong connection between partnerships and new programs can 
also be observed – discussed further below.  
There is also evidence of a similar link between staffing flexibility and the ability to 
provide innovative professional development programs. For example, the Principal of 
a State School in Brisbane’s outer suburbs stated that:  
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…a ‘one size fits all’ model of professional learning is out-dated and largely ineffectual. 
Our plan is to design a differential program of professional learning...To do this we 
require resource flexibility and enhancement. IPS will free us up to allow this to 
happen. (2014 application) 
An interesting observation from another Brisbane State School was that it proposed 
a program that would replace an existing program (2015 application). This is the only 
example of the destruction phase of innovation manifesting itself in the Queensland 
IPS setting.  As considered in previous chapters, the public sector has weak or non-
existent mechanisms of destruction (Potts 2010) and regulatory constraints on these 
mechanisms are not well understood.    
The applications did not reveal any instance of a school being prohibited from 
implementing a new program due to any specific regulatory constraint. This finding is 
expected, given the existing autonomies that the schools had under the centralized 
system applicable to the schools at the time of the applications. However, the lack of 
innovation in programming was more than merely having to make trade-offs. It 
appears that staffing inflexibility – policies and procedures imposed on schools from 
central government departments – are restraining schools’ ability to offer additional 
programs. The regulation experienced by schools is “soft” regulation inside 
government (Hood et al. 1999) rather than “hard” regulatory provisions that was the 
focus of Chapter 4. This point is expanded under the discussion of new organization.  
5.5.2  New methods 
Next, I will examine new methods of delivering existing programs. On average schools 
proposed to implement one innovative practice (2013) or less (2014, 2015) from this 
category. Curriculum development and the use of Information Communications and 
Technology (ICT) were the two forms of proposed innovation practices observed. 
Curriculum innovations were present in 62 percent of applications in 2013, but 
dropped to 20 percent and 34 percent in 2014 and 2015, respectively. The proposed 
use of ICT increased, from 27 percent of applications in 2014 to 35 percent and 40 
percent in 2014 and 2015, respectively.   
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The ability to hire specific staff with specific skills and experiences – rather than relying 
on the central system – was a key driver of proposed innovative practices in this 
category. For example, the use of the International Baccalaureate (IB) program was 
something that presented in several applications. The use of this alternative 
curriculum is not prohibited through regulation, but there would be transaction costs 
in changing curriculum or offering it as an alternative – which is mitigated if schools 
can recruit appropriate staff. The Principal of a State School in South-East 
Queensland stated, ‘as an IPS school, [the school] could attract and retain staff with 
IB teaching experiences to strengthen the workforce capability and improve student 
learning outcomes by implementing an inquiry approach to learning’ (2015 
application). The Principal of a State High School in Brisbane’s inner suburbs noted 
that it was already offering the IB curriculum, but increased staffing flexibility meant 
that it would be able to extend the program to its middle years (2014 application).   
The use of ICT was found to enhance partnerships and academic programs. For 
example, a State School on the Gold Coast proposed video-conferencing with its 
sister school in Japan (2015 application) while a State School in suburban Brisbane 
proposed extension opportunities for gifted students through a video link to a local 
State High School (2015 application).  
5.5.3  New supply 
Forming new partnerships were a major feature of many applications. This finding is 
expected, given the emphasis placed on such partnerships in the IPS prospectus. On 
average, the applications indicated that schools would form more than one 
partnership. Of these, partnerships with other schools were the most popular, followed 
by community groups, universities, and business/industry.  
Partnerships provide schools with access to specialized knowledge, skills, and 
resources that it would otherwise not have. The partnerships mean that programs 
such as ‘specialist programs to maximise safety and enhance wellbeing for children 
and young people with disabilities’ (2013 application), ‘Early Childhood Transition 
Program between local Kindergartens and the school’ (State School, 2014 
application), and sporting programs like a ‘Centre of Excellence in Golf’ are able to be 
established (State School, 2013 application). One State College noted that increased 
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autonomy would allow it to take up an offer from a university to expand an existing 
program into chemistry, biology, and environmental/marine sciences (2014 
application). 
These partnerships may provide schools with future revenue streams when combined 
with innovations around buildings and facilities. For instance, a State School in 
Brisbane’s outer suburbs proposes to construct an Aquatic Centre to service the 
school and the local community, and plans to approach other community groups to 
use the school's performing arts center in return for student scholarships and training 
(2014 application).  
The applications reveal that existing regulation and bureaucratic decision making are 
preventing schools from establishing innovative partnerships. For example, the 
Principal of a State School on the Gold Coast explained the transaction costs: 
‘currently, we are limited in being able to pursue a higher level of community 
involvement as this requires time to seek, negotiate, develop and sustain’ (2015 
application).  A Brisbane State School principal stated, similarly, that as an IPS it 
would be able to establish partnerships ‘…without the current level of red tape and 
approval by Education Queensland’ (2014 application). 
5.5.4  New markets  
Schools identified opportunities that would expand services to new and different 
consumer groups. On average, less than one innovative practice was observed per 
school each year, although approximately one-quarter of schools identified marketing 
and parent engagement opportunities throughout the application period.  
In relation to parental engagement, one proposed innovative practice was providing 
courses to parents to address their educational needs to enable them to better assist 
in their children’s education. For example, a Gold Coast State High School proposed 
literacy and numeracy short courses (2013 application), and a nearby State School 
proposed making the school’s ICT training program available to ‘up skill parents in the 
applications necessary for students to access on-line (sic) learning’ (2015 
application). These proposals were assisted by the flexibility around school hours and 
staffing. Other applications focused on IPS branding, which itself would make the 
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school more attractive to parents with children in the private-education market 
segment. The Principal of a Brisbane State School commented that ‘Similar to our 
main competitors in the independent school arena, there will be an increased ability 
and perception within the community that we have a status that makes us even more 
desirable as the choice of the child's primary school education provider’ (2015 
application). 45   
The other commonly observed form of proposed innovative practice under this 
category was leasing or licensing the School’s facilities. Fifteen percent of schools 
nominated this in the 2013 applications and 17 percent of schools in 2014 – however, 
this dropped to 4 percent in the 2015 round. On the face of the applications, it was 
unclear why this had dropped – particularly as the IPS prospectus noted that schools 
would have greater autonomy over facilities. One possibility is that schools are leasing 
out their facilities already. For example, the Principal of an outer Brisbane State 
School noted that ‘our facilities are used extensively by short and long-term Hirers’ 
(2014 application). Similarly, another outer Brisbane State School indicated that it 
already had shared facility agreements in place (2014 application), a State High 
School in Townsville leases its swimming pool to the local municipality (2014 
application) and a State Secondary College had a public-private partnership in place 
for facilities management which it was able to do because it was a new school (2013 
application).  
Nevertheless, there is evidence that increased autonomy will enable schools to 
realize this possibility by lowering the transaction costs of dealing with the government 
department. One example is a State High School on the Gold Coast, whose principal 
stated that the school ‘currently provides extensive facility access to external 
                                                          
45 Marketing innovations were also found in New Zealand. The removal of zoning 
regulations and the introduction of school choice reforms saw marketing become a function 
of school councils and principals as a way to ‘convince potential students and their parents 
that their offerings were preferable to those of the school down the road’ (Fiske and Ladd 
2000, p. 212). In a recent article, Holloway and Keddie (2018, p. 10) question the value of 
marketing innovations within IPS schools on the basis that this allocates resources away 
from ‘education matters’. I would address this criticism by referring to Hayek (1945); an 
individual’s preferences are not given but are discovered. Of course, some advertising may 
be misleading, but competitive advertising acts as a discourse increasing the amount of 
knowledge about education services.   
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organizations but has been limited. IPS will provide greater flexibility to negotiate long 
term and facilities development agreements with these partners’ (2013 application). 
5.5.5  New organization  
New forms of organization presented as the third-most observed proposed innovative 
practice, with schools nominating between one and two practices (1.37-1.69) on 
average that they would undertake if admitted to the IPS program. It is significant 
because this category includes staffing flexibility – of which 46 percent of applicants 
in 2013, 67 percent in 2014 and 60 percent in 2015, indicated that they would be able 
to utilize as an IPS.  
There is a link between staffing flexibility and new academic support programs, staff 
development programs, and the ability to recruit specialized staff. A key submission 
from schools was that staffing flexibility would allow for educational staff to spend 
more time on student-focused activities. For instance, the Principal of a regional State 
School contended that ‘by becoming an IPS, we will have the autonomy to create a 
[Business Service Manager] position, which is currently not allocated for in our staffing 
model. This will enable the [Principal], [Head of Special Education Services] and 
curriculum leaders to focus on the priority of improving student outcomes with the 
BSM taking on management of the school's business, facilities and HR’ (2013 
application). Between 24 and 45 percent of schools, depending on the year, noted 
that as an IPS they proposed hiring of support staff to supplement the teaching staff. 
A Brisbane State School proposed hiring a ‘data coach’ (2013 application) as just one 
example. This is significant because the prospectus notes schools already had the 
ability to recruit non-teaching staff (Queensland Department of Education and 
Training 2012a). The autonomy to do this may be limited in practice as the evidence 
of the applications is that recruiting of non-teaching staff is constrained under the 
existing centralized model of service delivery. For instance, the Principal of a Gold 
Coast State School observes that: 
As a non-IPS school we have been hindered by 'red-tape' during our attempts to 
appoint quality staff to fill roles such as Coach, Head of Curriculum/Curriculum 
Coordinator and G&T Coordinator…Being an IPS will enable us more strategically 
and creatively model our staffing structure to meet student needs. (2015 application) 
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Likewise, an outer suburban State School Principal lamented that ‘unfortunately, 
traditional models of governance have previously meant that innovation is dependent 
on fluctuating staffing allocation and point in time funding’. They went on to explain 
that, in 2013, this leads to the loss of a staff member that ran a new reading program 
due to insufficient flexible staffing hours and funding (2015 application). The same 
school cited staffing flexibility as a limitation on the ability to provide staff with 
adequate professional development opportunities. A Brisbane State High School 
principal provided an example in 2013 where ‘an experienced [Information Processes 
and Technology] teacher retired mid-year and could not be replaced through existing 
mechanisms’ (2014 application). The Principal of a State High School in Townsville 
also noted the costs, stating ‘the current uncertainty and red tape surrounding 
teaching appointments would be removed when we are able to make direct 
applications and appointments ourselves…’ (2013 application). The Principal of a 
State High School in South-east Queensland warned of the ‘drift of the most effective 
teachers to the non-government sector’ (2013 application) unless processes were 
streamlined. 
Consistent with autonomy theory, there is evidence that increased flexibility allows 
innovative practices for school organizational structure. For example, a Brisbane 
State School proposed introducing middle-management in the form of year-level 
coordinators (2013 application). Innovation of this type is already taking place. For 
example, a regional State High School had already created Head of Department 
positions and reallocated administrative work, but its application highlighted a 
potential roadblock for this happening in other schools under the centralized system. 
The school noted that these changes required the approval of its Local Consultation 
Committee – which exists as part of the enterprise bargaining framework (see: 
Department of Education, Training and Employment State School Teachers’ Certified 
Agreement 2012, discussed in Stanley, Allen and Lane 2014).46 Other school’s 
committees may not be open to these changes, which may explain why this innovation 
                                                          
46  Note: The 2012 collective agreement was replaced by the Department of Education 
and Training State School Teachers' Certified Agreement 2016 on 5 October 2016. The 
consultation provisions discussed here remain.  
157 
 
has been constrained in the past. This requirement may also explain why flexibility 
around school hours did not feature heavily in applications.   
Flexibility does not necessarily mean increased teaching loads. Indeed, a State 
School on the Gold Coast envisaged that ‘additional [non-contact time] will be 
provided to teachers’ (2015 application) – in that case, to allow teachers to engage in 
assessment task design and moderation processes with other schools in the area to 
‘enhance the transition to junior secondary’ (2015 application).    
Let us now turn to buildings, facilities, and maintenance. These forms of proposed 
innovative practices within the new organization category were evident in 35 percent 
of applications in 2013, before falling to 19 percent and 11 percent in 2014 and 2015, 
respectively. The evidence is that autonomy will yield efficiency dividends. A Brisbane 
State High School complained that a submission had been sitting with Education 
Queensland facilities for some time (2013 application). The Principal of a regional 
State High School noted that buildings and facilities development was occurring in an 
‘ad hoc’ fashion, that ‘capital works requests currently take too long to be actioned’, 
and under the IPS model this school would be able to move much more effectively on 
those proposals (2013 application). In summary, the IPS will enable ‘direct 
transparent resourcing to the school without regional interference…’ according to the 
Principal of another Brisbane State High School (2014 application).  
A final theme is a link between hours of the school and other program offerings. As 
the Principal of a Brisbane High School explains, ‘early starts and later finishes [allow] 
for greater access to curriculum programs and flexible programs for vocational 
programs and parent engagement... The school will provide additional sporting 
options for students outside of school hours. Currently no interschool sport is 
organised or played on a regular basis for students in year 11-12.’ (2014 application). 
5.5.6  Conclusion of the Queensland case study   
The examination of the EOI applications for the first three years (2013-2015) of the 
Queensland IPS program has shown that the initiative will foster innovation in public 
education service delivery, according to the perceptions of individual school 
principals.  
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The study observed a range of proposed innovative practices, categorized according 
to an adaption of Schumpeter’s five forms of innovation (Schumpeter 1934). The 
study revealed that staffing flexibility and autonomy around recruitment were integral 
to fostering a range of innovative practices beyond the category of new forms of 
organization itself. The study provides evidence that the current centralized service 
delivery model is constraining innovation, not only with respect to staffing flexibility, 
but in schools forming partnerships, in leasing and licensing out its facilities, and in 
managing its buildings, facilities, and infrastructure. In this regard, the chapter’s 
findings are consistent with the theory of school autonomy (e.g., Chubb and Moe 
1990; Wohlstetter, Wenning, and Briggs 1995; Lubienski 2003a; Preston et al. 2012). 
The regulatory constraints of the service delivery observed in this chapter appear to 
fall within the ‘red tape’ category, and higher transactions costs that undermined 
principals’ capacity to implement innovative ideas were observed rather than direct 
legislative prohibitions. 
It has been claimed that ‘IPS is practically and logistically more difficult to carry out in 
primary schools than in larger and better resourced secondary schools’ (Gobby, 
Keddie, and Blackmore 2018, p. 169). The results of the Queensland case study 
presented in this chapter does not make findings of the ease of implementation. 
However, the findings do indicate that, on average, state school principals proposed 
more innovative practices than high school principals in the 2015 EOI round. The 
results show that there is capacity for innovative practices to be adopted, regardless 
of school type, which would otherwise be constrained if these schools continued to 
operate under the ordinary regulations applying to government schools in 
Queensland.    
5.6 Discussion    
At this point, the results of the Queensland IPS program case study can be brought 
back into conversation with the school autonomy literature and the emerging 
scholarship on Australian IPS programs. The first part of this section will offer 
supporting evidence to the claim in this chapter that the Queensland IPS program 
fosters planned innovations. The second part of this section deals with some 
researcher’s objections to IPS programs – applying the institutional theory of 
regulation, these education researchers are identifying costs of disorder. The third 
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part of this section will focus on the criticism that school autonomy programs are a 
“re-regulation” of government education rather than deregulation.   
5.6.1  Increasing autonomy, increasing innovation  
There have been some recent studies on the Queensland and Western Australia IPS 
programs. Although it was not the specific focus of these studies, many confirm that 
removing regulation and allowing greater local school autonomy fosters innovation. 
In the main, these studies involved interviewing principals, other schools leaders, and 
in one case the state government minister and senior departmental bureaucrats, after 
the IPS programs had commenced.  
For instance, one Queensland principal was positive about his school being been 
converted from a government school to an IPS. The principal noted that ‘…now 
they’re cutting red tape, they’re giving us the ability to staff our schools and make 
resource allocations and make strategic directions about the purpose of the school 
and the nature of running of the school…’ (Keddie, Gobby, and Wilkins 2018, pp. 385-
386). One of the dictatorship costs involved in public education is enforced uniformity 
across the system. One example of soft regulation previously used by the department 
was ‘berating’ principals into compliance in the event schools went outside the core 
curriculum and offered subjects like dance (Keddie, Gobby, and Wilkins 2018). Under 
the IPS program, the principal was given the autonomy to cater to the preferences of 
his school community. Similarly, two other WA principals ‘believed that the 
[Department of Education] was inflexible, inefficient, and unresponsive to their 
schools’ needs’, limiting innovative local approaches (Gobby 2013b, p. 278). Another 
deputy principal with experience in private schools attributed the success of those 
private schools to a higher degree of autonomy (Gobby 2016).  
The recent stream of research identified several specific innovative practices. These  
included extra-curricular activities (Keddie, Gobby, and Wilkins 2018), external 
auditing and accreditation for quality control and differentiation (Gobby, Keddie, and 
Blackmore 2018), engaging in marketing and social media to promote the school’s 
brand and potentially earn new revenue streams (Holloway and Keddie 2018), as well 
as structural changes to outsource ‘the school’s uniform shop, the school’s 
Information Technology supply and maintenance and the school’s café.’ (Gobby 
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2013b, p. 281). Other principals sought to use their autonomy towards socially-
orientated goals, ‘finding creative solutions to reducing disadvantage, deprivation and 
social exclusion (Holloway and Keddie 2018, p. 390). 
These examples – along with the five forms of innovation observed in this chapter’s 
study – are also supported by an earlier evaluation of the WA program undertaken by 
the Centre for Program Evaluation at the University of Melbourne. One principal 
interviewed for this evaluation said that the ‘frustration with bureaucracy is far less’ 
(Centre for Program Evaluation 2013, p. 32). In another review of the WA IPS program 
in 2015 (again commissioned by the Education Department), teachers reported that 
‘things happen much more quickly; things get fixed more quickly; things get approved 
more quickly; excursions are easier and less bureaucratic; red tape is less’ (Hamilton 
Associates 2015, p. 33). Accordingly, there is evidence that IPS programs have 
reduced the regulatory burden.  
The Centre for Program Evaluation found that increased principal accountability and 
autonomy encouraged ‘a stronger sense of entrepreneurship and engagement as 
school leaders’ (2013, p. 7). In 2018, the Queensland Department of Education 
commissioned an evaluation of the IPS program. The finding concerning innovation 
is as follows.  
One of the key features of IPS is that they have the the (sic) capacity to, and are 
expected to innovate, trial and share good practice across the state school system. 
IPS principals note that the ability to make local decisions, find new ways of operating, 
to choose their own staff in a timely way, have brought confidence to innovate and 
make a significant difference for students over time. Of the respondents from IPS in 
the survey, 95.7% agree that innovative practices and programs have been 
implemented in their school (Potential Solutions 2018, p. 18).   
None of the above is to say that innovation does not occur in centralized government 
schools. To be sure, the Queensland evaluation noted that ‘90.3% of non-IPS 
principals agree that innovative practices and programs have been implemented in 
their school’ (Potential Solutions 2018, p. 18). This does not detract from the point 
that greater autonomy in the IPS program has increased the scope for innovation. 
Indeed, the study presented in this chapter reports the planned innovations that the 
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principals stated they were not able to currently achieve without the greater autonomy 
provided by the IPS program. That is, centralized regulation constrains innovation in 
this setting. The evaluation did note that ‘non-IPS principals and the majority of key 
stakeholders report they do not have visibility of these innovations [that are occurring 
in IPS schools]’ so there is need to promote greater innovation diffusion (Potential 
Solutions 2018, p. 6).    
Another relevant finding of the Queensland evaluation was that IPS principals formed 
an association to enable ‘new thought, ideas, reflections, and created a platform for 
conversation, sharing of improvements and innovation’ (Potential Solutions, 2018, p. 
5). There is a long history of research on the question of innovation diffusion (e.g., 
Rogers 1995) including in the public sector context (e.g., Walker 1969; Moranto and 
Wolf 2013; De Vries, Bekkers, and Tummers 2018a). Recent research by Potts and 
his colleagues at RMIT University highlight the positive economic function that 
industry associations play in coordinating and diffusing knowledge in the form of 
information sharing and learning, amongst other things, as opposed to self-interested 
lobbying and rent-seeking (Thomas and Potts 2018; Berg et al. 2018 c.f., e.g., Tullock 
1967; Krueger 1974). While the specifics of innovation diffusion is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, it is noted that there is greater scope in this regard as non-IPS principals 
claim that they are excluded from the benefits of this knowledge generation (Potential 
Solutions, 2018; c.f. Holloway and Keddie 2018).  
In sum, the study presented in this chapter, combined with the other recent research, 
sharpens our understanding of how innovation occurs in schools by thinking of school 
principals as entrepreneurs employing new combinations of productive factors at their 
disposal (Schumpeter 1934; Gobby 2013b; Keddie, Gobby, and Wilkins 2018). This 
is true even if some principals might personally resist the label of an entrepreneur 
(Gobby 2013a). Indeed, other principals are explicit in seeking to run their school ‘like 
a business’ (Gobby 2013b, p. 282). 
5.6.2  Institutional trade-offs  
The institutional theory of regulation (Djankov et al. 2003; Shleifer 2005; Davidson 
2013) assists in further exploring the link between increasing autonomy and 
increasing innovation. Namely, it can be shown that the regulation of an IPS has a 
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different combination of dictatorship and disorder costs as compared to the regulation 
of a centralized government school. The upshot of this chapter is that one of the costs 
of a centralized system of education service delivery is that regulation of the 
departmental bureaucracy constrains principals from implementing innovative 
practices at the school level. The constraints on innovation are conceptualized as a 
cost of dictatorship. 
Consequently, it can be said that there are lower costs of disorder associated with 
IPS as compared to centralized government schools. As has been previously 
explained, the perception of the costs of disorder is subjective in the minds of the 
principals (Allen and Berg 2017). Those perceptions have already been noted earlier 
in this discussion section. Moreover, for the overwhelming majority of principals that 
have expressed satisfaction with their new-found freedom following the acceptance 
into the IPS program, the perceived costs of dictatorship under the centralized system 
may now be higher than they first thought at the time of their EOI applications.  
Nevertheless, there is a trade-off. In light of the institutional theory, providing schools 
with a greater level of autonomy to stimulate innovation increases the costs of 
disorder. In the context of the IPS program, there are several concerns that have been 
identified in recent school autonomy literature. The concerns include: the benefits of 
innovation will not be evenly shared amongst the government education system; 
some schools will be more successful at than others, disadvantaged or high-needs 
students will not receive adequate resourcing and support, and specialization will 
result in schools adopting exclusionary admissions practices that will harm those 
students excluded – segregating them into schools of ‘known losers’ (Gobby, Keddie, 
and Blackmore 2018, p. 165; see also: Jacobs et al. 2016; Keddie 2017). The reason 
that these outcomes can be characterized as costs of disorder is that the concerns 
flow from the autonomous actions or omissions of individual school principals – acting 
in conjunction with school councils and other senior educators – rather than potential 
actions or omissions of the centralized government department (as regulator).  
To provide one example of the perceptions of disorder costs, Keddie (2016b) reported 
that one teacher was worried that an English as a Second Language program was 
‘vulnerable’ to being cut – although it is noted that the program had not actually been 
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affected. This teacher expressed the perceived disorder cost well in remarking that 
principal autonomy ‘makes a lot of assumptions – that all principals are ethical, that 
all principals are fair and just’ and these assumptions may not be correct (Keddie 
2016b, p. 720). Likewise, another recent study concluded – with concern – that IPS 
programs could pave the way for external vendors to involve themselves in service 
delivery and argued that the central bureaucracy is better placed to solve quality and 
equity concerns (Holloway and Keddie 2018). A Parliamentary Inquiry into the 
Western Australian program expressed similar sentiments about inequality and a two-
tier system, although no concrete examples are provided (Jacobs et al. 2016). While 
there is no doubt that these concerns are legitimately held, they tend to reflect 
perceptions of possible disorder costs rather than that based on actual evidence. The 
fundamental point, for the purposes of this thesis, is that potential failures of individual 
principals and schools in exercising their autonomy need to be weighed against the 
potential failures of the bureaucracy in constraining innovation.  
Of course, it is possible that the perception of the disorder costs can be manipulated.47 
For example, in analysing the Western Australian program, Gobby (2016, p. 26) 
reports that in the announcements to introduce greater school autonomy ‘the 
[Department of Education] and politicians sought to allay [fears of inequality and a 
two-tier education system] by reinforcing the value and support of the system for all 
schools’ and ‘also promoted the potential benefits of IPS for low SES areas’. More 
recently, a Parliamentary Inquiry into the Western Australian program found that the 
state government had selected the highest performing schools for admission to the 
IPS program to ‘increase the likelihood that the initiative would achieve its objectives’ 
(Jacbos et al. 2016, p. 4). The inquiry also noted that the government’s efforts in 
promoting the IPS program have ‘exacerbated the perceived differences’ between 
IPS and non-IPS schools (Jacobs et al. 2016, p. 50). In highlighting the benefits of 
the IPS program, the government can be seen here as trying to lower the perceived 
costs of disorder and amplify the relative costs of dictatorship.  
                                                          
47 As indicated previously, there is an analogy here with the public choice economics of 
Twight (1988; 1994) who discusses a manipulation of transaction costs. It is also 
reminiscent of Hayek’s (1960) complaint about public sector ‘“public relations” that seek to 
manipulate public opinion in favour of government programs.  
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In any case, Keddie (2016b) finds that the five staff interviewed across two IPS 
schools were all conscious about equity concerns, and one principal claimed that ‘a 
more direct allocation of funding to the school under IPS supports greater equity for 
Indigenous students’ (p. 719). Similarly, in another study, a deputy principal was 
cognisant of equity concerns in considering the possibility of promoting her school as 
having an ‘elite status’ (Gobby, Keddie, and Blackmore 2018, p. 165). Therefore, the 
evidence from recent interview studies suggests that principals are mindful of 
potential costs and take appropriate action (i.e., self-regulation) to limit these costs, 
meaning that the costs of disorder are lower than commonly assumed. Accordingly, 
the rhetoric that school autonomy somehow “dismantles public schooling” should be 
moderated (Gobby, Keddie, and Blackmore 2018; Smyth 2011).  
5.6.3  School autonomy and regulation   
As Djankov et al. (2003, p. 600) states, ‘no institution fully eliminates the transaction 
costs of dictatorship and disorder.’ Although it is not the focus of the scholarship, the 
recent research into school autonomy in Australia shows that IPS programs are still 
a centralized institutional possibility characterized by high dictatorship costs in 
contrast to other arrangements. As such, centralized regulations may continue to 
constrain innovative practices undermining the intent of school autonomy programs. 
It must be remembered that the institutional arrangement of the IPS program still 
retains all of the “hard” regulation applicable to government schooling. Indeed, a 
consistent theme with school autonomy programs in Australia is that they have been 
implemented administratively rather than through any legislative change.48 To put it 
another way, the executive arm of government has attempted to create a new 
institutional form – IPS schools, as distinct from centralized government schools – 
without undertaking regulatory reform. This means that although there are different 
“soft” regulations for this new institutional possibility, many of the centralized 
regulatory barriers are still in place, limiting the ability of schools to operate 
autonomously. As the review of the WA program notes, the term “Independent Public 
Schools” ‘describes schools with greater autonomy set firmly within system 
                                                          
48 The increasing regulatory complexity in New South Wales and Victoria was shown in 
Chapter 3. In the case of Victoria, it was shown that there has been a sizable increase in 
regulatory complexity after school autonomy reforms were introduced.  
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requirements and constraints’ (Hamilton Associates, p. 41). Similarly, the Queensland 
evaluation confirms that Independent Public Schools ‘are required to operate in line 
with the same legislation, industrial instruments, directives, whole of government 
policy and national agreements as all other state schools’ (Potential Solutions 2018, 
p. 8).  
A brief review of the primary Queensland legislation, starting from the period 
immediately prior to the first IPS EOI applications in 2012, confirms this point.49 A 
legislative word and page count comparison shows that between 1 January 2012 
(reprint number 3B current to 28 June 2012) and 1 May 2018 the principal legislation 
increased by 585 words or 8 pages.50 Further, there is no mention of Independent 
Public Schools under the Act. As such, the IPS reforms appear to be more about 
limiting the central bureaucracy – removing soft forms of regulation inside government 
– rather than tackling the broader problem of hard forms of overregulation in public 
sector services. This is not necessarily negative – this chapter has shown that the 
removal of red tape and other soft regulation gives principals the ability to innovate in 
ways they said could not occur under the status quo. However, the failure to tackle 
regulatory complexity at the legislative level has several consequences for the future 
of school autonomy and public sector innovation more broadly.  
The first consequence of not undertaking legislative-level regulatory reform is that the 
administrative and compliance burden may merely shift from the department level to 
the school level. Has overregulation in the system been reduced, or has the burden 
merely shifted from one location to another? Is this a case of “re-regulation” (Gobby 
2013b; see also, e.g., Fiske and Ladd 2000), where schools are given greater 
autonomy on the one hand, but subject to new forms of control on the other? The 
answers to these questions are relevant because the school principal’s role could 
change from being primarily about managing front-line service delivery to being 
concerned about complying with regulations previously managed by the central 
bureaucracy (e.g., Gobby, Keddie and Blackmore 2018). It is for this reason that one 
                                                          
49 Historical versions of the Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 have been obtained 
from the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, Queensland. 
<https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/>. 
50 Note: word and page estimates exclude headers, footers, tables of contents, and 
endnotes.   
166 
 
researcher has described school autonomy programs in the United Kingdom as 
‘simultaneous centralisation and decentralisation’ (Higham and Earley 2013). Others 
speak of freedom exercised within centralized systems of compliance (Keddie, 
Gobby, and Wilkins 2018, p. 381).  The previous chapter has identified a growing 
complexity in the regulation of public education services. Without regulatory reform at 
the legislative level, there is a compliance burden that needs to be met somewhere 
within the system. This may be one reason that principals have observed an increase 
in the administrative burden under the IPS programs in Queensland and Western 
Australia (Gobby 2013a; 2013b).  
The second consequence is that the efficacy of school autonomy programs will 
continue to be limited by the prevailing legislative and regulatory structures. This 
question extends beyond the principal legislation detailed in Chapter 3. Take staffing 
flexibility, for example, which is a crucial aspect of the IPS reforms. Research from 
the Institute of Public Affairs shows that government schools are subject to centralized 
employment regimes governed by state-wide awards or enterprise bargaining 
agreements (Stanley, Allen, and Lane 2014; see also Gobby 2016). Pay and 
conditions are standardized across the entire system, removing the ability for 
individual schools to use financial incentives to attract staff or to reward improved 
performance. The various awards or agreements also contain provisions that limit the 
ability of school principals to make changes in workplace practices by prescribing 
matters like school hours, the number of days in a school year, student-teacher ratios, 
and face-to-face-teacher hours. Surely, fixing these matters limits the scope for 
innovation. For other matters, principals must comply with union consultation 
provisions which significantly increase the transaction costs of negotiating and 
implementing changes in work practices. A possible alternative would be to borrow 
from American charter school laws, where public schools are established as separate 
legal entities – where staff are employees of individual schools rather than centralized 
government departments. 
The third consequence is that there is a risk that a future administration can unwind 
any action. To be sure, any legislative changes could be reversed as well – but there 
are higher transaction costs associated with this type of change. Additionally, in states 
with an upper house, the government will not necessarily control both houses of the 
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legislature.51 An example of this risk has been realized recently in WA. Shortly after 
the state election in 2017, The Australian newspaper reported that the incoming Labor 
government announced that schools operating as an IPS would be required to 
consider hiring employees within the Department’s pool of excess staff whenever they 
have a vacancy (Burrell 2017). Although the government has stated its commitment 
to keeping the IPS program, these moves may be the first steps towards re-
centralizing service delivery.  
5.7 Conclusion   
It is difficult to measure public sector innovation (Potts and Kastelle, 2010; Arundel 
and Huber 2013; Demircioglu and Audretsch 2017). Even when confined to the 
education context, there are difficulties measuring the effect of regulatory change 
(DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf 2018; 2019). By advancing a unique method, this 
chapter provides a future ability to track perceived and planned innovations in the 
education sector and investigate whether these have been implemented. In making 
an empirical contribution, this chapter examines a dataset which enables tracking of 
specific public sector innovation activity over time – militating against measurement 
issues generally associated with this area of research. 
This chapter has shown that school autonomy initiatives such as Queensland’s IPS 
program are fostering innovative approaches to improve outcomes in the delivery of 
public education in Australia. The IPS program was regulatory change – removing 
constraints and oversight from the department. This is significant because the results 
presented in this chapter provide evidence of a correlation between deregulation and 
public sector innovation. That is, higher levels of public sector innovation may be 
observed where individual service units (in this case schools) are given greater 
autonomy to be responsive to the needs of their consumers (in this case parents and 
guardians, and students), and where the dynamic process of developing new 
combinations of resources is less constrained. The discussion about institutional 
trade-offs suggests that this new institutional form may represent a more efficient 
                                                          
51 In the Westminster system, the government will generally have a majority in the lower 
house. However, note that there is only one house in the legislatures of the Australian 
Capital Territory, Queensland, and the Northern Territory.  
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institutional possibility of undertaking public education services compared to 
government schooling as it economizes a number of the costs of dictatorship without 
radically increasing the costs of disorder.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that removal of departmental 
regulatory constraints was the impetus for planned public sector innovation within the 
school context. However, the discussion in this chapter noted that because IPS 
programs have been introduced without underlying legislative-level regulatory reform, 
school autonomy has not addressed the problem of increasing regulatory complexity 
at the legislative level detailed in the previous chapter. Unless this problem is 
addressed, the provision of public education services may suffer under the weight of 
overregulation – and will ultimately undermine the benefits of these autonomy 
programs. The findings of this chapter suggest that IPS reforms have been driven by 
education policy rather than an understanding of the economics of regulation (Pincus 
2014). The IPS program is still a highly centralized form of service delivery. The next 
chapter will look to the United States’ school choice programs to examine the 
regulatory features of two other decentralized institutional possibilities – charter 
schools and voucher programs.   
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Chapter 6 – Regulation of School Choice Programs  
6.1  Introduction  
The history of school choice programs in the United States has been well chronicled 
elsewhere from a variety of perspectives (e.g., Nathan 1996; Bulkley and Fisler 2003; 
Forman 2005; Raywid 2006; Hess 2010; Wohlstetter, Smith, and Farrell 2013; 
Stewart and Wolf 2014; DeAngelis and Erickson 2018). The movement for school 
choice reform in the United States intensified at the end of the 1980s and the early 
1990s, with policy reports calling for the structural reform of public education to break 
up the monopoly of government schooling (e.g., Budde 1988; Kolderie 1990). The first 
charter school laws were introduced in the state of Minnesota in 1991 (referred to in 
that legislation as “outcome-based schools”).52 Although politically controversial, 
school choice proposals have long received support from both Democratic and 
Republican lawmakers and administrations at the federal, state, and local levels 
(Vergari 2003). Of course, the idea of separating the functions of funding and 
managing schools has a much longer history in the mainline of economic thought 
(Mitchell and Boettke 2017) on the public provision of education (Smith 1776; Mill 
1859; Friedman 1955; Hayek 1960). Indeed, voucher programs have existed in the 
United States since the 19th century (DeAngelis and Erickson 2018). The purpose of 
this chapter is not to examine the history of school choice reforms in any great detail. 
Instead, the purpose is to use the regulation of school choice programs as a case 
study to gain insights for public sector innovation more broadly.   
That one of the aims of school choice laws is to encourage innovation in public 
education is something of a cliché in the academic literature. Friedman (1955) is often 
cited for this proposition, despite making only a passing reference to local service 
delivery encouraging experimentation in schooling. The link between charter schools 
and innovation is cited far more than it is actually studied, although there are several 
notable exceptions (e.g., Lake 2008; Lubienski 2001; 2003a; 2009; Mintrom 2001; 
Preston et al. 2012).53  
                                                          
52 Minnesota Session Laws 1991; Chapter 265, Article 9, Section 3.  
53 This research is summarised in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter.   
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Instead, the focus of much of the economic scholarship has been to compare the 
academic performance of students in charter schools or voucher programs compared 
to traditional government schools (e.g., Betts and Tang 2011; Cheng et al. 2017; 
Jeynes 2012; Shakeel, Anderson, and Wolf 2016). Other economic research has 
studied school choice programs from a cost-efficiency perspective as compared to 
traditional government schools (Gronberg, Jansen, and Taylor 2012; 2017). Only 
recently, one team of researchers, associated with the Department of Education 
Reform at the University of Arkansas, have started to seriously examine the effects 
of regulation on participation in voucher programs (DeAngelis and Burke 2017; 
DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf 2018; 2019; Sude, DeAngelis, and Wolf 2018). Although 
school choice programs have also been a topic explored by legal scholars, few 
lawyers have ventured into conducting a legislative analysis of school choice laws 
(Grady 2012; Kasuboski 2018).54  
The argument advanced in this thesis is that there are a variety of ways that public 
sector services can be regulated – trading-off disorder and dictatorship costs – and 
that this fact has implications for public sector innovation. Innovation will occur within 
the constraints of the regulatory structures that mandate service delivery. Public 
education provides an excellent example to observe a variety of institutional forms in 
which schooling can take place. So far, chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis have 
considered institutional possibilities within Australia, including government schools 
and Independent Public Schools. This chapter extends the analysis by examining the 
legislative frameworks of two decentralized institutional possibilities in the United 
States – charter schools and voucher programs – that sit alongside centrally-
managed government schools.  
Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section two serves 
to set out the historical and theoretical background of school choice reforms in the 
United States. Section three explains the methodology behind selecting Washington, 
D.C., as a case study. Sections four and five provide a Schumpeterian legislative 
analysis of charter school laws and voucher program laws, respectively. The 
legislative analysis in these sections will be explained through the prism of the 
                                                          
54 Both of these studies investigate charter schools. This research is summarised in Section 
4 of this chapter.  
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institutional theory of regulation. Additionally, the implications for public sector 
innovation will be discussed within these sections. Section six concludes the chapter.       
6.2  School choice reforms, from theory to practice     
The purpose of this section is to provide an in-depth review of the theoretical claims 
of school choice programs. Just as there is no single way that public services can be 
delivered, there is no single model of school choice program. The two institutional 
possibilities studied in this chapter – Charter Schools and Voucher Programs – aim 
to fulfill the same goal in different ways. That is, the legislative framework governing 
service delivery provides parents and guardians seeking to educate their children in 
the education system with a choice of school. That parents and guardians have better 
information about the needs of their children than the state – and stronger incentives 
to fulfill them – is a straightforward proposition, recalling that knowledge is dispersed 
(Hayek 1945; 2002). However, constructing a system that decentralizes decision 
making power has been politically controversial (Vergari 2007). As noted above and 
in previous chapters, encouraging innovation in the way educational services are 
provided is a claim that is often put forward by proponents of school choice programs.  
What is the impact of regulatory structures on the provision of public education? 
Traditionally, the economic analysis of school choice has been based on a 
neoclassical price or market theory, introduced in the previous chapter, which 
distinguishes between demand-side and supply-side changes. For instance, on the 
demand side, voucher programs give parents access to public funding to educate 
their children in a private school; charter schools give parents the option of sending 
their children to a public school run by an independent board of trustees, and which 
is independently regulated. On the supply side, voucher programs build capacity by 
outsourcing services to the private sector; charter schools introduce mechanisms for 
public schools to be established on the initiative of individuals without relying on the 
state. In this way, both vouchers and charters are institutional possibilities that the 
literature speaks of as “quasi-market” systems (e.g., Le Grand and Bartlett 1993; 
Whitty 1997; Forman 2007; Lubienski 2009). The approach that is taken in this 
chapter, however, is to analyze the legislation, applying the institutional theory of 
regulation (Djankov et al. 2003; Shleifer 2005; Davidson 2010; 2013). Borrowing from 
Allen (2006), the approach taken here is not an exercise in advocacy but one of 
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“exegesis” of the legislative text and critical analysis to identifying the perceived costs 
of disorder and dictatorship of different regulatory approaches. 
In the previous chapter, it was pointed out that the claim that school choice fosters 
innovation at the school level rests on the theoretical basis of the “market” and 
“autonomy” theories. That is, introducing market mechanisms that put schools in 
competition with each other means schools will have incentives to introduce 
innovative practices; and providing local schools with autonomy will allow schools to 
use local knowledge to come up with and implement innovative practices to meet the 
needs of local students best. However, the theoretical basis for the link between 
school choice programs and innovation is more profound and more complex than this.  
This is not to say that these theories do not hold any explanatory power. However, 
both of these perspectives presuppose institutional and structural change. For public 
services, structural changes require a regulatory change of some kind. For example, 
the study on Queensland’s Independent Public Schools presented in Chapter 4 
showed the effect on the creation phase of innovation in the government schooling 
sector that would occur if school principals are subject to less departmental regulation 
(soft regulation), while the same legislative frameworks applicable to centralized 
government schools remain in place (hard regulation). Regulatory changes will be 
required to implement school choice programs. As Wohlstetter, Wenning, and Briggs 
(1995, p. 345) explain, ‘a key assumption underlying the charter school movement is 
that district and state regulations stymie innovation, and so for schools to become 
high performance organizations, they need to be deregulated.’ Similarly, Hess (2001, 
p. 143) argues that ‘the key thread defining the charter school movement is the desire 
to free schools from bureaucratic constraints that allow them to operate as close-knit 
communities dedicated to a shared vision.’ 
An appreciation for the institutional settings governing public sector services was 
explicitly evident in the work of early proponents of charter schools. For instance, 
Chubb and Moe, in their seminal Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools (1990), 
noted that schools in the private sector and schools in the public sector had different 
institutional features. They note that ‘society does not control them directly through 
democratic politics, and society does control them – through the marketplace’ (Chubb 
and Moe 1990, p. 27). In describing the bureaucratization of public education, three 
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passages are particularly instructive in constructing a more comprehensive regulatory 
constraint theory of public sector innovation.  
All public authorities, in seeking to impose higher-order values on schools – values 
that many in society, including many in the schools, may not embrace – face serious 
control problems that are endemic to the larger democratic “organization” in which 
they are forced to operate. They cannot solve these problems by granting the schools 
lots discretion. Discretion is the very source of their problems. The best means of 
ensuring that their values get implemented is to engineer the schools’ behaviour 
through formal constraints – to bureaucratize. (p. 41) 
… 
Policy proponents can specify precisely what they want the schools to do and build 
these specifications explicitly into legislative mandates and administrative regulations. 
In this way they can formally enshrine not only the goals schools are required to 
pursue, but also the criteria and standards they are to employ, the procedures and 
methods they are to follow, the types of personnel they are to hire, and virtually 
anything else of relevance to the implementation of policy. The dangers of political 
subversion are therefore vastly reduced, because there is little or no discretion left to 
subvert. (p. 43) 
… 
To put this most generally: schools and their personnel are granted a measure of 
discretion by technical necessity, but detailed formal specifications in legislative 
mandates and administrative regulations are voluminously imposed on all concerned, 
so that the schools’ scope for discretionary action is sharply narrowed – and the 
discretion that remains is then insulated from political control through extensive 
reliance on civil service, tenure, (nominal) professionalism, and other structural 
means. (p. 45)  
The purpose, according to Chubb and Moe, of the extensive – and excessive – 
bureaucratic regulation of education was twofold: (i) to facilitate the central control of 
service delivery; and (ii) further the interests of education bureaucrats, education 
professionals, and other special interests rather than further the purpose of a 
government education system. The characterization of regulation restricting the 
schools’ discretion strongly echoes Mises’ (1944) explanation of the purpose of public 
sector regulation.55 As to the second point, it seems that Chubb and Moe (1990) have 
                                                          
55 See full discussion of this point in Chapter 2, Section 3.  
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been influenced by the private interest theory of regulation and the wider public choice 
and institutional economics (e.g., Coase 1937; 1960; Downs 1967; Tullock 1965; 
Stigler 1971; Niskanen 1971; Posner 1974; Williamson 1985).56 The significance of 
Chubb and Moe’s theory of school choice being grounded in this way is that it takes 
us away from an analysis of schools as a black box (taking inputs of land, labor, and 
capital resources, and optimally producing educated students), and recognizes them 
as the product of individuals operating in an institutional environment. This takes us 
closer towards economics based on individual action.57   
However, while the private interest theory of regulation provides a powerful critique of 
the self-interested reasons that the regulatory framework has been put in place and 
remains in force, the institutional theory of regulation (Djankov et al. 2003; Shleifer 
2005; Davidson 2013) helps understand the trade-offs involved when comparing one 
regulatory framework to another. Indeed, Chubb and Moe (1990) are explicit in 
advancing an institutional critique – better institutional arrangements will lead to better 
schools. An appreciation of the institutional approach is the essential background to 
the “autonomy” and “competition” perspectives previously canvassed.   
In the context of my inquiry, Chubb and Moe’s above observations can be reframed 
as a trade-off between control of service delivery and innovation. School choice 
programs are not merely designed to change the economic incentives to innovate – 
they are about removing hard regulatory constraints. However, the institutional theory 
predicts that structural reforms to promote innovation will come with the cost of 
disorder. How have school choice laws been designed to facilitate greater innovation? 
How do school choice laws mitigate against the predicted increase in disorder costs? 
Because public sector services are creatures of regulation, these questions can be 
answered by exploring the legislative characteristics of school choice programs.   
                                                          
56 Some of these works are directly cited by the authors. See also, e.g., earlier work from 
Moe (1984) skilfully summarizing the "new economics of organization" and its application to 
public bureaucracy.  
57 This is the “methodological individualism” of the mainline of economic thinking (Mitchell 
and Boettke 2017). Note that Chubb and Moe (1990), in the extracted passages I cite in this 
chapter, speak of ‘schools” providing a firm level analysis. Which is why I have claimed that 
they bring us closer to that type of analysis. Further consideration of the question “what is a 
school?” (Coase 1937) is discussed in Chapter 7.      
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6.3  Selecting a jurisdiction for legislative analysis       
The United States, like Australia, is a federation of states. States are (and semi-
autonomous federal districts like Washington, D.C.), in the main, responsible for 
school education. This means that laws governing school choice programs will differ 
from one jurisdiction to another (e.g., Mintrom and Vergari 1997; Finnigan 2007; 
Grady 2012).  
This chapter will use the school choice legislation of one jurisdiction as a case study 
for detailed legislative analysis. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a detailed 
comparison of the legislation governing school choice programs in every US 
jurisdiction. Instead, the purpose of this chapter is to show that the features of the 
institutional possibilities of charter schools and voucher programs are written into the 
legislation. For this task, therefore, it suffices to identify a jurisdiction that (i) has both 
charter school laws and voucher programs; and (ii) has been objectively assessed as 
being a leading example of school choice laws. It is on this basis that, Washington, 
D.C. has been selected for legislative analysis.     
In relation to charters schools, the Centre for Education Reform (CER) publishes an 
annual scorecard and ranking for each US jurisdiction’s charter school laws. The 
methodology of the rankings is based on four categories: the existence of 
independent and multiple authorizers; the extent to which regulatory policies limit the 
growth of charter schools; the extent to which charter schools have operational and 
fiscal autonomy; and funding equity between charter schools and traditional 
government schools (Candal 2018). In 2018, the CER ranked Washington D.C.’s laws 
as number one out of 45 US jurisdictions (Candal 2018).  
Further, Washington D.C. is one of only 16 US jurisdictions that have voucher 
programs. The Fordham Institute publishes a ranking that takes into account a suite 
of school choice programs including charter schools, voucher programs, education 
tax credits, and academic savings accounts. In 2015, Washington, D.C. ranked in the 
top ten cities, second to only New Orleans, Louisiana (Wohlstetter, Zeehandelaar, 
and Griffith 2015). However, this assessment ranks cities rather than jurisdictions. 
The CER ranked Louisiana 18 out of 45 jurisdictions explaining that ‘although charter 
schools have thrived in areas such as New Orleans, charters state-wide are 
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overregulated and underfunded. Moreover, state interference has prevented effective 
operators from opening schools’ (Candal 2018, p. 38). As such, Washington D.C.’s 
legislative code has been chosen for the study outlined the sections to follow. 
The legislation analysis presented in this chapter uses the Schumpeterian conception 
of innovation as “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1934; 1942) as a framework – 
showing how regulation affects the dynamic forces of innovation. As has been 
advanced in previous chapters, this chapter adds to literatures using the 
Schumpeterian conception of innovation for insights into public sector innovation 
(Windrum and Garcia-Goni 2008; Potts 2009; Potts 2010; Potts and Kastelle 2010; 
Mazzucato 2013; Stewart-Weeks and Kastelle 2015) and as a framework for 
regulatory analysis (e.g. Bauer 1997; Yandle 2002; Diamond 2014). In the sections 
to follow, the regulatory constraints impacting on the creation and destruction phases 
will be examined for charter schools and voucher programs in Washington, D.C.  
6.4 Charter schools  
Charter schools are public schools. The difference between the institutional 
possibilities of charter schools and government schools is that charter schools are 
independent organizations that are given a “charter” from a public authorizing body 
and are not managed or regulated by the central government department. This 
institutional possibility still fits within the definition of “regulation inside government” 
proposed by Hood et al. (1998; 1999), because the charter school is a public body at 
arm’s length from the public authorizing body, and the authorizing body has an official 
mandate to oversee the activities of the charter school. 
Allen and Mintrom (2010, p. 457) offer a typical description of charters schools as 
follows.  
Charter schools are non-sectarian, publicly funded schools of choice that operate with 
freedom from many of the regulations that pertain to traditional public schools. They 
operate in parallel with—and often in competition with— traditional public schools. 
Charter schools enjoy a high degree of autonomy concerning how they are governed and 
operate. In return for this autonomy, they are required to be closely accountable to public 
officials and attract sufficient student numbers to remain viable. If they do not meet 
177 
 
appropriate standards of educational quality and financial management, charter schools 
may forfeit some of their autonomy or be compelled to close.  
Charter schools are an increasingly popular institutional possibility for the public 
provision of education. According to the National Center for Education Statistics 
(2016), at a school level, and between 2000-01 and 2015-16, ‘the percentage of all 
public schools that were charter schools increased from 2 to 7 percent, and the total 
number of charter schools increased from 2,000 to 6,900’. During this same 15-year 
period, charter school enrolment increased from 400,000 students ‘in fall 2000 to 2.8 
million students in fall 2015, an overall increase of 2.4 million students’ (NCES 2016). 
This section of the chapter will examine the key regulatory features of charter schools, 
using Washington, D.C. as a case study, and then provide a review of the empirical 
evidence for the proposition that charter schools foster innovation.    
6.4.1 Charter school law in Washington, D.C.   
The institutional possibility of charter schools in Washington, D.C. (DC) exists in the 
Code of the District of Columbia (DC Code). The District of Columbia School Reform 
Act of 1995, was originally enacted as part of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions 
and Appropriations Act of 1996 and signed into law by US President Bill Clinton on 
26 April 1996.58 It is currently codified in Title 38, Subtitle IV, Chapter 18, of the DC 
Code.59 This primary legislation was obtained from the official DC Law Library online 
database, in force as of 22 March 2019.60 Additionally, other health and safety 
regulations apply . An exposition of the legislation reveals regulation of the creation 
phase and destruction phase that is more dynamic than centralized government 
schools.  
 
                                                          
58 Public Law 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 – 107-156.  
59 Note that the subsidiary District of Columbia Municipal Regulations contain provisions 
regulating charter schools’ eligibility and receipt of grant funding for land, buildings, and 
capital equipment. However, charter schools are otherwise exempt from regulations 
established for the District of Columbia public schools (§ 38–1802.04 DC Code). For this 
reason, the subsidiary regulations have not been specifically considered in this case study. 
60<https://code.dccouncil.us/dc/council/code/> (last accessed 28 March 2019) 
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Creation Phase  
One of the defining features of charter schools as an institutional possibility is that 
charters can be created independently of the decisions of a central government 
department or ministerial discretion. In Washington, D.C., charter schools are 
established by an eligible applicant filing an application (called a “petition”) with an 
eligible chartering authority (§ 38–1802.01(c)).61  
Alternatively, an existing government, private or independent school can apply to be 
converted to a charter school, with the same requirements that would otherwise apply 
to a new applicant (§ 38–1802.01). In this case, the creation of a new charter school 
directly displaces the existing school – providing an evolutionary mechanism when a 
charter school becomes a more preferable institutional possibility compared to private 
schools (increased regulation and state support) or government schools (decreased 
regulation and increased autonomy), recognizing that the trade-off between the costs 
of dictatorship and disorder are not static over time (Djankov et al. 2003). One 
example of this is the practice of “turnaround”, where poorly performing government 
schools are converted to charter schools (e.g., DeGory 2016).62     
It is worthwhile detailing, at some length, the requirements of a petition. Specifically, 
section 38–1802.02 of the DC code requires that a petition must include a statement 
addressing the following matters:  
• The mission and goals of the proposed school;  
• The manner in which the school will conduct district wide assessments;  
• The need for the proposed school in the geographic area of the school site;  
• The proposed instructional goals and methods for the proposed school – 
including self-motivation, classroom instruction and learning; the scope and size 
of the proposed school’s program;  
• The plan for evaluating student academic achievement – and proposed remedial 
actions if a student falls below expectations;  
                                                          
61 Note that eligible applicant is broadly defined, meaning “a person, including a private, 
public, or quasi-public entity, or an institution of higher education”.  
62 Although it is noted that this practice is not exclusive to using charter school structures, it 
was a key structure in President Obama’s ‘Race to the Top’ 2009 Federal funding initiative. 
See, e.g., Corbett (2015).   
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• An operating budget  
• The site where the school will be located – including any buildings or proposed 
buildings 
• Details of any major contracts planned ($10,000 or above);  
• A timetable for commencing operations as a public charter school; 
• The proposed rules and policies for governance and operation of the proposed 
school – including policies and procedures for enrolment, admission, 
suspension, expulsion, other disciplinary issues, health and safety, and 
compliance with all other applicable laws; 
• Copies of the proposed articles of incorporation and bylaws of the proposed 
school; 
• The names and addresses of the members of the proposed Board of Trustees;  
• The qualifications that will be required of employees; 
• How parents, teachers, and other members of the community have been 
involved in the design and will continue to be involved in the implementation of 
the proposed school; 
• How parents and teachers will be provided orientation and other training; 
• Assurance that the proposed school will seek, obtain, and maintain accreditation 
from at least one appropriate educational accreditation body; and  
• An explanation of the relationship that will exist between the public charter school 
and the school’s employees.63 
An analysis of the application process through the prism of the institutional theory of 
regulation is revealing in that provisions are aiming to guard against risks of both costs 
of dictatorship costs and costs of disorder. An obvious risk in a regulatory system 
allowing independent applicants to start public schools is analogous to the 
precautionary principle. That is, individuals may not be adequately prepared or 
qualified for the task of setting one up and may fail in their endeavors, potentially 
wasting a significant amount of taxpayer’s funds (recalling that the grant of a charter 
will unlock public funding). The regulatory framework, therefore, puts an onus on the 
applicant to prove these matters to evidence capacity. Predictably, however, there is 
an associated dictatorship cost. Not only are there positive transaction costs 
                                                          
63 Note: parts of this section have been summarised or paraphrased for brevity.  
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associated with regulatory compliance, but the approval power must be given to some 
public authority to determine whether the conditions have been met.      
Section 38–1802.03(d) of the DC Code requires the chartering authority to approve 
the petition if it determines that:  
• The petition satisfies the legislative requirements (and, if applicable, the applicant 
agrees to satisfy any lawful condition or requirement provided by the chartering 
authority);  
• The public charter school has the ability to meet the educational objectives outlined in 
the petition; 
• The approval will not cause the chartering authority to exceed the specified limit under 
the Code (each eligible chartering authority cannot approve more than 10 petitions to 
establish a public charter school per year).64 
Many of the factors required in the initial petition are objective in that the applicant will 
provide the documentation, or they will not (although foreseeably, charter authorizers 
may request further information where initial documentation is thought to be 
insufficient). 
Additionally, on a plain and ordinary reading of the statute, there does not appear to 
be overriding discretion for the authorizer to reject the application. However, there are 
several subjective matters, including the need for the proposed school and the 
proposed school’s ability to meet the educational objectives. This is the crux of the 
dictatorship costs associated with establishing charter schools. An authorizer will 
need to be persuaded of the merits of the application. There is a risk that an authorizer 
may be prone to capture (e.g., Stigler 1971) other forms of public corruption (e.g., 
Djankov et al. 2003) or otherwise capricious conduct. What is interesting is that 
several sections appear to be designed to temper these risks of dictatorship.  
For instance, following the receipt of an application, section 38–1802.03(b) of the DC 
Code requires that the chartering authority to hold a public hearing in order to ‘gather 
the information that is necessary for the eligible chartering authority to make the 
decision to approve or deny the petition.’ The chartering authority must publicly 
advertise this (§ 38–1802.03(c)). In addition to transparency and accountability, 
                                                          
64 Note: parts of this section have been summarised or paraphrased for brevity. 
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holding public hearings provides the applicant with an opportunity to address any 
objections raised. Further, a decision to deny the charter petition shall be subject to 
judicial review by a court or administrative review by the Office of the State 
Superintendent of Education (§ 38–1802.03(j)(2)). The purpose of these procedural 
rules is to limit error on the part of the administrative decision-maker (e.g., Posner 
2014; Wendel 1993).  
Another example is section 38–1802.03(j)(1) that states that ‘no governmental entity, 
elected official, or employee of the District of Columbia shall make, participate in 
making, or intervene in the making of, the decision to approve or deny such a 
petition.’65 This requirement guards against the perceived dictatorship costs of bias 
or capture – the risk that politicians, bureaucrats in the boards of education, or 
traditional government school district officials may view charter schools in competition 
to state public schools and will oppose or otherwise hamper an application on that 
basis (e.g., Vergari 2001; 2007).  
Who can authorize a charter? The relevant chartering authority in DC is the Public 
Charter School Board (PCSB) – a public body, but independent of executive 
government and therefore separate from the Board of Education that operates other 
government schools.66 School choice proponents perceive several costs of 
dictatorship in highlighting the need for independent authorizers. These include that 
the administrators of the traditional government schooling system may be skeptical 
or openly hostile to charters, seek to impose unreasonable conditions on charters, 
and may be subject to political pressure (Vergari 2001).   
Although this chapter primarily uses DC as a model law, it is worth noting that other 
states have multiple authorizing authorities. These include a combination of local 
school boards, tertiary institutions, non-profit organizations, and state departments 
(Wohlstetter et al. 2015; Vergari 2001). In an analysis of ten years of data from 
                                                          
65 An exception to this includes employees of a public school which is the subject of a 
conversion (§ 38–1802.03(j)(1)).  
66 Technically § 38–1800.02 provides that “eligible chartering authority” also includes the 
Board of Education and any entity designated as an eligible chartering authority by 
enactment of a bill by the District of Columbia Council after April 26, 1996. However, the 
Board of Education has transferred all charter school authorizing power over to the Public 
Charter School Board and there have been no other authorities created at the time of 
submission.   
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Minnesota, Carlson, Lavery, and Witte (2012, p. 265) found that ‘the type of institution 
that authorizes a charter school has no statistically significant relationship with mean 
levels of student achievement.’67 Although, less is known about the effect of multiple 
authorizers more generally (Carlson, Lavery, and Witte 2012; Wohlstetter et al. 2015). 
Proponents of stronger school choice claim that states with multiple chartering 
authorities have almost three and a half times more charter schools than states that 
only allow local school board approval (Center for Education Reform, 2011).  
The Center for Education Reform (2011, p. 1) explains why multiple authorizers are 
important to mitigate perceived dictatorship costs.  
States that do not have multiple authorizers create hostile environments for charters 
because school boards often view charter schools as competition and reject 
applications not based on merit, but on politics. Without objective oversight from 
multiple authorizers, charter schools have no alternatives for approval, and quality 
growth in a state is severely stunted. School board hostility has prevented certain 
states, such as Maryland, Tennessee, and Rhode Island from meeting growing 
demand for school choice. 
For this reason, on the dimensions of “strong” charter laws is that ‘a charter school 
must be allowed to seek sponsorship from a public entity other than a local school 
board and/or be allowed to appeal a school board decision to another body’ (Hess 
and Davis 2000, p. 17 citing Bierlein 1997; see also Vergari 2003). DC’s laws meet 
this test as it can appeal the decision, noted above. Also, despite having a single 
authorizing body, the CER (2001, p. 3) commended DC’s charter laws stating that the 
PCSB is ‘a model to the nation for its effective oversight and performance 
management tools that hold schools accountable and the DC PCSB schools 
consistently outpace conventional public school achievement.’  
The fact that any person can file an application, and the existence of an independent 
authorizing body with grounds to review a decision, provides evidence that there are 
more spontaneous creation mechanisms built into the regulatory framework as 
compared to centralized government schools. Although there is a limit to this 
dynamism, because, as detailed above, the DC charter laws have an annual cap on 
                                                          
67 In Minnesota, charter school laws permit local school boards, postsecondary institutions, 
nonprofit organizations, and the Minnesota Department of Education to act as authorizers.  
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the number of approvals that the PCSB can issue (§ 38–1802.03(i)). This has the 
effect of weakening charter laws (Vergari 2003) by limiting the dynamism of the 
creation mechanism. 
A recent law review article has highlighted some of the perceived disorder costs 
associated with having independent authorizers for charter schools. Kasuboski (2018) 
provides a legislative analysis of the state of Ohio’s charter school laws and 
highlighted two examples of the risks presented by opportunistic companies.  
In the first example, a charter authorizer contracted out its supervision to a for-profit 
corporation which acted with an apparent conflict of interest. Kasuboski (2018, p. 8) 
explained that together, they were the 
responsible sponsors in the scandal-laden case of Olympus Charter Schools, a group 
of eight charter schools that were managed by a for-profit corporation and only 
operated for a month before they "collapsed.". At the time that the schools closed, the 
eight schools were serving a total of 128 students, even though the state had been 
paying for 700 students. [The for-profit contractor] was to serve as the treasurer for 
Olympus Charter Schools and as its sponsor's "financial watchdog," which a 
spokesperson from the company believed "was not a conflict of interest."68  
In the second example, Kasuboski (2018, p. 8) is more explicit and alleges ‘corruption’ 
on the part of the authorizer.  
Kids Count was the authorizer tasked with overseeing Richard Allen Schools. The 
Institute of Charter School Management Resources (a for-profit company) provided 
consulting for and collected lease payments from Richard Allen Schools. The Institute 
of Management Resources (a non-profit group) managed the financial resources for 
Richard Allen Schools. Jeanette Harris founded Kids Count; Jeanette Harris served 
as the CEO and President of Richard Allen Schools; Jeanette Harris ran the Institute 
of Charter School Management Resources; Jeanette Harris founded the Institute of 
Management Resources. This web meant that the schools were essentially overseen 
by themselves, and that one group was able to cycle taxpayer dollars into personal 
income.69 
                                                          
68 Footnotes omitted.  
69 Footnotes omitted.  
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On this basis, Kasuboski (2018, p. 14) calls for stricter regulation of authorizers 
proposing that ‘the state should establish greater independence between those who 
authorize and monitor charter schools, and those who have a vested interest in their 
success.’ This is a sensible recommendation for Ohio. Regulating for independence 
would mitigate costs of disorder mentioned above without necessarily increasing 
dictatorship costs as the independence from the central government department or 
the political process is maintained. Accordingly, such proposals would represent an 
institutional efficiency gain.   
How do the provisions of the DC Code guard against risks such as these? In 2016, 
the Public Charter School Fiscal Transparency Amendment Act of 2015 was signed 
into law effective 8 October 2016.70 The effect of these amendments is to (i) require 
directors of charter schools to disclose conflicts of interest and establish governance 
rules for approving contracts or transactions; (ii) require greater transparency and 
reporting when charter schools contract out to other school management 
organizations; and (iii) establish that a failure to comply with conflict of interest 
obligations constitute financial mismanagement – risking revocation of a charter.  
Washington, D.C. has been affected by cases of financial mismanagement predating 
these amendments. In a joint report, the Center for Popular Democracy and the 
Alliance to Reclaim Our Schools (2015) highlighted three specific cases of financial 
mismanagement. However, the DC code has mechanisms of destruction which 
operated in all cases to manage the risk. Effectively, mechanisms of destruction 
provide for ex post enforcement of isolated cases of actual mismanagement as 
opposed to increasing the amount of ex ante regulation. Those mechanisms of 
destruction will now be discussed.  
Destruction phase  
The public sector suffers from weak or non-existent mechanisms of destruction (Potts 
2010). However, a key feature of charter schools is that decentralized mechanisms 
for destruction are built into the legislative framework. Similarly to the creation phase, 
charter authorizers have the power to revoke a charter. This is why some have 
                                                          
70 D.C. Law 21-153. 
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described charters as a “contract” that can be revoked if certain conditions are 
breached (e.g., Grady 2012). Applying the bargain theory of contract (e.g., Cooter 
and Ulen 2007), it can be seen that part of the “bargain” of gaining access to the 
institutional features of a charter school is that the matters provided by the applicant 
in the petition (the “terms of the contract”) can be enforced.  
Of course, a charter is not a contract in the common law sense, but the legislative 
framework borrows from this conception. In Hayekian jurisprudence (see Hayek 1973) 
there is a distinction between “nomos” (those rules or laws applying within the social 
order – discovered law) and “thesis” (those rules or laws applying within an 
organization – made law). For Hayek’s purposes, among other things, this distinction 
serves as a philosophical basis for the separation of powers. For our purposes, it 
serves as another way of looking at the function of legislation. Hayek (1973, p. 127) 
explains that ‘a statute (thesis) passed by a legislature may have all the attributes of 
a nomos, and is likely to have them if deliberately modeled after the nomos. But it 
need not, and in most of the cases where legislation is wanted it cannot have this 
character’. Applied to the laws passed to provide public services such as education, 
in most cases, the legislation has the character of rules applying within an 
organization – directing how services are to be provided. Under Hayek’s 
characterization, restrictive regulation is the default setting; however, legislation can 
have the attributes of the nomos if it is designed that way. There is something to be 
said about this here, where an independent chartering authority is forming an 
enforceable agreement with another independent organization seeking to provide 
public services.    
Specifically, under section 38-1802.13 of the DC Code, a chartering authority has the 
power to revoke a charter where the authority determines that the school:  
• committed a violation of applicable law;  
• materially violated the conditions, terms, standards, or procedures set forth in the 
charter;  
• failed to meet the goals and student academic achievement expectations set 
forth in the charter; 
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• engaged in a pattern of non-adherence to generally accepted accounting 
principles; 
• engaged in a pattern of fiscal mismanagement; or 
• is no longer financially viable.71  
For the first three cases, the authority has discretion about whether or not the charter 
school is revoked (“may”). For the latter three cases, the authority is required to revoke 
the charter (“shall”). Of course, all of these matters are findings of fact for the 
authority’s determination and are potentially reviewable. The two key differences 
under the institutional possibility of charter schools as compared to government 
schools are that the decision-maker is the independent authorizer rather that a 
Minister (or another executive actor) and that there is a rule-based mechanism to 
trigger the action.72  
Where the chartering authority decides to revoke a charter for one of the above 
reasons, the Board of Trustees of the relevant charter school can request an informal 
hearing to persuade the chartering authority otherwise (DC Code § 38-1802.13(c)(2)). 
If the chartering authority maintains the decision, the Board of Trustees could then 
seek judicial review (DC Code § 38-1802.13(c)(6)(a)).73 Although parallels can be 
drawn between these procedural requirements and the problems that have been 
identified earlier in this thesis with the restrictions on the exercise of the destruction 
mechanisms in Victoria, it can be distinguished on the basis that there is a rule-based 
mechanism and does not rely on the complete discretion of a single Minister. 
Additionally, school closure in the Quality Provision Framework (QPF) was 
fundamentally for enrolment reasons rather than poor performance (Caldwell & 
Hayward 1998).74 
How have these powers been exercised in practice? The data shows that between 
1996 and 2016, 108 charters were approved in DC (PCSB 2016). Of these, six were 
approved but did not open (PCSB 2016). Of the 101 schools that did open, 37 
                                                          
71  Note: parts of this section have been summarised or paraphrased for brevity. 
72 See Chapter 3 for the examination of closure of Australian government schools.  
73 The DC Code specifies that the chartering authority’s decision to revoke a charter shall 
be upheld unless the court finds that the decision was ‘arbitrary and capricious or clearly 
erroneous’ (§ 38–1802.13(c)(6)(b)). 
74 See Chapter 4.  
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subsequently closed, including seven which merged with or were acquired by other 
operators (PCSB 2016). The reasons for the closures varied. 16 schools were closed 
citing academic deficiencies (of which two also had governance deficiencies, one also 
had financial and government deficiencies and one also had financial and 
management deficiencies); 11 schools closed following financial and/or management 
deficiencies; two schools suffered from fiscal mismanagement; and five schools 
closed after low enrolments that subsequently led to financial deficiencies – with no 
reasons recorded for the remaining three schools (PCSB 2016). The method of 
closure also varied: eighteen charter schools had their charter revoked; 16 charter 
schools voluntarily relinquished their charter; and three charter schools were not 
renewed at the 15-year mark (PCSB 2016). 
A few case studies emerge from the joint report by the Center for Popular Democracy 
(CPD) and the Alliance to Reclaim Our Schools (AROS), which would all be included 
in the above figures. First, the School for Arts and Learning (SAIL) was a charter set 
up to cater for students with special needs (PCSB 2011). It was alleged that SAIL was 
using public grants to fund the private expenditure of the founder and his wife (CPD 
and AROS 2015). The school was closed in 2011 after it voluntarily relinquished its 
charter, stating that it did not have the financial resources to keep operating (PCSB 
2011). This followed an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(Anderson 2010). Second, the Nia Public Charter School’s founder and former 
director was sentenced to imprisonment after being found guilty of embezzling (CPD 
and AROS 2015). This school was subsequently closed for poor academic 
performance (CPD and AROS 2015). Third, the founder of the Dorothy I. Height 
Community Academy Public Charter School was alleged to have received $2 million 
in kickbacks from a private management company (CPD and AROS 2015). The PCSB 
voted to revoke the school’s charter on the grounds of fiscal mismanagement (PCSB 
2015). What is striking about all of these cases is that they serve as an example of 
the perceived costs of disorder within this institutional possibility but show that the 
destruction mechanism built into the regulatory framework empowered the PCSB to 
take appropriate action.  
The public sector innovation literature has highlighted the risk-averse nature of the 
bureaucracy – fearing wastage and negative media (e.g., Mulgan and Albury 2003; 
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Albury 2005; Koch et al. 2006; Bommert 2010; Potts and Kastelle 2010; Mulgan 2014; 
c.f., Torugsa and Arundel 2017). Given the weak destruction mechanisms that exist 
within centralized institutional possibilities, active regulatory measures are needed 
inside government to prevent wastage. The problem is that preventing bad wastage 
(e.g., financial mismanagement) also constrains good wastage (e.g., unsuccessful 
innovation) (Potts 2009). Decentralized systems such as charter schools manage the 
perceived disorder costs differently. When bad wastage occurs at a school level, 
mechanisms kick in leading to the potential closure of services. Nevertheless, it 
should be acknowledged that any closure will displace students, and there is not much 
research into these effects (Vergari 2007).75   
Another in-built mechanism of destruction is that a charter is not granted indefinitely. 
The DC code provides that ‘a charter granted to a public charter school shall remain 
in force for a 15-year period’ and can be renewed for further periods of 15 years (§ 
38–1802.12(a)). Further, the DC code requires chartering authorities to conduct a 
review of the charter school ‘at least once every 5 years to determine whether the 
charter should be revoked’ (§ 38–1802.12(a)). This provides a rule-based mechanism 
for revocation because the chartering authority is required to close the school on 
certain grounds, as discussed above. This introduces some dynamism into 
government expenditure in contrast to a centralized institutional possibility where 
funding is typically granted ad infinitum.76 However, the level of dynamism should not 
be overstated – particularly compared to voucher programs considered later in this 
chapter. The review mechanism can be seen as charter laws giving effect to the 
compromise between completely decentralizing the provision of public education and 
government schooling (Vergari 2003; Heise 2012) in that their establishment and 
closure are not determined by the operation of market forces but not by a central 
government department either.  
The last matter to consider in this sub-section of the chapter is what happens when a 
school is closed. Under the DC Code, once a school has had its charter revoked, not 
                                                          
75 For a recent exception to this see, e.g., Carlson and Lavertu (2016) who consider the link 
between the closures of charter schools and student achievement in Ohio.  
76 One Australian lawmaker has called for putting “sunset clauses” on new government 
expenditure within the authorizing legislation (Paterson 2019). 
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renewed, or has voluntarily relinquished its charter, the land and capital resources of 
the school are redirected through mandatory dissolution provisions (§ 38–1802.13).  
 
Specifically, section 38-1802.13(d) the DC Code requires the non-profit corporation 
operating the charter school to dissolve and, after debts are discharged and any other 
creditors’ claims fulfilled, any remaining assets remaining will be:  
• Transferred or conveyed to the District of Columbia, to be controlled by and 
subject to the disposition instructions of the Office of the State Superintendent 
of Education and used solely for educational or similar purposes; or  
• Transferred to another charter school in a transaction overseen by the 
chartering authority if the acquiring school agrees to enroll the closing school's 
students at the start of the following school year.77  
The closure mechanism completes the evolutionary process. However, it is noted that 
the charter laws constrain the way that the District of Columbia or the charting 
authority can deal with these public resources. For instance, it does not allow the 
government to use the assets to fund or provide public services in areas other than 
education. This is a similar arrangement to the QPF in Victoria (Caldwell and Hayward 
1988), presented in Chapter 4, where assets from closed schools were used to fund 
other education projects. Although recall that the distribution process in Victoria was 
an exercise of Ministerial discretion (approved by Cabinet) making a political decision 
(Caldwell and Hayward 1988), whereas the DC charter laws provide for a rule-based 
mechanism. Again, this provides evidence that the institutional possibility of charter 
schools has emerged as a compromise between voucher programs and centralized 
government schools (Vergari 2003).  
6.4.2 Decentralizing features   
Our legislative analysis continues in this sub-section, considering several important 
decentralizing features that flow from the regulation of creation and destruction 
considered above. The features further distinguish the institutional structure of charter 
schools from government schools or Independent Public Schools. The key 
                                                          
77 Note: parts of this section have been summarised or paraphrased for brevity. 
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decentralizing features include the concept of the charter school as a separate legal 
identity, school autonomy over policies and procedures, giving schools the choice of 
an accreditation body, and uncoupling enrolments from geographic regions.   
First, charter schools are non-profit entities that are individual bodies corporate.78 The 
legal concept of separate legal entity is well established in the United States (e.g., 
Blumberg 1990) as it is in other common law jurisdictions. The effect of incorporation 
is that the law will treat the corporation as legally separate from its board members 
(directors or trustees), management (principals, teachers, and other administrative 
staff), funders (government) or regulators (authorizers). A corporation’s powers flow 
from the incorporating statute and its internal rules. Under the DC code, charter 
schools’ powers include the ability to adopt a name and corporate seal, to acquire 
real property, to make contracts and leases, to receive and disperse funds, to incur 
debts, and to sue and be sued (§ 38–1802.04(b)). The fact of separate legal entity 
has several implications.  
For instance, teachers are employees of the charter school – rather than the 
education department. This is made clear by the DC Code (§ 38-1802.07(c)) which 
states that ‘an employee of a public charter school shall not be considered to be an 
employee of the District of Columbia Government.’ This means that individual schools 
can determine the number of staff they will employ and set their own pay and 
conditions. One early study of California charter schools discussed the limiting role of 
teachers’ unions in the public school system, in general, claiming that charter schools 
are ‘less constrained by union contracts’ (Corwin, 1996, p. 25). One example of 
employment innovation is the use of merit pay that is not found in either state public 
schools or independent public schools (Anderson and Marsh 1998; Podgursky and 
Ballou 2001; Preston et al. 2012). Another example is the non-use of tenure, and 
teachers and parents influencing new staff hiring (Preston et al. 2012). As has been 
shown in previous chapters, enhanced bargaining over these conditions at an 
individual school level provides the flexibility for other innovative practices to be 
introduced.  
                                                          
78 § 38–1802.04 requires charter schools to be non-profit; and have benefit of name and 
corporate seal only if the name includes the words “public charter school”. However, this is 
not the case in every jurisdiction, as noted by Thompson and Martin (2000).  
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Separate corporate personality also means that individual schools will have a legal 
interest in their own buildings and facilities (whether freehold, leasehold, or license). 
A core idea from the mainline of economic thought (Mitchell and Boettke 2017) is the 
importance of property rights for economic exchange and development. This supports 
innovative practices such as the leasing and licensing out of school property for other 
uses. In practice, separate legal identity is a crucial requirement to allow 
entrepreneurs to establish schools in response to market opportunities. The boards 
of trustees of charter schools will consist of parents, community leaders, and so on. 
These individuals are embedded in their local communities. Accordingly, they will 
have higher incentives to be more responsive to local preferences than centralized 
bureaucrats – and better local knowledge and connections to discover those 
preferences.   
Another implication flowing from a separate legal entity is the ability to enter into 
contracts with third parties, without requiring the permission or oversight of a 
centralized government department. This leads to the potential to have innovative 
sources of supply and new forms of organization emerge. For example, under the DC 
Code, a public charter school is required to be non-profit (§ 38–1802.04) – but charter 
schools are able to contract out service delivery to for-profit entities known as 
“Education Management Companies” (EMC) or “Education Management 
Organizations” (EMO) (e.g., Lubienski 2003a; 2009; Vergari 2003; 2007; Wohlstetter, 
Smith, and Farrell 2015). Another option is “Charter Management Organizations” 
(CMO), where charter schools are operated within an organizational hierarchy. CMOs 
‘[manage] multiple charter schools with a common mission, instructional design, and 
home office management team that offers ongoing support to schools’ (Wohlsetter, 
Smith, and Farrell 2015, p. 122). The emergence of CMOs and EMOs has been 
described as an “unintended consequence” of charter school laws (Wohlsetter, Smith, 
and Farrell 2013; 2015). As Witt (2003, p. 85) notes, some policy measures ‘induce 
learning because they create incentives to search for a creative response.’ What are 
these incentives? The insight of transaction cost economics is that organizational 
forms allow elements of scale depending on transaction costs – choosing between 
governments, firms and hierarchies, and markets (e.g., Williamson 1985). The 
institutional possibilities framework (Djankov et al. 2003; Shleifer 2005; Davidson 
2010; 2013) adds to this understanding in that decentralized regulatory approaches 
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like charter schools with separate legal entities enables new forms of private 
governance to emerge – seeking to manage social costs. As such, the decentralized 
regulatory framework will encourage learning and experimentation with new sources 
of supply and new organizational forms. 
Second, individual schools will tailor policies and procedures in line with their charter. 
As has been discussed, a vital aspect of the charter school model is that schools are 
free from many of the regulatory constraints usually applicable to public schools (e.g., 
Chubb and Moe 1990; Vergari 1999; Hess 2001). Although in some jurisdictions there 
may be a mismatch between autonomy in charter school theory and practice in the 
expression of the charter school laws (Finnigan 2007), Washington D.C. charter 
schools enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Relevantly, section 38-1802.04(c)(3) of the 
DC Code states, amongst other things, that charter schools:  
(A) Shall exercise exclusive control over its expenditures, administration, personnel, 
and instructional methods, within the limitations imposed in this subchapter; and 
(B) Shall be exempt from District of Columbia statutes, policies, rules, and regulations 
established for the District of Columbia public schools by the Superintendent, Board 
of Education, Mayor, District of Columbia Council, or Authority, except as otherwise 
provided in the school’s charter or this subchapter (relating to health and safety, and 
civil rights). 
The significance of school autonomy being entrenched in the legislative framework is 
that the executive branch of government cannot unwind it – evidencing a lower 
perceived cost of dictatorship in this institutional possibility as compared to 
government schools.  
Note that the ability to tailor educational offerings is also facilitated through the (quasi) 
market that comes as a consequence of school choice. As previously discussed, the 
market theory holds that ‘diverse individual preferences that are neglected in 
necessarily uniform public provision, because public schools are shielded from market 
discipline and are not accountable to their consumers’ (Walberg 2000 cited in 
Lubienski 2003a, p. 398). But the order is essential. The state of nature for public 
services is a high degree of regulatory control over service delivery (e.g., Mises 1944, 
Hayek 1973). The opposite case is true of the regulation of business where private 
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orderings are the default position (Djankov et al. 2003). Therefore, for public services, 
it is the decentralized legal framework that allows for competition by facilitating a 
more-spontaneous entry and exit (mechanisms of creation and destruction) so that 
schools that can operate within the same geographic location as other schools.79 
Indeed some charter schools have no geographic boundary at all – running wholly 
online (e.g., Woodworth et al. 2015). Further, because decision making is made 
locally rather than by the central bureaucracy, services are subject to a lower risk of 
government failures such as regulatory capture and rent-seeking behavior (e.g., 
Stigler 1971).  
A separate but related issue is the freedom given to charter schools to set their own 
curriculum. Recall that one of the significant perceived costs of dictatorship with any 
system of public education is the imposition of values (Mill 1859; Friedman 1955; 
Hayek 1960; McLaughlin 1995). One of the reasons that it can be said that charter 
schools are characterized by a lower cost of dictatorship than traditional government 
schools is that providing schools (and therefore parents) with a choice of curriculum 
program means that values cannot be imposed on students by the state. In other 
words, the ability for schools to choose a curriculum forms part of the ‘freedom from 
government influence’ granted to charter schools (Verven 2017, p. 977). It is important 
to note, however, that the freedom to choose is not unconstrained – as curriculum 
and other learning and teaching standards will be something that is assessed by the 
accreditation bodies.80 
Third, charter schools are given options for accreditation. While this is a form of public 
control to limit costs of disorder, schools are given a choice about which body best 
suits its mission and charter. This is quite distinct from requirements under the laws 
in Australian jurisdictions which are regulated by a single government agency.81 As 
noted above, the DC Code requires charter schools to ‘seek, obtain and maintain’ 
accreditation from at least one educational accreditation body as part of its petition – 
forming part of its charter (§38–1802.02(16)). Charter schools are given a range of 
                                                          
79 The effect of competition will be expanded further in Section 5 of this chapter.   
80 Note that Washington, D.C. has adopted the Common Core initiative (akin to a national 
curriculum).  See, generally, § 38–1803.11 of the DC Code.  
81E.g. In Victoria it is the Victorian Department of Education and Training, on behalf of the 
Victorian Registrations & Qualifications Authority.    
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options that can be pursued, or the ability to come to another agreement with the 
chartering authority. Specifically, section 38–1802.02(16) lists:  
• The Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools; 
• The Association of Independent Maryland Schools; 
• The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools; 
• The Virginia Association of Independent Schools; 
• American Montessori Internationale; 
• The American Montessori Society; 
• The National Academy of Early Childhood Programs; or 
• Any other accrediting body deemed appropriate by the eligible chartering 
authority that granted the charter to the school.  
All of these bodies have their own requirements, policies, and standards that a charter 
school will need to meet in order to be accredited. These requirements have legal 
force in that a charter school is required to maintain its accreditation (§38–
1802.02(16)). Again, this evidences that charter schools are not without regulatory 
constraints – with regulatory mandates given to both charter authorizers and other 
accreditation bodies.  
Fourth, charter school enrolments are not limited by geographic area (§ 38–
1802.06(a)). Of course, one of the fundamental ideas behind school choice: 
empowering parents to make decisions about where their children are educated, 
rather than this decision being planned by the state. However, a lack of price signals 
means that demand for some charter schools may exceed capacity. Under a system 
of complete enrolment freedom without prices, the risk of the state making an arbitrary 
or adverse decision is traded-off against an increased risk of social harm through 
schools using other clearing mechanisms such as discrimination. The D.C. code 
mitigates against this possibility by providing that a charter school may limit enrolment 
to ‘specific grade levels’ but may not limit enrolments on the basis of ‘race, color, 
religion, national origin, language spoken, intellectual or athletic ability, measures of 
achievement or aptitude, or status as a student with special needs’ (§38–1802.06(b)). 
Instead, the charter laws introduce a random lottery mechanism to deal with any over-
enrolments (§ 38–1802.06(c)).  
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Overall, the decentralizing features combine, resulting in less state control over the 
delivery of services compared to traditional government schools – a reduction in the 
costs of dictatorship. Having observed decreased dictatorship costs, the institutional 
possibilities frontier model (Djankov et al. 2003) predicts that there will be an increase 
in the perceived costs of disorder. Of course, that the trade-off is institutionally efficient 
is a subjective judgment (Allen and Berg 2017). Advocates on both sides of the school 
choice debate will be assisted in their efforts by empirical research into the effects 
(educational and non-education) of charter schools compared to traditional 
government schools (Vergari 2007). One recent study has shown that that charter 
schools in Washington, D.C., are 68 percent more cost-effective than traditional 
government schools and represent an 86 percent higher return on investment 
(DeAngelis et al. 2019). Therefore, despite the criticism that charters divert funding 
away from traditional government schools (e.g., Lehnen 2016), recent evidence 
appears to show that charters are a more cost-efficient institutional arrangement for 
the delivery of public education services. This helps explain the increased popularity 
of charter schools – the positive outcomes cause a shift in the perceived trade-off, 
with parents and guardians being relatively less sensitive to the perceived costs of 
disorder and relatively more sensitive to the costs of dictatorship. 
So far, by examining the DC code, this section of the chapter has shown that charter 
schools have a lower perceived cost of dictatorship, although they are still subject to 
regulatory constraints. This predicts that charter schools will have greater innovative 
potential over traditional government schools. The next section considers this 
prediction in light of the empirical evidence.  
6.4.3 Charter schools and innovation, reviewing the evidence  
This legislative analysis of charter schools provided in this chapter underscores the 
fact that charters create a more dynamic environment compared to traditional 
government schools and Independent Public Schools. Finnigan (2007, p. 504) notes 
that ‘the theory of charter schools assumes that this combination of autonomy and 
accountability will allow educators to implement innovative ideas and practices.’ 
Similarly, Bulkley and Fisler (2003, p. 319) state that one of the rationales for charter 
schools is that ‘the interplay of autonomy and market forces would make charter 
schools more innovative and of higher quality than traditional public schools in such 
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areas as instruction and curriculum; school organization and governance; and, in 
some cases, teacher qualifications and union involvement in schools.’  
In the model proposed by Bulkley and Fisler (2003), adapted in Figure 6.1 below, 
innovation in charter schools is a function of creation of new charter schools (or 
allowing traditional government schools to convert to charter schools), charter schools 
having greater autonomy to manage service delivery at a local level, and schools 
being held accountable to both the market (i.e., parents) and the government (i.e., 
through authorizers). Importantly, these characteristics are a function of the charter 
school laws. The contribution of this chapter is to show the fundamental importance 
of charter school legislation in creating these conditions.  
Figure 6.1 – Rationale for Charter Schools 
 
Source: Adapted from Bulkley and Fisler, p. 319.  
However, the empirical evidence of the link between charter schools and innovation 
is mixed (see, e.g., Lubienski 2003a; Preston et al. 2012; Wohlstetter, Smith, and 
Farrell 2013) notwithstanding the fact that innovation is ‘specified as a policy goal in 
approximately three-quarters of the [charter school] laws, with virtually all of them 
explicitly seeking innovations in instructional practice such as “teaching methods”’ 
(Lubienski 2003a, p. 399).82 Four reviews of the literature are particularly helpful in 
digesting the empirical evidence.  
First, Lubienski (2003a) reviewed 56 empirical studies, which remains the most 
comprehensive meta-analysis on charter school innovation. The author classified 
innovations as “educational” changes (practices regarding curricular content and 
                                                          
82 The DC Code does not list innovation as a specific policy objective, but refers to the 
ability to disseminate “innovative practices” as a requirement for corporations to receive 
funding (§ 38–1806.03). 
197 
 
instructional strategies with an immediate impact at the classroom-level), and 
“administrative” changes (organization-level practices and structural designs that do 
not directly affect classroom techniques or content). Broadly, the study found that 
organizational innovations were present in some charter schools (e.g., class sizes, 
discipline codes, parental involvement, marking techniques, merit pay, school 
uniforms), as were educational innovations (e.g., new curriculum programs, individual 
education planning or instruction, use of technology). However, it was noted that 
many of the educational practices listed as innovative were already evident in 
traditional government schools – but may be new in the local context. One of the 
reasons for mixed evidence may be the tension in defining innovation (Arsen, Plank 
and Sykes 1999; Lubienski 2003a).83  
Second, Bulkley and Fisler (2003) reviewed a handful of studies and arranged the 
evidence of innovation in three categories – governance and management, school 
organization, and teaching and learning – following the framework of Arsen, Plank, 
and Sykes (1999). In the governance and management category, it was noted that 
charter schools made much heavier use of contracting out functions to Education 
Management Organizations and that there was a lesser degree of involvement of 
teaching unions, as compared to traditional government schools. In school 
organization, reported innovations included ‘school and class sizes, grade 
configurations, staffing patterns, and use of staff time,’ total school size, and less use 
of state teacher certifications (Bulkley and Fisler 2003, p. 325). Under the category of 
teaching and learning, it was noted that many charter schools had a “unifying focus” 
in terms of specialist extra-curricular activities or a philosophical approach to 
education (Bulkley and Fisler 2003). The review noted a need for further research.  
Third, Lake (2008, p. 121) considers that ‘innovation is fundamentally in the eye of 
the beholder’. On this basis, Lake (2008) offers a cascading definition of innovation: 
innovation as something never before seen or done in public education (e.g., new 
governance arrangements and virtual schools); innovation as something new to a 
community or student population (e.g., introducing new educational philosophies and 
methodologies, such as Montessori, and specialised programs for gifted or special-
                                                          
83 This is also a feature of the public sector innovation literature, as Chapter 1 of this thesis 
has shown.   
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needs students); or innovation as something that responds to family needs and 
preferences (e.g., enhanced school safety, or a focus of the school’s curriculum 
around a specialized theme). Lake (2008) also mentions a study that found greater 
adoption of innovative practices in charter schools compared to traditional 
government schools.   
Fourth, Preston et al. (2012) used the 2007-08 Schools and Staffing Survey – a 
nationally representative sample capturing 203 charter schools and 739 state public 
schools across 36 states of the US. Overall, the study found that charter schools were 
not more innovative than state public schools – but this headline overlooks some of 
the key findings when the local context is considered. After all, it is the local context 
that matters. As Wohlstetter, Smith, and Farrell (2013; 2015) suggest, charter schools 
sought to fill niches in the public education market where traditional public schools 
had not performed well, for example with student cohorts of at-risk or low-achieving 
minorities. In considering local context, Preston et al. (2012) found evidence of 
innovation in academic support services (e.g., voluntary tutoring, language 
immersion, internships, distance learning programs), staffing policies (e.g. tenure and 
merit pay), organisational structures (e.g., looping, use of houses, mixed-age or multi-
grade classrooms, block scheduling, year-round scheduling), and governance 
(teachers and parents have an influence on new staff hiring).  
There is also evidence that the state public school system is innovating in response 
to the competition of charter schools. For example, a Massachusetts study 
(Steedman, Cummins and Ricciardelli 2014) found that state public schools 
introduced administrative innovations (e.g., marketing).   
6.4.4 Conclusion of charter school law analysis  
Once a policy innovation, charter schools are now established as a ‘permanent reform 
that will be tinkered with but that likely will not disappear’ (Wohlstetter, Smith, and 
Farrell 2013, p. 1). In this legislative analysis on charter schools, it has been shown 
that charter school laws in Washington, D.C, provide for more dynamic delivery of 
public services by facilitating the organic establishment of charter schools and the 
revocation of those charters where operators have breached the conditions of the 
“bargain”. It would be a fair assessment to say that charter schools had not lived up 
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to the hype of being ‘laboratories of innovation’ as US President Barack Obama has 
referred to them (as cited in Lubienski 2009). This may be the language of political 
rhetoric rather than considered research. It may also be that charter schools do not 
have the autonomy in practice that the theory assumes, as research has shown 
charters in jurisdictions outside Washington, D.C. must negotiate exceptions from 
state laws and do not have authority over key decisions (Finnigan 2007). As is 
demonstrated in this section, charter schools are still subject to extensive regulatory 
constraints. However, just because charter schools have not been as innovative as 
school choice advocates might suggest, there is nevertheless a strong foundation of 
evidence to show that there is an increased capacity for innovation compared to 
traditional government schools with a tighter degree of central government regulation. 
This section of the chapter has furthered that research by examining the legislative 
framework in detail – showing that charter schools have a more spontaneous 
mechanism for the “creation” and “destruction” of public services compared to 
centralized government schooling considered in previous chapters. The next section 
of the chapter considers the other major school choice program – voucher programs. 
6. 5  Voucher Programs  
Voucher programs are a form of private school choice. As has been detailed in this 
chapter, charter schools operate independently of the central government department 
but are still public schools. In contrast, voucher programs are a distinct institutional 
possibility that provides parents and guardians with taxpayer funding to use towards 
private school tuition for their children.84  
As mentioned previously, there is nothing new about this concept. School voucher 
programs have existed in the United States for well over a century (DeAngelis and 
Erickson 2018). In modern times, Friedman is frequently cited for giving voucher 
programs an economic analysis. Friedman’s (1955, p. 77-78) contention was to 
separate the roles of the state in funding education and directly managing schools.  
                                                          
84 In Chapter 3 it was noted that Australia has a partial or “de facto” voucher program 
(Donnelly 2015) – although it is not usually referred to in these terms – where a percentage 
of the cost of education at a government school is provided to private schools.  
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Governments could require a minimum level of education which they could finance by 
giving parents vouchers redeemable for a specified maximum sum per child per year 
if spent on "approved" educational services. Parents would then be free to spend this 
sum and any additional sum on purchasing educational services from an "approved" 
institution of their own choice. The educational services could be rendered by private 
enterprises operated for profit, or by non-profit institutions of various kinds. The role 
of the government would be limited to assuring that the schools met certain minimum 
standards such as the inclusion of a minimum common content in their programs, 
much as it now inspects restaurants to assure that they maintain minimum sanitary 
standards.85  
Just as charter school laws differ from one jurisdiction to another, so do voucher 
program laws. Proponents of voucher programs (e.g. Novak 2009) distinguish 
between universal voucher programs (where all students receive the same level of 
funding), differential voucher programs (where all students receive a voucher, 
adjusted for low-income, special needs, etc.), and targeted voucher programs (where 
only some students receive vouchers based on low-income, special needs, poor 
academic performance, etc.). For this reason, there is a diversity of voucher programs 
even within jurisdictions. For instance, EdChoice (2019) reports that ‘there are 26 
operating voucher programs in 15 states—Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Louisiana (2), Maine, Maryland, Mississippi (2), New Hampshire, North Carolina (2), 
Ohio (5), Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin (4)—and Washington, D.C.’  
By student numbers, voucher programs are not the most pervasive institutional 
possibility for the provision of public education services. In discussing the origins of 
the education system in the United States, Raemdonck and Maranto (2018) use the 
concept of institutional path decency to explain why the United States historically had 
state-controlled monopoly provision of education rather than publicly funded market-
based providers. Nevertheless, the popularity of voucher programs has increased in 
recent decades following the legislative change. The growth of the popularity of 
voucher programs is illustrated in Figure 6.2. In total, there are an estimated 188,424 
students using voucher programs in the United States in 2019 – more than a doubling 
over the course of a decade (EdChoice 2019). Because participating in voucher 
programs are voluntary, the trend indicates that each year an increasing number of 
                                                          
85 See further discussion in Chapter 2.  
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parents and guardians are choosing the private sector over charter schools or 
traditional government schools. Indeed, Congress found that the voucher program in 
Washington, D.C. has been oversubscribed since its inception (§ 38–1853.02 DC 
Code).  
 
 
Figure 6.2 – Number of students using school vouchers, United States, 1991-2019 
 
Source: EdChoice 2019. 
In the same way as the previous section, this section of the chapter will examine the 
key regulatory features of voucher programs, using Washington, D.C. as a case 
study. The connection between voucher programs and innovation will follow the 
legislative analysis.    
6.5.1 Opportunity Scholarship Program in Washington, D.C. 
The voucher program in Washington, D.C. – called the ‘Opportunity Scholarship 
Program’ – commenced in 2004. This program is codified in the DC code. In its current 
form, the Scholarships for Opportunity and Results Act (SOAR) is contained in Title 
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38, Subtitle IV, Chapter 18N, of the DC Code.86 Similarly to the previous section, the 
legislation was obtained from the official DC Law Library online database, in force as 
of 22 March 2019.87 The theory of school choice suggests that voucher programs will 
regulate the creation and destruction mechanisms of service provision in a way that 
is more dynamic than charter schools. However, an examination of the DC code 
reveals that there are major limitations on this generalization for the DC program.   
In general terms, a voucher program is relatively straightforward. First, public funds 
are granted to an administrator of the program. Second, the administrator passes 
funding on to eligible students to use as payment (or partial payment) of fees at a 
private school. Accordingly, there is less regulatory complexity as compared to the 
charter school laws analyzed in the previous section. However, the DC Code 
regulates how the funds are distributed, restricts the eligibility of students, and puts 
requirements on schools accepting vouchers. I will consider these regulatory features 
in turn.        
6.5.2 Voucher administrators and student eligibility  
The SOAR Act provides that the Secretary of Education may approve grants to an 
‘eligible entity’ on a competitive basis (DC Code § 38–1853.04). The entity must be a 
non-profit organization, or a group of non-profit organizations, and must have a 
governing board consisting of a majority of DC residents (§ 38–1853.13(2); § 38–
1853.05). There is nothing in the statutory provisions that prevent the Secretary from 
awarding grants to multiple organizations – although, to date, there has only been 
one at any point in time. The program is currently administered by the not-for-profit 
Serving Our Children.88 An independent administrator is significant for the same 
reasons as independent charter school authorizers, explained above, accepting some 
duplication.  
The administrator’s primary function under the DC Code is to ‘…provide eligible 
students with scholarships to pay the tuition, fees, and transportation expenses, if 
                                                          
86 It was first established by the US Congress in 2003 – D.C. School Choice Incentive Act 
2003 (Public Law 108-199; 118 Stat. 126). 
87<https://code.dccouncil.us/dc/council/code/> (last accessed 28 March 2019). 
88 Serving Our Children <https://servingourchildrendc.org> (last accessed 28 March 2019). 
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any, to enable the eligible students to attend the District of Columbia private 
elementary school or secondary school of their choice’. (§ 38–1853.07(a)). The 
administrator has other subsidiary functions under the DC Code to support the 
operation of the program, including seeking out parents of eligible students and 
encouraging private schools to participate in the program (§ 38–1853.05).  
The targeted program’s purpose is to provide low-income parents with expanded 
opportunities for enrolling their children in private schools in the District of Columbia, 
particularly those whose children attend schools identified for improvement or 
targeted support (DC Code § 38–1853.03). An “eligible student” is one who comes 
from a household in receipt of food stamps or ‘whose income does not exceed 185 
percent of the poverty line (DC Code § 38–1853.13(4)). The administrator may make 
scholarships of varying amounts on the basis of need, although the maximum 
individual scholarship awards for the 2018-19 school year are $13,287 for high school 
students and up to $8,857 for elementary and middle school students (Serving Our 
Children 2019; DC Code § 38–1853.07(a)(3)(B)). As such, voucher programs are 
more restricted in their operation compared to DC Charter Schools that have open 
enrolment (DC Code § 38–1802.06).  
The law makes clear that the intention was for a tripartite funding arrangement and 
voucher programs ‘would not lead to a reduction in funding for the District of Columbia 
public and charter schools.’ (DC Code § 38–1853.02). As Hess (2010) suggests, this 
can be seen as an institutional compromise between the power of school choice 
proponents and the power of entrenched interests in the government schooling sector 
– each having separate perceptions of the institutional costs of dictatorship and 
disorder (Berg and Davidson 2016; Allen and Berg 2017).   
… there was no risk of monetary loss to the school district if students departed for 
private schools. Indeed, the compromise that allowed the voucher-program legislation 
to pass required that D.C. public schools receive additional funding, even as they 
would no longer bear the expense of educating the voucher students.  (Hess 2010, p. 
45) 
However, on another level, it is a significant limitation on promoting innovation within 
centralized public sector services such as government schools. This legislative 
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feature leads to what Hess (2010, p. 45) describes as ‘choice without consequence.’ 
That is, one of the valuable aspects of voucher programs as an institutional possibility 
is that it requires schools to compete for enrolments. This is the market theory 
underlying school choice (e.g., Lubienski 2003a). If funding does not follow the 
student, market incentives for innovation are removed.  
Funding does follow the student in the institutional possibility of voucher programs. 
As DeAngelis and Flanders (2019, p. 2) correctly observe, ‘…private schools lose 
100% of the revenues associated with voucher students when families choose other 
schools or when government officials determine their schools should not be able to 
participate in a voucher program’. This is meaningful because the DC Code does not 
explicitly regulate the establishment or closure of private schools. Instead, the code 
regulates the provision of taxpayer funding – discussed further below. The 
consequence of this is that it is up to parents and guardians of eligible students to 
make use of this funding.   
There are perceived costs of disorder associated with voucher programs generally 
associated with exercising this parental choice. For instance, Egalite and Wolf (2016, 
p. 444) highlight two such costs.    
… [school choice] critics worry that parents will choose poorly when selecting a school 
for their child (Lauder & Hughes, 1999) and hypothesize about what will happen to 
those students who remain in neighborhood traditional public schools. [Also], 
opponents of school choice have claimed that such a policy undermines the 
democratic goals of education (Gutmann, 1987). 
Another perceived cost of disorder is that taxpayer funding will be wasted on public 
school programs (Flanders 2018; DeAngelis and Flanders 2019). However, as 
Chapter 4 of this thesis has shown, school closure is a mechanism of destruction that 
can be observed in centralized government schools too. As two recent studies on the 
American state of Milwaukee show, academic results are a predictor of private school 
closures, so the “churn” of school closures may be ‘emblematic of a functional 
marketplace’ (Flanders 2018, p. 254; DeAngelis and Flanders 2019). As such, there 
are not necessarily additional disorder costs with recurrent expenditure to private 
schools on this basis, including the cost of maintaining capital stock. However, it may 
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be more problematic where taxpayer funds are used to fund capital works specifically 
– but these are outside of the scope of the voucher program.  
An examination of the legislation reveals that there are regulations imposed on 
authorizers that appear to be designed in a way that limits the perceived costs of 
disorder in engaging the private sector to provide public services. For example, the 
administrator of the voucher program must ‘ensure that the amount of any tuition or 
fees charged by a school participating [in the voucher program] to an eligible 
student… does not exceed the amount of tuition or fees that the school charges to 
students who do not participate in the program’ (§ 38–1853.07(a)). This removes the 
risk that schools could expropriate the voucher by adding additional fees on top of its 
ordinary school fees – undermining the purpose of the voucher program by shutting 
out low-income households. Recent studies, discussed further in Section 6.5.3, 
suggest that regulation of this type does not affect private schools’ participation in 
voucher programs (DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf 2018; 2019). Another example is that 
the DC Code provides that administrators may use not more than three percent of the 
amount provided under the grant each year for the administrative expenses of 
carrying out its program (§ 38–1853.07(b)). This guards against the risk that 
independent administrators will expropriate funds for their own purposes rather than 
the public purpose of the voucher program.   
6.5.3 Regulation on schools accepting vouchers  
The DC Code also regulates schools that accept taxpayer funding from the voucher 
program. Although, the regulation of public schools is limited compared to charter 
schools. Technically, the legislation places the obligations on the voucher 
administrator – meaning that the regulation inside government, in this case, is 
between the Secretary for Education and the voucher administrator. In practice, 
schools will not be able to participate in voucher programs unless they agree to these 
regulatory provisions.  
Specifically, section 38–1853.07(a)(4) of the DC Code requires that a student may 
use no vouchers unless the participating school:  
• Maintains a valid certificate of occupancy issued by the District of Columbia; 
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• Provides information to all prospective students’ information on its school 
accreditation; 
• For schools that have been operating for 5 years or less, submits proof of 
adequate financial sustainability of the school and the school’s ability to be in 
operation through the school year; 
• Agrees to submit to site visits by the administrator;  
• Has financial systems, controls, policies, and procedures to ensure that funds are 
used for the proper purpose; 
• Ensures that for core academic subjects, students are taught by a teacher who 
has a baccalaureate degree or equivalent degree; 
• Is accredited by a national or regional accrediting agency;  
• Conducts criminal background checks on school employees; and 
• Agrees to data and information reporting requirements, including about academic 
growth and achievement, high school graduation and college admission rates, and 
parental satisfaction.89  
These regulatory provisions are in addition to the regulations ordinarily governing 
private schools in Washington, D.C.90 It can be seen that the regulatory provisions 
are less extensive than those previously considered for a charter school petition and 
operation. Additionally, there is no cap on the number of participating schools 
enhancing competition (although there is a cap on eligibility and funding). In this way, 
voucher programs are subject to less central control and therefore a lower perceived 
cost of dictatorship. This is enhanced by the fact that schools are subject to the 
additional regulatory requirements of voucher programs on an opt-in basis. Private 
schools can continue to operate lawfully without participating in voucher programs.  
Perceiving higher disorder costs, some researchers have called for greater regulation 
of voucher programs – particularly in the area of discrimination. Discriminatory 
practices can be characterized as either costs or dictatorship or costs of disorder, 
depending on the actor and institutional context (Djankov et al. 2003). In the context 
                                                          
89 Note: parts of this section have been summarised or paraphrased for brevity.  
90 For a summary of these provisions, see, e.g., US Department of Education, 
<https://innovation.ed.gov/resources/state-nonpublic-education-regulation-map/district-
columbia-regulations/> (  23 April 2019).  
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of voucher programs, regulation aiming to control discriminatory practices seeks to 
limit perceived disorder costs but have the consequence of increasing the perception 
of dictatorship costs.  
For instance, it has been claimed that voucher programs result in greater racial and 
socioeconomic segregation (e.g., Nelson 2017). This is a form of indirect 
discrimination as a consequence of the operation of school choice programs 
themselves. That is, schools do not discriminate as such – and segregation does not 
occur through force – but, as the argument goes, greater choice allows parents to 
discriminate and move enrolments away from government schools (Friedman 1955). 
Theoretically, the reason this can be characterized as a perceived cost of disorder is 
that it could damage social harmony and potentially lead to violence against one 
group over another. However, the relationship between school choice and increased 
racial segregation is weak for both charter schools (Garcia 2008) and voucher 
programs (Green and Winters 2007; Egalite and Wolf 2016; DeAngelis 2017; 
Swanson 2017).  
Another example is more direct discrimination based on personal attributes through 
the operation of school enrolment policies or teaching practices. Mengler (2018, p. 
1261) contends that because ‘private schools have broad discretion to operate as 
they wish, many [people] fear that the schools have the ability to discriminate against 
disfavoured groups, such as LGBT students or racial and religious minorities.’91 
Mengler (2018) goes on to cite anecdotal evidence of voucher-accepting private 
schools with “anti-LBGT” policies in the American states of Colorado, Indiana, 
Georgia, and North Carolina. Imposing greater regulation on voucher programs, as 
Mengler (2018), suggests may be well-intentioned. However, the upshot of the new 
comparative approach developed in this thesis is that any proposals must be weighed 
against the trade-off with increased dictatorship costs. Where discriminatory practices 
go to the maintaining the religious ethos of private schools, regulatory measures will 
increase the perception of one of the central criticisms typically directed at 
                                                          
91 Note that Mengler (2018, p. 1252) explains that although other inclusive acronyms (such 
as LGBTQIA+) are often used in political discourse, Mengler employs “LGBT” throughout 
the paper ‘as an umbrella term to encompass the full spectrum of sexual and gender 
minorities affected by voucher discrimination’. Given the author’s explanation, I adopt that 
usage here.   
208 
 
government intervention in school education – the state controlling values (e.g., Mill 
1859; Hayek 1960).92  
Imposing regulatory constraints to deal with these perceived disorder costs is likely to 
constrain the dynamism of public sector service delivery by limiting participation in 
voucher programs. In the latter case, three recent studies have explicitly considered 
this link between the regulation of voucher programs and schools’ participation in 
voucher programs. 
First, DeAngelis and Burke (2017) examine private schools in Washington, D.C., 
Indiana, and Louisiana using data from the Private School Universe Survey from 
school years 1999-2000 and 2013-14. In relation to DC private schools, the authors 
of the study reported that ‘private schools in D.C. have around a 10-percentage point 
lower likelihood of describing themselves as providing an alternative or non-traditional 
education after switching into the voucher environment’ (DeAngelis and Burke 2017, 
p. 321). Therefore, the authors suggest that there is a correlation between private 
schools that subject themselves to voucher program regulation and homogenization 
of program offerings (DeAngelis and Burke 2017).  
The same states were the subject of another study conducted by Sude, DeAngelis, 
and Wolf (2018). The focus of that study was on the effects of regulation on the 
likelihood of private schools participating in voucher programs. The study used the 
Private School Universe Survey in conjunction with the Great Schools Review scores. 
In summary, the study found that higher-quality private schools (characterized by 
higher tuition fees and larger enrollments) were less likely to participate in voucher 
programs. However, this study did not go into the content of the regulatory provisions.  
The final two studies, currently published as two separate working papers by 
DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf (2018; 2019), examine the effects of voucher regulation 
on private schools in Florida, and in California and New York, respectively. Previous 
literature noted that in empirical research into the effect of regulation and voucher 
                                                          
92 There is a separate academic literature and legal case law, beyond the scope of this 
thesis, considering whether providing taxpayer dollars to religious schools through voucher 
programs violates the “Establishment clause” of the United States Constitution and similar 
provisions in various other American state constitutions. See, e.g., Gibbs (2010); Eberle-
Peay (2012); Mead (2015); O’Connor (2015); Wilhelmsen (2016); Black (2018).   
209 
 
programs it was difficult to prove causation rather than correlation (DeAngelis and 
Burke 2017). These two studies overcame that difficulty by using an experimental 
methodology of random assignment – using surveys to randomly assign different 
hypothetical regulations to school leaders to test how willing they would be to 
participate in the voucher program. After asking demographic questions about the 
respondent and details of the school’s profile, the survey contained a question asking 
“If your state launched a new school choice program next academic year, with a value 
of $6,000 per student, per year, how likely is it that your school would participate in 
the program?” (2019, p. 36). In the 2018 study, there were four versions of the survey 
(control group, plus three treatment groups). In the 2019 study, there were five 
versions of the survey (control group, plus four treatment groups). The only difference 
was a note explaining the regulatory component that the private school would be 
subject to – as indicated in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1 – Surveys of Private School Leaders 
Control Group “This program would not require any changes in school 
operations or additional government regulations”. 
Treatment Group One “The only requirement would be that every student would 
have to take the state standardized tests each year.” 
Treatment Group Two “The only requirement would be that your school would have 
to accept all students who applied (and you would be required 
to use random lottery for admissions in the case of 
oversubscription).” 
Treatment Group Three “The only requirement would be that your school would have 
to accept the voucher amount ($6,000) as full payment for 
voucher students.” 
Treatment Group Four 
(2019 study only) 
“The only requirement would be that every student would 
have to take nationally norm-referenced standardized tests 
each year.” 
Source: DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf (2018; 2019) 
Studies of this kind have some limitations as the authors acknowledge in some detail. 
Nevertheless, the results are telling. For the Florida study (DeAngelis, Burke, and 
Wolf 2018, p. 1) it was found that:  
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Relative to no regulations…open-enrollment mandates reduce the likelihood that 
private schools are certain to participate by about 17 percentage points, or 70 percent. 
State standardized testing requirements reduce the likelihood that private schools are 
certain to participate by 11 percentage points, or 44 percent. We find no evidence to 
suggest that the prohibition of copayment affects program participation overall. 
Similarly, for California and New York (DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf 2019, p. 2) it was 
found that: 
Relative to no regulations…open-enrollment mandates reduce the likelihood that 
private school leaders are certain to participate in a hypothetical choice program by 
about 19 percentage points, or 60 percent. State standardized testing requirements 
reduce the likelihood that private school leaders are certain to participate by 9 
percentage points, or 29 percent. We find no evidence to suggest that the prohibition 
of copayment or nationally norm-referenced testing requirements affect the overall 
willingness to participate in a school choice program. 
In sum, this is important for the context of my inquiry as it highlights the operation of 
the perceived dictatorship costs of the regulation of public services – enforced 
uniformity, and less responsiveness to individual needs and local contexts. The 
voucher program relies on private schools participating in these programs. In addition, 
the above stream of research underscores the importance of the economic analysis 
of legislation to examine the detail of actual – rather than hypothetical – regulatory 
provisions imposed on the eligibility, operation, and participation in voucher programs.  
6.5.4 Voucher programs and innovation, evidence and theory   
The contribution of this section of the chapter has been to show how voucher 
programs offer a more dynamic environment for service delivery, with fewer regulatory 
provisions as compared with charter schools. This finding suggests an increased 
scope for innovative practices to be developed within private schools participating in 
voucher programs. Yet the research on the link between voucher programs and 
innovation is extremely limited. The principal focus of innovation and school choice 
research has been on charter schools rather than vouchers programs (e.g., Lubenski 
2009). The current research agenda on American voucher programs is focussed on 
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academic achievement (e.g., Chingos and Peterson 2015; Egalite and Wolf 2016).93 
There is an empirical gap that needs to be addressed by future research in this area. 
In the meantime, there is another theoretical reason, supporting the legislative 
analysis in this chapter, that sustains the proposition that a more dynamic 
environment for service delivery will promote innovation. That is, innovation results 
from dynamic competitive processes – not because there is a profit incentive (that 
may have limited relevance in a public sector context), but because the process of 
competition itself is one of discovery (Hayek 2002).    
To date, the underlying theoretical links between voucher programs and innovation 
are largely the same as previously discussed in relation to charter schools. That is, a 
combination of school autonomy, market competition, public choice, and institutional 
theories support the contention that voucher programs will foster greater innovation 
than state public schools and be more responsive to their local needs as compared 
to more centralized institutional possibilities. I will not rehearse that line of argument. 
Instead, I will make an additional contribution to the theory of school choice and 
innovation by pointing to the role of prices and competition in knowledge generation 
and preference discovery.  
The regulatory constraint theory of public sector innovation developed in this thesis 
predicts that the private schools participating in a voucher program will be afforded 
greater autonomy than charter schools, and greater dynamism predicts an even 
greater level of competition. The school autonomy and school choice literature focus 
on the increased economic incentives for schools to innovate, and for schools to be 
responsive to local need. The purpose of this chapter was to show that these 
economic incentives will be a function of the regulatory framework – and, in turn, the 
regulatory framework is developed in an attempt to control competing costs of 
dictatorship and disorder. But there is something more than the economic incentives 
of school communities to remain open. This is particularly so where organizations are 
                                                          
93 Outside of the United States, Parry (1997a) examines voucher programs in Chile, finding 
that public schools were more likely to offer innovative programs – although this was largely 
linked to specific funding. Additionally, in separate paper, Parry (1997b, p. 129) contends that 
‘a history of centralization combined with the military government's preoccupation with control 
hindered the development of initiative and innovation in the education sector and discouraged 
effective participation’ 
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predominately not-for-profit – or legally required to be non-profit. That something more 
is knowledge and preference discovery.  
Hayek (1945) established that the market system was a way of coordinating 
knowledge dispersed throughout the community. In this regard, voucher programs 
introduce a mechanism not seen in other institutional possibilities for service delivery 
in school education – prices. What is important about prices is not profit motive as 
such, but the powerful information that is generated about what services are valued 
and what needs should be fulfilled over others. In a centralized system, bureaucrats 
make these decisions. In a decentralized system of charter schools, individual school 
organizations make these decisions in negotiation with public charter authorizers. 
Under a voucher program, these decisions are made by parents and individual 
schools with prices attached.  
Preferences are not given; instead, knowledge has to be discovered (Hayek 1945; 
2002). Therefore, competition not only provides economic incentives for schools to 
innovate – but provides the mechanism for discovering needs and values as 
compared to centralized service delivery (Hayek 2002).  
In this regard, Hayek (2002, p. 14) makes two salient points for public sector 
innovation.   
First, as far as the management decisions of a genuine economy or of any other 
organization are concerned, it is only the knowledge of the organizers or managers 
alone that can have any impact. Second, all members of such a genuine economy—
conceived of as a consciously managed organization—must serve the uniform 
hierarchy of objectives in all their actions. Contrast this with the two advantages of a 
spontaneous market order or catallaxy: it can use the knowledge of all participants, 
and the objectives it serves are the particular objectives of all its participants in all their 
diversity and polarity.  
Therefore, the more that public services are legislated to reflect the “nomos” (Hayek 
1973), the more people that are necessarily recruited to the task of knowledge 
generation and innovation – and the more innovation that will be fostered in the 
context of public sector services. Secondly, an institutional-level preference for 
competition in public sector services allows for a diversity in service provision 
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guarding avoiding high dictatorship costs. However, as has been shown in this 
chapter, even decentralized institutional possibilities will never fully replicate the 
“nomos” as there will always be some constraints on public sector innovation 
embedded into the regulatory framework.   
Friedman (1997, p. 343) stated that ‘vouchers are not an end in themselves, they are 
a means to make a transition from a government to a market system.’ Friedman 
argued (1997, p. 344) that ‘for this image to be realised it is essential that no 
conditions be attached to the acceptance of vouchers that interfere with the freedom 
of private enterprises to experiment, to explore and to innovate.’ This chapter has 
shown there are indeed conditions be attached to the acceptance of vouchers 
designed to mitigate the costs of disorder of this institutional possibility. The constraint 
on public sector innovation is, therefore, a cost of dictatorship.   
Looking past innovation, Hess (2010, p. 41) summarises that school voucher 
programs – such as the one found in Washington D.C. – have succeeded if the 
ultimate goal of these programs is ‘is to get low-income children out of terrible urban 
school systems and into high-quality private schools where they can learn safely and 
increase their odds of getting high-school diplomas.’ 
6.5.5 Conclusion of voucher program law analysis  
In summary, the legislative analysis of school voucher programs has shown that the 
creation and destruction mechanism for vouchers is constrained by (i) approval by the 
voucher administrator; and then (ii) the interaction between consumer substitution 
(i.e., parents of eligible students) and private school participation. This process is, 
therefore, more analogous to the “nomos” or the private orderings of the market 
(Hayek 1973; Djankov et al. 2003) as compared to charter schools and centralized 
government schools. The implication of this is that the regulatory features that restrict 
participation in the program, or the quantum of the voucher, will act as constraints on 
the operation of the (relatively more) spontaneous creation and destruction 
mechanisms – and will, therefore, limit the scope for public sector innovation in this 
setting.  
214 
 
6.6  Conclusion  
The focus of this chapter was to provide a legislative analysis of two popular school 
choice programs in the United States – charter schools and voucher programs – using 
the legislative provisions of Washington, D.C. as a case study for exposition and 
critical analysis. In comparing institutional possibilities, Vergari (2003, p. 512) 
contends that ‘charter schools can be viewed as a policy compromise between those 
who would maintain the traditional public education system and those who would like 
to see it completely overhauled via the adoption of a voucher system of education’ 
(see also Hess 2010; Heise 2012). The analysis presented in this chapter is 
consistent with this view.  
The results of the legislative analysis confirm that charter schools provide a more 
dynamic institutional possibility for public education – through more spontaneous 
mechanisms of creation and destruction. Although charter schools remain highly 
regulated, the inherent decentralizing features mean that the perceived costs of 
dictatorship are lower than traditional public schools. This appears to be correlated 
with the evidence that charter schools foster innovation – although perhaps do not 
live up to the bold claims of school choice advocates. The review of the legislative 
provisions of the Opportunity Scholarship program shows that voucher programs are 
an even more decentralized institutional possibility, characterized by lower regulatory 
constraints. Recently, other research has confirmed that the regulatory provisions of 
voucher programs is important for uptake in voucher programs and may discourage 
specialization. These findings have implications for innovation in this public sector 
context.   
Overall, the results of the legislative analysis presented in this chapter reinforce the 
central argument of this thesis. Namely, that barriers to creation and destruction in 
public sector services can be found by analyzing the legislative structures governing 
service delivery – and more dynamic processes will foster innovation. 
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Chapter 7 – Summary and conclusion  
7.1 Introduction  
This thesis has developed a new comparative approach to research in public sector 
innovation – focusing on the regulatory constraints governing service delivery in a 
public sector context. School education services has been taken as an exemplar to 
show that there is no single way that public services are provided. Instead, a range of 
institutional possibilities can be observed with different regulatory structures to 
manage the competing social costs of dictatorship and disorder. This thesis has 
mapped several institutional possibilities through a series of detailed case studies on 
government schools, independent public schools, charter schools and voucher 
programs. In summary, it has been shown that each institutional possibility has a 
distinct regulatory framework governing service delivery resulting in different 
constraints on public sector innovation.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary and conclusion to the thesis. 
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section two will draw together a summary of the 
findings and contributions that I have made in this thesis. Section three will discuss 
the implications of these contributions, the wider significance of the new comparative 
approach to regulatory approach for public sector innovation that I have developed, 
and avenues for future research. Section four deals with the limitations of the research 
findings. Lastly, in section five, I will conclude the thesis.   
7.2 Summary of the thesis findings and contributions  
This thesis is comprised of three parts. The first part of the thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) 
developed a theoretical and methodological approach. The second part of the thesis 
applied the new comparative approach to public sector innovation to four distinct 
institutional possibilities for providing public school education services being 
government schools in Australia (Chapter 4), Independent Public Schools in 
Queensland (Chapter 5), and American charter schools and voucher programs as 
enshrined in the Washington, D.C. code (Chapter 6). The third part of the thesis 
considers the implications arising from the above, as detailed in this chapter.   
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7.2.1  A new comparative approach to public sector innovation  
In the first part of the thesis, I developed the theoretical and methodological 
framework in response to the following research question: 
• Question one – what is a new comparative approach to public sector innovation?  
The first part of the thesis commenced by undertaking a critical synthesis and 
evaluation of the public sector innovation literature (Chapter 2). Following this, I 
developed a new comparative approach to public sector innovation research, 
focusing on comparing legislative and regulatory structures – along with a 
Schumpeterian lens for legislative and regulatory analysis based on conceptualizing 
innovation as the dynamic and evolutionary process of “creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter 1942) (Chapter 3). A new comparative approach to public sector 
innovation applies the institutional theory of regulation to facilitate a comparison 
between different institutional possibilities for regulating public sector service 
provision, based on new comparative economics and the associated IPF framework 
(e.g., Djankov et al. 2003; Shleifer 2005). 
The motivation for public sector innovation research derives from the considerable 
size of the public sector, the reliance that individuals place on public sector services, 
the unique complexity of public sector service delivery, and the place that public 
sector innovation plays within the context of wider national innovation systems. The 
public sector innovation literature questions why there is a lack of innovation in the 
public sector. Specifically, there is an underlying assumption that the public sector 
suffers from a lack of innovation as compared to the public sector. In applying the 
Schumpeterian conception of innovation as “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1942) 
to the public sector, barriers to the creation phase and destruction phase of innovation 
have been observed. In critically analyzing and synthesizing the extant public sector 
innovation literature through the prism of creative destruction, I have shown that the 
relationship between regulation and public sector innovation is unclear – and this 
important connection is understudied. An overarching contribution of this thesis is that 
this lacuna has been addressed in a systematic way. 
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In investigating the link between regulation and innovation in the public sector context, 
the standard approach to research in this field would indicate a comparison between 
the regulation of public sector services and the regulation of private sector services. 
However, the problem with that approach is public sector services, unlike the private 
sector, cannot be legally provided without a legislative or regulatory framework 
governing service delivery. The default institutional setting for private sector services 
is private market exchange. While the common law and equity have evolved over time 
to govern contractual disputes, and statutory provisions may impose additional 
obligations and requirements, the organization and performance of private sector 
services is governed by mutually beneficial exchange. In this setting, innovation will 
be adopted and diffused through entrepreneurial action guided by market feedback 
mechanisms. By contrast, constitutional and democratic governments operating 
under the rule of law must establish legal frameworks to govern the delivery of public 
services. The legal frameworks will include the legislative or executive approval for 
the lawful appropriation of public funds, and legislative and regulatory instruments to 
govern that expenditure. Such legislative and regulatory measures ensure 
accountability, certainty, and enforceability in the provision of public sector services. 
This proposition builds on existing regulatory theory that holds that regulation is a 
mechanism for government to control the performance of the public sector in 
achieving the government’s public policy objectives (Mises 1944; Freiberg 2017; 
Windholz 2018). Having now rehearsed my argument that public sector services are 
“creatures” of regulation, the fundamental insight that was developed in the first part 
of the thesis is that, in public sector innovation research, the regulation of public sector 
services should not be compared to the regulation of unrelated private sector 
services. Instead, a new comparative approach to public sector innovation holds that, 
in comparing the dynamic force of innovation, the performance of public sector entities 
should be compared with alternative institutional possibilities for delivering the same 
type of public sector service. Therefore, a new approach is needed for exploring the 
connection between regulation and public sector innovation.  
A framework is required for a comparison between different methods of providing 
public sector services. The institutional theory of regulation, from new comparative 
economics holds that ‘the two central dangers that any society faces are disorder and 
dictatorship’ and ‘institutions function to control these twin dangers…’ (Djankov et al. 
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2003, p. 598). The institutional theory of regulation was developed to explain the 
institutional possibilities and trade-offs involved in the “social control of business” 
(Djankov et al. 2003; Shleifer 2005). That is, perceived market failures in the 
commercial context can be solved through institutions such as market competition 
and other forms of private governance, private enforcement of the law through public 
courts, public enforcement of the law by public regulatory bodies, or state ownership. 
The IPF maps the relative costs of dictatorship and disorder of institutional 
possibilities and this model has been used as a tool for comparative institutional 
analysis and to critique regulation. In this thesis, I have made a theoretical contribution 
by extending the institutional theory of regulation and the IPF model to explain the 
“social control of public sector services” – explaining a lack of innovation as a cost of 
dictatorship. This theoretical contribution provides the grounding for the empirical 
findings that I have developed in part two of this thesis.      
In summary, the new comparative approach to public sector innovation that I have 
developed holds that:  
• There is no single method of delivering public sector services. In any area of public 
sector services there is a range of institutional possibilities for service delivery that 
can be observed (either examining a single jurisdiction or by comparing different 
jurisdictions) to economize the perceived costs of dictatorship and disorder in 
different ways. 
• In public sector services, each institutional possibility will be grounded in legislative 
and regulatory structures that have distinct constraints on the dynamism of how 
public sector services are first adopted, transformed, and ultimately come to an 
end.  
The new comparative approach to public sector innovation predicts that:  
• Centralized institutional possibilities will feature regulatory characteristics that, by 
design, provide central government agencies with the legal power to exercise 
direct control over service delivery. By contrast, decentralized institutional 
possibilities will feature regulatory characteristics that separate the oversight and 
management functions of public service delivery. 
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• The performance of centralized public sector services will exhibit a relatively 
greater uniformity in service delivery with less duplication compared to 
decentralized institutional possibilities (relatively lower disorder costs). However, 
the regulation of centralized public sector services results in relatively less 
dynamism in public sector services (relatively higher dictatorship costs). The 
opposite will be observed for decentralized public sector services.  
7.2.2  A regulatory research agenda for public sector innovation  
The theoretical and methodological framework that I have developed in the first part 
of this thesis allowed the following research question to be addressed:    
• Question two – how can mechanisms of the creation and destruction phases of 
innovation be observed within public sector services?  
The Schumpeterian view of innovation as “creative destruction” was originally 
conceptualized to explain the dynamics of private sector activity. In this thesis, the 
Schumpeterian conception has been applied to non-market production. In the private 
sector, prices and consumer substitution operate as mechanisms of both creation and 
destruction. The mechanisms in the public sector are less clear – particularly 
mechanisms of destruction. Indeed, the review of the public sector innovation 
literature (Chapter 2) has confirmed Potts’ (2010) earlier contention that researchers 
have focussed exclusively on the creation phase of public sector innovation. The 
extant public sector innovation literature either has not considered regulatory 
frameworks governing public service delivery in a detailed way.  
The new comparative approach to public sector innovation calls for regulatory 
constraints on the delivery of public sector services to be a specific focus of analysis. 
The method involves sourcing the relevant legislative and regulatory provisions, 
undertaking a textual analysis to observe creation and destruction mechanisms that 
are embedded in the regulatory framework, and comparing with other institutional 
possibilities. This methodology is distinguished from others that seek to construct new 
artificial mechanisms of creation or destruction (c.f., Potts 2010; Potts and Kastelle 
2010).  
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A contribution of this thesis has been to answer the elusive question of how 
mechanisms of creation and – particularly – destruction can be observed within a 
public sector context. It is clear that mechanisms of creation and destruction 
mechanisms must exist in the public sector, otherwise public sector services or 
programs could never lawfully be established or come to an end. Specifically, this 
thesis has shown that the creation and destruction mechanisms will be built into the 
regulatory framework governing public sector service delivery. Part two of this thesis 
focussed on applying the new comparative approach to public sector innovation to 
public school education. The establishment and closure of schools are key creation 
and destruction mechanisms at a “firm” level. This thesis explored this across three 
institutional possibilities. 
In chapter four, the application section of the thesis began by examining the legislative 
provisions governing centralized government schools in Australia. The relevant 
findings of this chapter include:  
• A review of the primary legislation in every Australian state and territory regarding 
government schooling found that ministerial discretion is the sole mechanism for 
school closure in every Australian jurisdiction.  
• One jurisdiction – Western Australia – has the possibility of a rule-based 
mechanism in legislation (in addition to the general Ministerial power) but this has 
not been provided for under the relevant regulations.  
• The mechanism of ministerial discretion is problematic because of information 
problems, political economy reasons, and administrative law constraints on the 
exercise of this power.  
In chapter six, the application section of the thesis continued by considering charter 
schools in Washington, D.C. The review of charter school legislation showed that:  
• Charter schools are created by an applicant filing an application to be approved 
by a chartering authority that is independent of the centralized government school 
system. 
• A chartering authority can revoke charters, in a number of defined circumstances, 
including where there has been a breach of the terms of the charter, charter school 
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administrators have engaged unlawful conduct or financial mismanagement, or 
the charter school is no longer financially viable. Additionally, charter school 
administrators can voluntarily relinquish its charter. Further, a charter will expire 
but can be renewed by the chartering authority – a rule-based mechanism for 
closure.  
Finally, also in chapter six, the thesis explored the regulatory framework of the 
Opportunity Scholarship Program operating in Washington, D.C. A review of the 
governing legislation revealed that:  
• At a “firm” level, schools are established independently of government. As a 
corollary of this, the public sector leverages from the creation and destruction 
mechanisms that exist in the private sector.  
• Voucher programs provide government funding to eligible students that attend 
participating schools. Therefore, at a “consumer” level, voucher program laws 
have the effect of introducing price and consumer substitution mechanisms.  
Therefore, the theoretical and application parts of the thesis have combined to show 
that mechanisms of creation and destruction are governed by the relevant legislative 
frameworks. One implication of the new comparative approach to public sector 
innovation is that regulatory constraints on the delivery of public sector services 
should be a preliminary point for analysis. However, a deeper implication is that is 
regulatory constraints should become the unit of analysis. This will open up new 
research possibilities to overcome the ‘paucity of measurement’ that has been 
previously diagnosed in the public sector innovation literature (Demircioglu and 
Audretsch 2017a, p. 1681).  
The implication of the answer to the second research question is that, in observing a 
lack of public sector innovation, researchers and policymakers should look first to the 
legislative and regulatory framework governing service delivery and conduct. The 
review of the public sector innovation literature presented in this thesis (Chapter 2) 
has shown that these important primary sources have been overlooked in favor of 
analyzing other research methods such as surveys and interviews. It may be that 
researchers in public sector administration are familiar with these methods and 
unfamiliar with statutory interpretation and doctrinal analysis. To be sure, there is 
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knowledge gained from obtaining and analyzing the usual data sources in the public 
sector context. However, the assumptions behind the analysis must account for the 
reality that (i) each public sector organization will have its own legislative mandate for 
how its public sector services are established, provided, and come to an end; and (ii) 
the regulatory structures governing service delivery are likely to differ across other 
state, federal, and international jurisdictions. The implication of the regulatory 
research agenda is therefore significant for the design of future public sector 
innovation research – even for research not specifically focussed on the effect of 
regulation.   
Finally, it is important to note that the new comparative approach that I have 
developed and applied in this thesis cautions against analyzing legislative and 
regulatory frameworks in isolation from the regulation of other alternative forms of 
service delivery. Indeed, this is at the heart of the new comparative approach as no 
institutional arrangement will ever completely economize on the perceived costs of 
dictatorship and disorder (Djankov et al. 2003).  
7.2.3  Institutions of public school education   
The second part of the thesis applied the new comparative approach to public sector 
innovation to four institutions possibilities for the provision of public school education. 
There are at least three reasons that this context was chosen for application and 
analysis. First, from a methodological standpoint, it was necessary to select a single 
type of public sector service to allow a comparison between institutional possibilities 
of the same service – and there is no single method of providing school education. 
Second, from a theoretical perspective, the distinct literature of school autonomy and 
school choice could be brought into conversation with the public sector innovation 
literature. Third, from a public policy perspective, school education currently accounts 
for over a quarter of combined Australian state, territory, and federal government 
expenditure on public services. 
The application section of the thesis answered the following research question:  
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• Question three – what are some examples of the institutional possibilities that can 
be observed for the provision of public school education services, and what are 
the key legislative or regulatory characteristics of these possibilities? 
In addressing this research question, I presented a series of case studies examining 
the regulatory frameworks governing service delivery on centralized government 
schools in Australia (Chapter 4), Independent Public Schools in Queensland (Chapter 
5), and American charter schools and voucher programs (Chapter 6). In applying the 
new comparative approach, and the IPF model, I have shown that these are distinct 
institutional responses with different combinations of perceived costs of dictatorship 
and disorder. I will now address this research question in more detail, dealing with 
each institutional possibility in turn.    
Centralized government schools 
The first case study focused on centralized government schools in Australia (Chapter 
4). In section 4.2, I provided a historical account of public education in Australia. The 
emergence of two distinct education systems can be explained through the subjective 
IPF framework. Publicly-funded denominational schools were an institutional 
response to the perception of high dictatorship costs such as the state imposing 
values on students while national schools (centralized government schools) were an 
institutional response to the perception of high disorder costs emanating from 
duplication, unequal access to services, sectarian and social divisiveness. In section 
4.3, I showed that despite the institutional possibilities remaining constant over time 
there had been a measurable increase in regulatory complexity. This finding was 
based on an analysis of the historical and current primary legislative provisions 
governing school education in two Australian state jurisdictions – New South Wales 
and Victoria – measured in page counts and word counts. A contribution of this 
chapter is that it provides the first attempt to detail, quantify, and analyze the 
regulation of government schooling in Australia. 
The key regulatory characteristics of centralized government schools are:  
• Ministerial power for establishing and closing schools;   
• Public ownership and control of land and buildings;     
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• Restricted geographic enrolment zones;   
• Centralized registration and employment of teachers, principals, and other staff;   
• Mandated curriculum; and 
• Reporting and accountability requirements to education departments. 
Independent Public Schools 
The second case study focused on Independent Public Schools (Chapter 5), exploring 
regulatory constraints on innovation in the school context by examining Queensland’s 
IPS program. In section 5.2, I considered the relevance of the school autonomy 
literature to gain insight into public sector innovation. The school autonomy literature 
suggests that if schools are under less regulatory constraints from the centralized 
bureaucracy, schools will enjoy greater autonomy to innovate. This perspective has 
relevance for public sector innovation because it calls for an examination of the public 
sector regulatory frameworks. Therefore, I found school autonomy theory is 
consistent with, and reinforces, the new comparative approach that I had developed 
earlier in the thesis. Australian IPS programs have received recent attention from 
education policy researchers, and this chapter engaged with recent studies. However, 
a conceptual contribution of this case study was analyzing the Queensland IPS 
program from an economic perspective and bring the school autonomy literature into 
conversation with public sector innovation literature.  
In section 5.3, I introduced the Queensland IPS program. This section explained that 
the key regulatory characteristics are the same as centralized government schools as 
there is no legislative distinction between a government school and an IPS under the 
legislative regime. There is, however, a difference in sub-legislative regulation inside 
government, as schools accepted into the IPS program are given comparatively 
greater autonomy to enhance innovation and subject to comparatively less 
departmental oversight. Accordingly, Independent Public Schools are characterized 
by relatively lower perceived dictatorship costs, and relatively higher perceived 
disorder costs. 
The key regulatory differences between centralized government schools and 
Independent Public Schools can be summarized as follows:   
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• IPS have ability to directly recruit staff and locally manage human resources; 
• IPS have greater autonomy to manage infrastructure and financial resources; 
• IPS have greater autonomy to partner with industry and other community 
organizations; and 
• IPS have increased flexibility over curriculum offerings and educational practices.  
Charter schools 
The third case study focused on charter schools (Chapter 6). This institutional 
possibility was born out of the school choice movement in the United States. By 
intention and design, charter schools are independent organizations that are given a 
“charter” from a public authorizing body to run a public school with public funding. 
Charter schools are not directly managed or regulated by a central government 
department or school board. Instead, charter schools are overseen by the chartering 
authority – a public body that is independent of the executive government and the 
education bureaucracy.  
In section 6.2, I considered the historical and theoretical context of school choice 
reforms in the United States. In this section, I noted that the foundational research on 
school choice (e.g., Chubb and Moe 1990) was influenced by institutional economics 
and the private interest theory of regulation in critiquing centralized public schools. 
Proponents of the charter school movement do not argue for reforming the regulation 
of central public schools; they seek a new institutional possibility. Therefore, the 
beginnings of a comparative approach are evident in school choice scholarship, 
although this approach has not been applied in an integrated way. Instead, economic 
analysis of education has tended to focus on the demand-side and supply-side effects 
of school choice on the education market. Consequently, the critical analysis applying 
new comparative economics to school choice laws that is presented in Chapter 6 is a 
novel contribution of this thesis that adds to the school choice literature in addition to 
providing insight for public sector innovation. In section 6.3, I explained the 
methodology behind selecting the charter school laws of Washington, D.C. as a case 
study. In section 6.4, I set out the legislative analysis of the charter school laws. This 
section explained that the key regulatory characteristics that distinguish charter 
schools from centralized government schools.  
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The key regulatory differences between centralized government schools and charter 
schools are as follows:  
• Not-for-profit applicant organizations (with corporate personality or separate legal 
identity) can petition to establish a charter school in the appropriate form; 
• There is a single chartering authority – the DC Public Charter School Board;  
• The chartering authority decides whether to approve the petition, assessed 
against the legislative criteria, and has the power to revoke a charter on certain 
grounds (a mixture of rules and discretion);  
• There is a legislative cap limits the number of charter schools that can be approved 
by a chartering authority in any year. Enrolments are based on applications and a 
random selection lottery for oversubscriptions;  
• Principals, teachers, and staff are employees of the charter school;  
• The charter school organization holds the legal interest in land and buildings;  
• The charter school organization has the legal capacity to enter into contracts with 
third parties; and  
• The choice of curriculum and accreditation body is enshrined in legislation or by 
agreement with the chartering authority;  
Voucher programs 
The fourth and final case study that was presented in this thesis focused on voucher 
programs that provide public funding to support enrolments in private schools 
(Chapter 6). Voucher programs are a dominant form of “school choice” in the US, 
second to charter schools. Although not the focus of the legislative analysis in Chapter 
6, it is noted that Australia also has a de-facto voucher program (the subject of some 
discussion in Chapter 4) so the findings of the chapter are likely to have implications 
in the Australian policy context. The Washington, D.C. voucher program - Opportunity 
Scholarship Program – operates by an independent entity providing funds to schools 
for eligible students. The schools are private and established independently of the 
voucher program. The distinction between charter schools and voucher programs is 
important: charter schools cannot operate without public authorization, whereas 
private schools may continue to operate but cannot receive taxpayer funding without 
public authorization.  
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There was a degree of overlap in presenting the case studies on voucher programs 
and charter schools. That is, the history of voucher programs was also detailed in 
section 6.2 and the rationale for selecting the voucher program laws of Washington, 
D.C. was also covered in section 6.3. Following the case study on charter schools in 
section 6.4, the legislative expression of the Opportunity Scholarship Program was 
analyzed in section 6.5.  
The key regulatory differences between voucher programs and charter schools are 
as follows:  
• Schools are established and closed independently of public decision-makers;  
• The Secretary of Education provides public grants to an ‘eligible entity’ (currently 
the not-for-profit organization Serving Our Children), that subsequently provides 
eligible students” with scholarships to pay tuition, fees, and transportation 
expenses;  
• An “eligible student” is one whose household is in receipt of food stamps or whose 
income is lower than or equal to 185 percent of the poverty line;  
• Participating schools are subject to legislative conditions on accepting vouchers 
on an opt-in basis, on various matters including financial probity, teacher 
qualifications, accreditation requirements, data and reporting requirements, and 
subject to site visits.   
Summary  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this summary discussion is that there is no 
single way to regulate the public provision of school education services. Instead, the 
institutional possibilities canvassed evidence that there is a spectrum of regulatory 
control in seven key areas (ownership, management, governance, staffing, 
enrolment, curriculum, and accreditation). Table 7.1, below, provides a stylised 
summary of the regulatory characteristics for each institutional possibility. Recall that 
the IPF model shows the trade-offs of dictatorship and disorder associated with the 
spectrum of institutional possibilities. Abstracting the four institutional possibilities, 
Figure 7.1, below, plots the possibilities on an IPF curve.  
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Starting at the lower bottom left portion of the IPF, the perceived social costs of 
government schools that have been previously observed involve the imposition of 
values through the curriculum by the state, the lack of responsiveness to individual 
student needs, and the possibility of regulatory capture – or worse forms of corruption. 
This thesis added to this list by discussing the social costs of increasing regulatory 
burdens (Chapter 4), the lack of destruction mechanisms (Chapter 4), and the 
constraints on school-based management in this institutional setting (Chapter 5). 
These are costs of disorder because it emanates from the exercise of state power.  
Moving along the IPF to Independent Public Schools, schools and principals are 
provided with greater decision-making autonomy in a range of areas described in 
Table 7.1, below. However, with greater autonomy comes a perceived increase in the 
costs of disorder – emanating from the exercise of private decision-making. These 
include the risk that costs and benefits of innovation will not be evenly distributed, 
concerns that disadvantaged students will not receive adequate support, an 
apprehension that greater specialization may lead to selective entry practices, and a 
perception that school staff may devote too much time and expenditure to non-
educational functions.  
Table 7.1 – Institutions of public school education, regulatory characteristics   
 Decentralized Centralized 
Voucher 
Programs 
Charter 
Schools 
Independent 
Public 
Schools 
Government 
Schools 
Ownership Private Not-for-profit 
organization 
Government Government 
Management Not specified School-based 
autonomy 
Limited school-
based 
autonomy 
Department 
Governance Voucher 
Program Entity 
Charter 
Authorizer 
Department Department 
Staffing Not specified Organization 
employees 
Government 
employees 
Government 
employees 
Enrolment Eligibility 
criteria 
Lottery Geographic Geographic 
Curriculum  
 
Limited school-
based 
autonomy 
Limited school-
based 
autonomy 
Limited school-
based 
autonomy 
Department 
Accreditation School-based 
autonomy 
School-based 
autonomy 
Limited school-
based 
autonomy 
Department 
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Figure 7.1 – Institutions of public school education, institutional possibilities 
frontier   
 
Moving further along the IPF, charter schools are characterized by lower perceived 
costs of dictatorship because charter schools have legislated autonomy in terms of 
ownership, management, staffing, and accreditation – featuring independent 
regulatory oversight and decentralized spontaneous mechanisms of creation (e.g., 
voluntary application) and destruction (e.g., financial viability). Charter schools are 
characterized by higher perceived costs of dictatorship comes in greater opportunism, 
and agency problems such as conflicts of interest with for-profit companies. 
Regulation of charter schools mitigates these costs through rule-based destruction 
mechanisms, oversight by a single charter authorizer, regulatory compliance and 
financial management requirements, and enrolment controls – although this means 
that dictatorship costs are not entirely economized.  
Finally, moving to the upper right portion of the IPF, voucher programs exhibit 
comparatively perceived costs of dictatorship – with opt-in regulation and narrower 
regulatory coverage and compliance obligations. However, voucher programs the 
greater potential for discriminatory practices loom as an increased disorder cost.  
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7.2.4 Regulating for an innovative public sector       
The four case studies that have been developed in the second part of the thesis also 
allow the following research question to be addressed:   
• Question four – does the potential for the dynamism of innovation change if 
regulatory constraints change? 
The theoretical approach that I have developed in the first part of this thesis would 
answer this question in the affirmative. Under the new comparative approach to public 
sector innovation, regulatory constraints are characterized as costs of dictatorship. 
That is, centralized regulation of public services is imposed by governments to control 
perceived disorder costs; however, autonomy, discretion and spontaneity in the 
delivery of public services is necessarily constrained. Therefore, the IPF model 
depicted in Figure 7.1, above, predicts that decentralized institutional arrangements 
will be more favorable to innovation as compared to centralized institutional 
possibilities. The empirical findings that I presented in the second part of this thesis 
support this theoretical prediction – affirming the explanatory power of the new 
comparative approach.  
Chapter 5 presented a case study on the Queensland IPS program, gaining insight 
into the connection between regulation on public sector innovation. The Queensland 
IPS program removed regulatory constraints on the principals of government schools, 
providing greater local autonomy over service delivery. The EOI application required 
principals to nominate innovative practices that they would not be able to implement 
without such autonomy. In this setting, principals can be seen described as 
entrepreneurs empowered to employing new combinations of productive factors to 
develop proposals for new products, new methods of production, new sources of 
supply, the exploitation of new markets and new ways to organize business 
(Schumpeter 1934). By providing a textual analysis of successful applications, this 
chapter made an empirical contribution, identifying specifically planned innovations in 
the school context that resulted from the removal of departmental regulatory 
constraints (“soft regulation”).  
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Overall, the Queensland case study in Chapter 5 found that the regulation of 
centralized government school is constraining innovation in the areas of staffing 
flexibility, in schools forming partnerships, in leasing and licensing out facilities, and 
in managing building, facilities, and infrastructure. However, because the Queensland 
IPS program was introduced without legislative reform (“hard regulation”), the problem 
of increasing regulatory complexity remains. Nevertheless, the results presented in 
this chapter are significant because they demonstrate that there is a correlation 
between the removal of regulatory constraints and increasing innovative potential in 
a public sector context.  
Chapter 6 presented a legislative analysis of two forms of American school choice 
programs – charter schools and voucher programs. In reviewing the school choice 
literature, I observed that school choice laws were introduced to remove the “hard” 
regulatory constraints that exist within centralized institutional possibilities. Using the 
code for the District of Columbia as the model law for legislative analysis, this chapter 
makes an empirical contribution by demonstrating that the features of the institutional 
possibilities of charter schools and voucher programs are written into the legislation.94  
The legislative analysis demonstrated that school choice programs charters create a 
more dynamic environment as compared with traditional government schools and 
Independent Public Schools, with spontaneous mechanisms for the “creation” and 
“destruction” of public school education services. In turn, voucher program laws 
establish an even more dynamic environment for service delivery compared to charter 
schools, with opt-in regulatory provisions and narrow regulatory coverage. These 
findings demonstrate that there is a correlation between regulatory structures and 
dynamism in a public sector context – curbing perceived costs of dictatorship with the 
trade-off of increased perceived costs of disorder. The results of the legislative 
analysis are reinforced by a review of the empirical evidence of charter schools and 
innovation and through surveying an emerging stream of experimental studies on the 
regulation of voucher programs. The implications of these findings will be discussed 
in the next section of the chapter.    
                                                          
94 The regulatory features of charter schools and voucher programs are summarized in 
sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, above.   
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7.3 Implications of the research findings    
The final research question posed for this thesis is as follows:  
• Question five – given the new comparative approach that has been developed, 
and the research findings, what are the implications for future research exploring 
the relationship between regulation and public sector innovation? 
This section of the chapter draws together a number of the broader implications for 
public sector innovation. I will now consider the need for regulatory reduction in the 
public sector, the application of the new comparative approaches to other types of 
public sector services, and the possibility of secession from public sector services.  
7.3.1  A focus on regulatory reduction in the public sector   
This thesis begins to provide an account of overregulation in Australian public sector 
services. The findings suggest that a focus on regulation reduction in the public sector 
regulatory reduction is needed to remove constraints on innovation. This thesis has 
provided a ground-breaking attempt to analyze “regulation inside government” (Hood 
et al. 1999) using public school education as the context for this exploratory study. 
The findings in this thesis suggest that decentralized institutional arrangements, 
characterized by fewer regulatory constraints, will be conducive to a comparatively 
more innovative public sector environment. A question for future research is whether 
the same trends can be observed in other areas of public sector services.  
The first step in investigating overregulation is measuring the extent of the problem. 
A practical problem for Australian public sector research is that the official repositories 
of legislation and regulation cannot be downloaded as a single compilation. 
Additionally, there is no readily available way to ascertain which statutory provisions 
will apply in a particular public sector context. However, in order to do progress this 
research agenda, more accurate and efficient tools for collating and analyzing 
legislation and regulation need to be developed. 
In this regard, “RegData” is the state-of-the-art regulatory measurement tool 
developed in the United States that machine-learning and artificial intelligence to 
collate the number of restrictive clauses (“shall,” “must,” “should,” “prohibited”) and 
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then identify the relevance of the regulations to various industries (Al-Ubaydli and 
McLaughlin 2017). The database is used to support an open-source website to crowd-
source research insights (https://quantgov.org). RegData shows great promise for 
application in Australia, although that extension of the project remains in its infancy 
(McLaughlin, Potts, and Sherouse 2019). Overall, it is proposed that better 
measurement and monitoring of regulation will have implications for the political 
economy of regulation. Specifically, drawing attention to the quantity and extent of 
public sector regulation in an open, transparent, and methodological way impacts the 
political economy of public sector regulation by affecting the perception of costs of 
dictatorship caused by overregulation (Allen and Berg 2017) that provides an impetus 
for legislative and regulatory change.  
How could regulatory reduction be achieved? Australian governments already have 
adopted several institutional responses to regulatory reduction. Allen (2018) charts 
the history of regulatory reform in Australia. Two approaches can be distinguished. 
First, “backward-looking” targeted regulatory reduction that focuses on specific 
sections of the economy, such as trade liberalization, or parliamentary sitting days 
focussed on repealing regulation after taking stock (Allen 2018). A second, by 
complementary, approach involves forward-looking process-orientated measures, 
such as requiring Regulatory Impact Statements for new regulations, regulatory 
budgets for government departments, and “one-in-n-out” rules (Allen 2018). As an 
example at the Commonwealth level, the Australian Government’s “Regulatory 
Burden Measurement Framework” provides that ‘all new regulations or changes to 
existing regulations need to have the regulatory costs imposed on businesses, 
community organisations and individuals quantified’ and regulators must then 
consider appropriate measures to offset those costs (Australian Government 2016, p. 
1). The findings presented in this thesis suggest that those regulation units should 
extend their purview to measuring the cost of new regulations on the public sector 
also.  
Other institutional responses to reducing overregulation include the allocating 
responsibility for regulatory reduction to a specific government minister (e.g., New 
South Wales has a Minister for Better Regulation and Innovation), appointing 
independent commissioners (e.g., Victoria has a dual Better Regulation 
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Commissioner and Red Tape Commissioner), forming advisory or consultation 
groups to report to government (e.g., Queensland’s Better Regulation Task Force), 
or giving this responsibility for public servants embedded within departments with 
central leadership and coordination (e.g. Office of Best Practice Regulation in the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet)95.  
Another approach to reducing the regulatory burden in the public sector that has been 
suggested is to create a regulatory “sandbox” where public sector entities could seek 
waivers from specific regulatory constraints in order to promote innovation (e.g., 
Bason 2018). Regulatory sandboxes are used, for example, as a regulatory model 
used in several jurisdictions for experimental financial technology to allow businesses 
to test innovative practices and business models without removing regulation on the 
traditional financial sector (e.g., Bromberg, Godwin, and Ramsay 2017; Zetzsche et 
al. 2017). Such a proposal may appear to be an attractive method to achieve a public 
sector parallel of the “permissionless innovation” approach that is advocated for the 
private sector (Thierer 2014). The caution is that the “sandbox” would need to be 
embedded in the legislative and regulatory framework, otherwise sandboxes would 
be limited to “soft” regulation and the problems with this scenario have been 
discussed at length in the context of the Independent Public Schools program 
(Chapter 5). The findings of this thesis suggest that public sector regulatory reform 
should move in the direction of introducing stock-taking institutional processes to 
identify discretion-based regulation and then developing rules-based mechanisms as 
a replacement.  
There is a need for future research on the comparative effectiveness of all of these 
institutional responses. Nevertheless, while Australian efforts on regulatory reduction 
have principally focused on cutting red tape and overregulation in the private sector, 
                                                          
95 See, e.g., Minister for Better Regulation and Innovation <https://www.nsw.gov.au/your-
government/ministers/minister-for-better-regulation-and-innovation/> (last accessed 26 July 
2019); Commissioner for Better Regulation and Red Tape Commissioner 
<http://www.betterregulation.vic.gov.au/About-Us> (last accessed 26 July 2019); Better 
Regulation Taskforce <https://desbt.qld.gov.au/small-business/advisory-groups/taskforce> 
(last accessed 26 July 2019); Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet < 
https://pmc.gov.au/regulation> (last accessed 27 July 2019).  
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such examples provide models for how public sector regulatory reduction could be 
achieved.  
7.3.2  Choice and competition in public sector services    
The new comparative approach to public sector innovation shows that there is no 
single method of delivering public sector services. In some institutional possibilities, 
the roles of funding, management, and delivery are fused. In other institutional 
possibilities, these roles are separated in different ways. While this thesis has 
focussed on school education services, it is proposed that this theoretical framework 
can be applied to public sector services more broadly. It has been shown that one 
advantage of choice and competition in decentralized institutional possibilities is that 
competition is a discovery process for knowledge generation (Hayek 2002).The 
greater dynamism that exists on the face of legislative and regulatory frameworks, the 
greater the innovative potential – ultimately promoting an evolutionary public policy 
as knowledge continues to unfold over time (Witt 2003). This insight has practical 
implications for contemporary Australian public policy developments concerning 
competition in public sector services.     
The Harper Competition Policy Review was established to provide a “root and branch” 
review of Australia’s Competition Law and Policy Framework (Bilson 2014).  The 
terms of reference directed the panel to review, amongst other things, ‘government 
involvement in markets through government business enterprises, direct ownership 
of assets and the competitive neutrality policy, with a view to reducing government 
involvement where there is no longer a clear public interest need’ (Harper et al. 2015, 
p. 526). In its final report, the panel recommended that that Australian governments 
place ‘user choice at the heart of service delivery’ (Harper et al. 2015, p. 36). User 
choice was also relevant to the panel’s broader recommendation that ‘innovation in 
service provision should be stimulated, while ensuring minimum standards of quality 
and access in human services’ (Harper et al. 2015, p. 8). However, the panel did not 
provide a framework for how this would be implemented or provide a detailed 
examination of the current regulatory barriers in place in the public sector context. 
The Commonwealth government supported the panel’s recommendations in principle 
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but deferred a detailed consideration of the matter to the Productivity Commission 
(Australian Government 2015).  
The Productivity Commission took a two-stage approach to further the 
recommendations of the Harper Competition Policy Review in 2016 (Productivity 
Commission 2016a). The Productivity Commission’s first study report nominated 
social housing, public hospital services, end-of-life care, public dental services, 
human services in remote Indigenous communities, and family and community 
services, as the priority areas user choice and competition reform in the public sector 
(Productivity Commission 2016b). Strikingly, in the context of this thesis, school 
education was omitted from this list. The Productivity Commission did consider 
primary and secondary schooling, but determined that school education was an area 
of service delivery where ‘improved outcomes…could be better delivered by reforms 
other than greater competition, contestability or user choice’ (Productivity 
Commission 2016b, p. 13) (own emphasis). This is a significant exclusion because 
one of the key purposes of the Productivity Commission’s work included examining 
‘how best to promote innovation and improvements in the quality, range and funding 
of human services’ (Productivity Commission 2017, p. xi). The theoretical framework 
and empirical findings in this thesis suggest that decentralized institutional 
possibilities – where choice and competition are embedded in the legislative and 
regulatory frameworks – will foster innovation in the school education context. 
Accordingly, the question of how to apply competition into the school education should 
be revisited.  
The second stage of the Productivity Commission’s inquiry involved investigating and 
then making specific recommendations to governments about how to implement 
“choice, competition and contestability” in the previously nominated priority areas 
(Productivity Commission 2017). In the course of its inquiry, the Productivity 
Commission (2016b; 2017) received evidence that prescriptive contract terms 
mandating how services are provided inhibit service-providers from implementing 
innovative responses that may be more effective, short-term contracts cause 
uncertainty which constrains innovation, and regulatory approaches due to the 
government’s risk aversion increase the cost of providing services. These findings 
reinforce the implication that governments need to undertaking a stock-taking review 
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of regulation governing public sector services, discussed in the previous subsection 
of this chapter.  
The Productivity Commission’s analysis features a limited examination of the 
mechanisms for the creation and destruction phases of innovation – which will be 
embedded into regulatory frameworks. Specifically, the Productivity Commission did 
recognize that contestability ‘means that a provider of human services faces a 
credible threat of replacement if it underperforms’ and the need to develop 
‘mechanisms to replace underperforming providers’ (Productivity Commission 2017, 
p. 65). However, the inquiry did not consider these mechanisms in any detail. This is 
problematic because these processes are central to the operation user choice. While 
previous research on contestability in human services has focussed on the regulation 
of entry (e.g., Davidson 2011), the implication of the new comparative approach 
developed in this thesis is that it is important for policymakers to consider both 
creation and destruction mechanisms in approaching regulatory reform and be 
particularly cognizant of how these are embedded into the regulatory frameworks. 
Moreover, it is important to consider not only the prospect of “market failure” but the 
competing reality of “government failure”. Accordingly, specific legislative and 
regulatory changes will be needed to foster innovation in public sector services – and 
the new comparative approach developed in this thesis could provide policymakers 
with a powerful framework to more closely analyze regulatory frameworks governing 
public sector services to create a more dynamic public sector. 
It may be necessary for the legislature to undertake more general reform to ensure 
competition in public sector services, in the effort to foster greater public sector 
innovation, as it is unlikely that the current competition law and policy framework 
would apply to public sector services. In Australia, the Competition and Consumer Act 
2010 regulates a variety of anti-competitive conduct. Historically, Australian public 
sector services have not been subject to competition law that would otherwise prevent 
governments from running centralized monopoly services or otherwise engage in anti-
competitive conduct. This situation flows from a legal presumption that the Crown 
(whether manifested in the Commonwealth, a State, or a Territory government) is not 
bound by statutory law unless the statute expressly or implicitly provides otherwise 
(e.g., Sawer 1958; Taylor 2000; Gray 2009; 2010) – with the consequence that 
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centralized government provision of services is put on an ‘uneven playing field’ 
compared to other institutional possibilities (Sneddon 1998, p. 467). In the new 
comparative framework, this risk is a perceived cost of dictatorship – in that the 
government is using its legal position to suppress other types of service delivery and 
manipulate transaction costs in its favor (e.g., Downs 1964; Tullock 1965; Niskanen 
1971; Chubb and Moe 1990). The previous major review into Australian competition 
law and policy, the Hilmer report, recommended that government business entities 
should be made subject to competition law and policy (Hilmer, Rayner, and Taperell 
1993). That recommendation led to legislative change meaning that governments are 
now subject to the competition law and policy insofar as the Commonwealth 
government, a state or territory government, or a local government “carries on a 
business”.96  
The definition of carrying on of a business has been held to apply in a number of 
cases including telecommunication services, postal services, broadcasting services, 
printing services, and ambulance services at sporting events (Duke 2018). However, 
tenders for goods and services related to wholly governmental activities, the provision 
of immigration detention centres, providing pharmaceutical, medical and dental 
services under Medicare, operating a public hospital, managing a national park, and 
police and corrective services have all been determined to fall outside the definition 
(Duke 2018). The Harper Competition Policy Review recommended extending the 
definition to encompass any activity in “trade or commerce” (Harper et al. 2015). 
Although the Commonwealth government gave its in-principle support to this 
recommendation (Australian Government 2015) it was not legislated as part of the 
government’s competition reform bills that passed the Commonwealth Parliament in 
2017.97 It follows that more general legislative changes may be required to expand 
the applicability of competition law frameworks beyond government “businesses” but 
to public sector services more broadly. Accordingly, the new comparative approach 
provides a framework for future research on competition in public sector services to 
consider the trade-offs involved in different institutional possibilities.   
                                                          
96 See: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth); sections 2A, 2BA, and 2C.  
97 See: Competition and Consumer Amendment (Competition Policy Review) Act 2017 .  
Moreover, this Amendment Act inserted exemptions on the Crown for new “concerted 
practices” provisions. 
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7.3.3  Seceding from public services  
The high dictatorship costs associated with centralized government services may 
have longer-term consequences. This thesis has shown that decentralized school 
choice institutional possibilities, such as charter schools and voucher programs, are 
characterized by lower dictatorship costs than centralized institutional possibilities, 
such as traditional government schools and independent public schools. If lawmakers 
do not introduce more dynamic institutional possibilities and allow individuals to self-
manage the competing costs of disorder and dictatorship through their own choices, 
then there is the possibility that perception of dictatorship costs in any of the existing 
public institutional possibilities may remain too high for some individuals. Public sector 
services will not necessarily be immune to competition external to the institutional 
possibilities for public service delivery within a particular jurisdiction. 
In the public school education context, the implication is that parents will secede from 
public sector services to private institutional possibilities. This is because there is the 
possibility of seceding exists where the government’s regulatory capacity means that 
there is a difference between regulation “on paper” and regulation “in practice” (Dixon 
and Tooley 2005) or where the government has specifically legislated for an 
alternative external possibility to comply with compulsory education requirements. 
Examples of these two possibilities will now be discussed.  
The first kind of secession can be seen through for-profit schools that exist externally 
to the provision of public services. Those that are critical of school choice programs 
will continue to highlight the perceived disorder costs associated with the 
“commercialization” of education in the public sector context (e.g., Molnar 2018). 
However, the research of James Tooley and Pauline Dixon, along with their various 
colleagues, has highlighted the value of for-profit schools in the context of developing 
countries (Dixon and Tooley 2005; Dixon 2012; Tooley 2013; Tooley and Dixon 2005; 
2007; Tooley, Dixon, and Amuah 2007; Tooley, Dixon, and Olaniyan 2005; Tooley, 
Dixon, and Stanfield 2008). In summary, this stream of research provides a wealth of 
observational evidence that many (and in some studies, a majority) poor parents living 
in the city slums or the remote villages of developing countries prefer to pay to send 
their children to for-profit schools operating outside formal education systems – 
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despite the existence of free government schools or regulated and other publicly-
supported non-government schools. The reasons for the success of these schools 
varied, adapted to the particularities of each local context. Although, in summary, 
Dixon (2012, p. 192) observes some broad themes of this research. 
Private schools often have more dedicated teachers, smaller class sizes, and better 
facilities, even while incurring a fraction of the government schools’ teacher costs. And 
children in low-cost private schools seem to be outperforming those in government 
schools even after controlling for socioeconomic factors and selection bias.   
A more recent effort in this literature has shown that ‘onerous market entry regulations 
offer constraints on the growth of official private education markets’ and lead 
entrepreneurs outside of the state-sanctioned education system (e.g., Baum, Cooper, 
and Lusk-Stover 2018, p. 100). There is a link here to the problem of regulatory 
complexity previously highlighted in this thesis. The implication for not solving 
regulatory complexity is not only will it act as a constraint on public sector innovation 
but it may have the effect of diverting resources and talent away from the public 
sector. The low-cost for-profit private schools in developing countries – unregistered 
or unrecognized – are not an institutional possibility of public service delivery as they 
are operating outside of the scope of “regulation inside of government” (Hood et al. 
1999). Instead, parents and entrepreneurial teachers and school proprietors are 
deliberately seceding from public sector services.  
The low-cost private school research speaks to a systemic failure of the public sector 
in these countries (often aided by foreign governments and non-government 
organizations) to provide the levels of service demanded by its citizens (Dixon 2012). 
The research also provides evidence that the regulation of schools may be different 
‘on paper’ compared to ‘in practice’ – as school operators can pay bribes to public 
officials in lieu of regulatory compliance (e.g., Dixon and Tooley 2005, p. 32). The 
implication of this is that the way to improve public sector services through greater 
innovation does not come in banning private endeavor or otherwise coercing 
unregistered or unrecognized schools to come within the orbit of public sector 
regulation and bureaucratic processes. Such moves would limit positive exchanges 
occurring in this setting and negatively distort the preference discovery process 
occurring in this setting (Dixon and Tooley 2005). Instead, Dixon and Tooley (2005) 
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propose a system of self-regulation – where regulatory processes are decentralized 
– to accommodate those seceding from public sector institutional possibilities. 
Further, those authors argue that the study of regulation is important because 
‘regulations have the capacity to stimulate or stifle the market for private education, 
as well as affect the quality of education provision’ (Dixon and Tooley 2005, p. 31).  
Secession of a different kind is occurring in developed countries. Through “home 
schooling” or “home education”, parents make a deliberate choice to educate their 
children in the home rather than in a school-based setting. This is a form of school 
choice often overlooked (Houston and Toma 2003). By exercising this freedom, 
parents are withdrawing from the reach of the public education system altogether. 
Expressed another way, Lubienski (2003b, p. 175) states that home education as a 
‘…form of governance is the essence of the incapacity of state-funded education 
systems to educate their children.’ A review of the home education literature by 
Jackson (2017, p. 334) notes that parents’ reasons for exercising this choice included 
the failure of schools to cater to the individual needs of students ‘values expected by 
parents not upheld by conventional schools’. Of course, the imposition of values has 
been a clear dictatorship cost of government intervention in education for time 
immemorial (e.g., Mill 1859; Friedman 1955; Hayek 1960; Chubb and Moe 1990). 
Although home education is not the provision of public services, governments do 
recognize it as a legitimate way of educating children. In Australia, all state and 
territory jurisdictions have legislative provisions contemplating secession from 
government or non-government schools (Lindsay 2003; Harding and Farrell 2003; 
Allan and Jackson 2010; Jackson 2017). These regulations require parents to register 
their students in order to comply with compulsory schooling laws (e.g., Allan and 
Jackson 2010; Jackson 2017). 
Recent Australian data suggests that the number of students registered for home 
education has increased substantially over the last decade – albeit from a low base. 
For example, in Victoria, the number of students registered in home education 
doubled over the last decade – from 1564 students from 859 households in 2008 to 
5333 students from 3214 households in 2018 (Victorian Registration and 
Qualifications Authority 2008; 2018). While the number of students equates to less 
than one percent of all Victorian system (Victorian Department of Education and 
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Training 2019), it evidences that increasing number of parents are seceding from 
institutional of public school education. An implication of the framework developed in 
this thesis is that an increase in the number of home education registrations suggests 
that parents seeking to coordinate education perceive the dictatorship costs 
associated with existing institutional possibilities as too high.  
This insight has interesting implications for political economy. In recent years, two 
Australian states have considered regulatory burdens for home education. In 2014, 
the Legislative Council of New South Wales formed a select committee to inquire into 
home schooling. Ultimately, the committee’s report recommended bolstering 
regulatory provisions (NSW 2014) but this was not supported by the government 
(NSW 2015). Regulatory change did occur in Victoria following a review of the 
Education and Training Reform Regulations 2007 (Vic).98 These actions suggest that 
the increase in home education numbers are not trivial. Applying the framework 
developed in this thesis, increasing regulatory constraints can be understood as 
government actors attempting to manipulate the perceived costs of disorder in favor 
of centralized government schools (Twight 1988; 1994). American research has 
shown that stricter regulatory constraints discourage home education registrations 
(Houston and Toma 2003). Although the utility of greater regulation of home education 
is questionable on a practical level; without strong enforcement as research suggests 
that many parents choose not to register their children in home education in any case 
(e.g., Townsend 2012; Gray and Riley 2013).  
The framework and findings developed in this thesis suggest that legislating 
alternative institutional possibilities may be more desirable than increasing regulatory 
requirements on home educators. That is, through decentralized institutional 
possibilities of voucher programs and charter schools, as examples, the state can 
have greater control over educational outcomes to limit perceived costs of disorder 
and at the same time provide greater freedom for schools to innovate and cater for 
individual preferences thereby limiting costs of dictatorship as compared to traditional 
government schools. Recent American research tends to confirm this theory, 
suggesting that there is a decline in the number of children in home education after 
                                                          
98 Note that the prompt for the review of these regulations was that it was scheduled to 
expire in 2017 due to a sunset clause.  
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the introduction of charter school laws (DeAngelis and Dills 2019). Whether recent 
action by New South Wales and Victoria stem the flow out of the formal education 
systems in Australia remains to be seen – but another question is what the impact is 
on public sector innovation. These questions could be a focus of future research 
efforts using the new comparative approach.  
7.4 Limitations    
This thesis has some important limitations that should be noted. First, this thesis has 
utilized public education services to examine the dynamics of public sector innovation. 
It has advanced a new comparative model to compare regulation of public sector 
services and the impact on the process of innovation in this context. It has not 
presented a comparative analysis of education outcomes. Whether or not increased 
dynamism in regulatory structures and innovative practices developed in the public 
school education context translates to improved education outcomes is a question 
that goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the Schumpeterian conception 
of innovation (Schumpeter 1934; 1942) cautions that innovation is a process of 
transformational change and the forms of innovation are not limited to new products 
and new methods – but also include new markets, new sources of supply, and new 
organizational forms that are valuable but may not have a direct bearing on the 
educational outcome.  
Second, this thesis has analyzed four separate institutional possibilities for public 
school education service delivery. In this respect it is noted that centralized 
government schools, Independent Public Schools, charter schools, and voucher 
programs do not represent an exhaustive list of institutional possibilities. The list of 
could be extended – and therefore this thesis should be seen as a significant and 
original contribution to the comparative examination of regulatory structures rather 
than the final word. For instance, in Australia, denominational and other private 
systems of education have been discussed but the modern legislative and regulatory 
provisions have not been a core focus of the legislative and regulatory analysis that 
has been presented. In America, “magnet schools” are a distinct institutional 
possibility where transportation is provided to students along with a ‘special focus, 
such as visual and performing arts, Montessori methods, gifted and talented, or math, 
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science, and technology’ that become a “magnet” for students, supporting efforts at 
racial integration (Rossell 2009, p. 380). Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the most 
common institutional possibilities are “community schools”, “foundation schools and 
voluntary schools”, “academies”, and “grammar schools” all of which have different 
governance arrangements (United Kingdom Government 2019). In New Zealand, as 
a final example, there are different combinations of institutional possibilities including 
“Kura kaupapa Māori” where teaching is based on the Māori language and culture, 
“partnership schools” that integrate business and community groups, and “State-
integrated schools” that are located on privately owned land and usually have a 
religious character (New Zealand Ministry of Education 2019).  Further research could 
gain new insights by applying the theory and methodology developed in this thesis to 
other institutional possibilities.  
In the presentation of the spectrum of institutional possibilities for service delivery it is 
noted that there is a level of abstraction involved in the presentation of the institutions 
of public sector education. There are different institutional differences in national and 
sub-national jurisdictions and other external factors that may impact the trade-off 
between the costs of dictatorship and the costs of disorder. Likewise, there will be 
different levels of “civic capital” that impacts position of the IPF curve between 
jurisdictions, over time, and other changes that are beyond control (Djankov et al. 
2003; Boettke et al. 2005). Of course, a level of abstraction is inherent in any 
comparative analysis.   
Third, this thesis has engaged with arguments in the literature that supports greater 
public sector expenditure for innovation and research and development (e.g., 
Mazzucato 2013; c.f., Potts 2015). However, this thesis does not make any explicit 
findings regarding the relationship between public expenditure and innovation. 
Indeed, the research agenda explored in this thesis contrasts with contemporary 
political debates in Australia that are preoccupied with the size of the public funding 
pool that is available, and the formula that is used to allocate it. In any case, it is noted 
that just as there are several institutional possibilities for public school education 
services, so too are there several institutional possibilities for public support of 
innovation (Davidson and Potts 2016a; 2016b).  
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Fourth, this thesis has not directly examined political entrepreneurship. The focus of 
this thesis was the regulatory structures governing service delivery, not the lawmaking 
process as such. However, it is observed that the case studies presented on the 
SOTF program (Chapter 4) and Queensland’s IPS program (Chapter 5) originated 
from the policy agenda of incoming governments following change in the party of 
executive government.99 As such, there are broader political economy questions to 
be explored in this regard. For example, future research in this area may question the 
extent to which changes in government foster new waves of public sector innovation 
– as the observation here suggests that evolutionary forces in the political 
environment interact with evolutionary structures embedded in public sector services. 
Fifth, this thesis has not directly considered the impact of new and emerging 
technologies in the provision of public sector services.100 This is an issue for public 
sector innovation as governments seek to engage in digital innovation using 
technology and data analytics (e.g., Mcloughlin et al. 2019). In separate work, 
authored with my colleagues at RMIT University, applying economic theory, it has 
been theorized that the introduction of new technology may economize the perception 
of both dictatorship and disorder costs, providing the space for new institutional 
possibilities to emerge (Allen et al. 2018; Allen, Lane, and Berg 2019; Allen, Lane, 
and Poblet 2018). There are many questions here that are beyond the scope of the 
research questions posed for this thesis. For example, what is the impact of artificial 
intelligence and machine learning on the provision of public sector services? What is 
the impact of blockchain technology for the public sector’s record-keeping, regulation, 
and compliance? And how might further advances in ICT change the delivery of public 
services, and does this require a re-think of regulatory frameworks? There are many 
fruitful questions along these lines for future research on technology and the 
governance of public sector services that could utilize a new comparative approach 
to public sector innovation.  
                                                          
99 In the case of Victoria, the Liberal Party and National Party Coalition formed government 
in 1992 following previous Australian Labor Party governments led by Premiers John Cain 
(1982-1990) and Joan Kirner (1990-1992). In the case of Queensland, the Liberal National 
Party formed government in 2012 following previous Australia Labor Party governments led 
by Premiers Peter Beattie (1998-2007) and Anna Bligh (2007-2012).     
100 A limited discussion can be found in Section 5.5.  
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7.5 Conclusion  
This thesis has developed a novel approach to address the problem of a lack of public 
sector innovation. In applying an economic framework, this thesis has analyzed the 
regulatory constraints on public sector innovation, providing insight to trade-offs that 
exist and offering a critical analysis of the regulation of service provision in the school 
education sector.  
The approach that has been developed sits in contrast to the current trend within the 
broader public sector innovation research field that has tended to focus on importing 
management or leadership practices from the private sector such as “open 
innovation”,  “collaborative innovation”, “innovation labs”, or “e-government” that are 
intended to solve the generally accepted problem of a lack of innovation in the public 
sector (e.g. Bommert 2010; Lee, Hwang, and Choi 2012; Mergel and Desouza 2013; 
Torfing 2016; 2019; McGann et al. 2018; De Vries, Bekkers, and Tummers 2016; 
2018a). Instead, this thesis develops and applies economic theory to address the 
deeper question of why there is a lack of innovation in the public sector and why the 
idea of public sector innovation seems oxymoronic (Bommert 2010; Torfing 2019; 
Vigoda-Gadot et al. 2005). This thesis found that public sector is not regulated in the 
same way as the private sector, and there are various institutional possibilities for 
delivering public services that have different regulatory characteristics. The thesis 
found that regulatory structures governing service delivery are where mechanisms of 
creation and destruction can be observed and then analyzed, concluding that the 
potential for public sector innovation will change if these regulatory constraints 
change. It is appropriate to make a final caveat: this thesis does not assume that the 
outcome of innovative changes implemented in the public sector context will always 
be beneficial. Instead, this thesis has sought to better understand the process of 
public sector innovation. The analysis that has been presented here is an attempt at 
exegesis and systematic comparative analysis rather than advocacy of any one 
particular institutional setting.  
Ultimately, this thesis is an effort in a wider research program on the economics of 
regulation. As Richard Posner (2014) explains, the “old” law and economics focussed 
exclusively on applying economic insights to antitrust or competition law, whereas the 
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“new” law and economics involved applying economic reasoning right across the legal 
system (see also: Trebilcock 1997). This thesis continues in the emerging third wave 
of scholarship in this broad tradition – a “new comparative” law and economics (e.g., 
Djankov et al. 2003; Djankov et al. 2003b; Glaeser and Shleifer 2003; Shleifer 2005; 
Płóciennik 2013; Davidson 2014; 2016; Berg 2016; 2018; Allen, Lane, and Poblet 
2019) – by adopting an evolutionary approach to understand innovation (e.g., 
Schumpter 1934; 1942; Bauer 1997; Witt 2003; Dopfer, Foster, and Potts 2004; 
Windrum and Garcia-Goni 2008; Potts 2009; 2010; Potts and Kastelle 2010; Kastelle, 
Potts, and Dodgson 2014; Kastelle and Stewart-Weeks 2015) as a critical lens for 
legislative and regulatory analysis (e.g., Gilbert and Sunshine 1995; Yandle 2002;  
Diamond 2014). Of course, this thesis is not intended to be the last word on the 
connection between regulation and innovation in public sector services. Overall, 
however, it can be concluded that legislative and regulatory frameworks are not 
neutral for public sector innovation – rather, it is the starting point for coherent 
economic analysis.  
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